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THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

PIKI ISH-SHALOM traces the process by which leading neoconservatives endorsed the structural theories of democratic peace, generating a grand strategy of forceful democracy promotion. He analyses the reasons for this endorsement and its impact on American foreign policy. He then goes on to explore some internal incoherencies in this neoconservative grand strategy.

JEFFREY M. CAVANAUGH analyzes the process of "threat inflation" in the United States by examining three positive cases and one negative case of threat inflation since 1945. He concludes that successful threat inflation and hawkish policies stem from the interaction of several factors.

RICHARD K. BETTS compares the causes of the two biggest U.S. intelligence failures of recent times. In one case, warning was insufficient; in the other, excessive. In one case, the obstacles to success were less carelessness in professionals' performance than inherent limitations in the warning function. In the other, error came from intelligence trying to be useful more than being strictly accurate.

CHRISTOPHER J. FETTWEIS examines the importance of "credibility" in the U.S. war on terrorism. He challenges the conventional wisdom that a healthy reputation for resolve keeps a country safer or helps it pursue its goals. He argues that the credibility of the United States—or lack thereof—will not prove to be decisive in the fight against extremism.

PEGGY LOPIPERO, DORIE E. APOLLONIO, and LISA A. BERO discuss the efforts of the tobacco industry to prevent the passage of airline smoking restrictions. They find that interest groups and lobbyists do not necessarily feel obligated to provide accurate information and that competing interest groups may not be able to prevent this misrepresentation.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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"The Civilization of Clashes": Misapplying the Democratic Peace in the Middle East

PIKI ISH-SHALOM

A specter is haunting American neoconservatism—the specter of promoting democracy.[1] It exorcises whatever prudence conservatism might otherwise espouse; it drives neoconservatives' grand strategy to experimentalism that otherwise they would condemn as "social engineering." The neoconservatives' role in shaping the Bush doctrine makes it important to understand this obsession with promoting democracy, and to analyze its viability. Prior scholarly explanations of the Bush doctrine and the strategic thinking of neoconservatism emphasized power seeking in light of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks and the attendant threats of global terrorism, rogue states, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD);[2] the philosophy of Leo Strauss;[3] visions of national exceptionalism and imperial aspirations;[4]

[1] The term in the title was used by Niall Ferguson to characterize the culture of the Middle East in *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 106.

[2] Jacques E.C. Hymans, "The Roots of the Washington Threat Consensus" in Betty Glad and Chris J. Dolan, eds., *Striking First: The Preventive War Doctrine and the Reshaping of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 33–45; Douglas Kellner, "Preemptive Strikes and the War on Iraq: A Critique of Bush Administration Unilateralism and Militarism," *New Political Science* 26 (September 2004): 417–440; Stephen Peter Rosen, "An Empire, if You Can Keep It," *The National Interest* 71 (Spring 2003): 51–61.

[3] Anne Norton, *Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004); Shaida B. Drury, *Leo Strauss and the American Right* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

[4] Michael Cox, "The Empire's Back in Town: Or America's Imperial Temptation—Again," *Millennium* 32 (February 2003): 1–27; G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (September/October 2002), 44–60; Niall Ferguson, "Hegemony or Empire?" *Foreign Affairs* 82 (September/October 2003), 154–161; Robert Jervis, "The Compulsive Empire," *Foreign Policy* 137 (July/August 2003): 83–87; Jack Snyder, "Imperial Temptations," *The National Interest* 71 (Spring 2003): 29–40.

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ideological and religious articles of faith;[5] and the drive to control the oil market.[6] The role played by certain international relations theories, however, was mostly left out of the picture.

This article will demonstrate the role of the structural theories of the democratic peace thesis in generating the neoconservative grand strategy.[7] These are theories that try to explain the absence (or near absence) of war between democracies by pointing to the structural attributes of democracies, such as checks and balances, division of powers, and periodic elections. I argue that those theories played—and still play—multiple and crucial roles in shaping and in marketing the neoconservative agenda of promoting democracy abroad. The democratic peace thesis helped neoconservatives overcome their post-Cold War identity crisis and the demise of their old archenemy, communism. The strategic program of promoting democracy revived neoconservatism and gave it new coherence and purpose.

A decade after the Cold War ended, the neoconservatives faced yet another identity crisis when confronted with the apparent incompatibility between two major conservative theoretical frameworks: the pessimism and relativism of Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* and the optimism and universalism of Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History*. The structural theories of democratic peace offered the neoconservatives a middle ground between the two, along with a political platform that is both cautiously optimistic and mildly relativist. The political platform consists of three major premises: first, expanding democracy will enlarge the zone of peace and overcome the threats of civilizational wars, global terrorism, and rogue states; second, democracy should be understood structurally rather than culturally and morally; and third, building the structures of democracy is also possible in civilizations whose cultures and moralities are incompatible with those of the democratic West.

Those three premises explain neoconservatives' preoccupation with promoting democracy abroad, particularly in the Middle East, and by force if necessary. In other words, endorsing the structural theories of democratic peace resolved some of the neoconservatives' major difficulties, and generated the grand strategy of forceful democracy promotion. Moreover, by insisting on the scientific validity of the claim that democracies do not fight each other, the

[5] Michael Boyle, "Utopianism and the Bush Foreign Policy," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17 (April 2004): 81–103; Michael J. Mazarr, "George W. Bush, Idealist," *International Affairs* 79 (May 2003): 503–522; Jonathan Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy," *International Security* 29 (Spring 2005): 112–156.

[6] Edward Nell and Willi Semmler, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace in Iraq," *Constellations* 10 (September 2003): 425–436; Stephen Pelletiere, *America's Oil Wars* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Research Unit for Political Economy, "Behind the War on Iraq," *Monthly Review* 55 (May 2003): 20–49; Research Unit for Political Economy, *Behind the Invasion of Iraq* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2003).

[7] See also Piki Ish-Shalom, "Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: The Democratic Peace and the Politics of Democratization," *European Journal of International Relations* 12 (December 2006): 565–598.

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neoconservatives successfully marketed their agenda to the American public and to the administration of George W. Bush, proclaiming the proved strategic merits of exporting democracy. These thus constitute one of the sources of influence for the Bush doctrine and its preoccupation with democracy promotion.

A word of caution is in order. As will become clear below, not all neoconservatives endorsed the structural theories of the democratic peace, nor do all of them advocate democracy promotion. However, some prominent neoconservative thinkers did endorse the theories and the policy of promoting democracy. Furthermore, this policy came to be identified with neoconservatism. For this reason and the sake of brevity, I will use the general form of "the neoconservatives" throughout the article, rather than the more accurate but cumbersome terminology "some prominent neoconservative thinkers."

The article has four sections. The first outlines the major reasons for the neoconservatives' endorsement of the structural theories of democratic peace. The second explores the democratic peace thesis and its various theories to explain why the neoconservatives choose the structural theories rather than the normative ones. The third section demonstrates the strategic outcomes of adopting those theories, maintaining that it turned neoconservatism into what I metaphorically term the "civilization of clashes," an ideology of endless military crusades to spread democracy. The last section offers both a critique of the neoconservative grand strategy, pointing to two acute internal incoherencies, and an outline of an alternative theory of world affairs and democratization.

The Reasons for Endorsing the Structural Theories of Democratic Peace

Five factors contributed to the neoconservatives' adoption of the structural theories of democratic peace:

- The end of the Cold War;
- Neoconservatives' affiliation with Israeli politicians such as Benjamin Netanyahu and Natan Sharansky, who, in the latter half of the 1990s, made use of the democratic peace thesis in attempting to delegitimize the Oslo Accords;
- The long-standing neoconservative agenda of toppling Saddam Hussein;
- The terror attacks of 11 September 2001;
- The intellectual perplexity resulting from the conflicting theoretical frameworks of two major conservative works: Fukuyama's *The End of History* and Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*.[8]

[8] The two sets of writings started their life as articles and three years later were published as books: Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History? *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992); Samuel P.

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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, American foreign policy, following what was seen as its greatest success with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, underwent a phase of bafflement. The loss of the archrival brought the collapse of the purpose and coherence of a well-institutionalized foreign policy. What was bafflement for some verged on existential crisis for others, primarily the neoconservatives, for whom the main—almost sole—raison d'être was fierce anticommunism.

This crisis manifested itself in various ways. In 1989–1990, one of the flagship neoconservative journals, *The National Interest*, published a series of articles, mostly by conservatives and neoconservatives, on America's purpose after the Cold War. Irving Kristol, one of the godfathers of neoconservatism, wrote:

> It is very difficult for a great power—a world power—to articulate a foreign policy in the absence of an enemy worthy of the name. It is, after all, one's enemies that help define one's "national interest," in whatever form that definition might take. Without such enemies, one flounders amidst a plentitude of rather trivial, or at least marginal, options. That, it seems to me, is the condition of the United States today, as we enter the post-Cold War era.[9]

In their search for a new rationale, some prominent neoconservative thinkers such as Joshua Muravchik and Carl Gershman, and later also Charles Krauthammer, William Kristol, and others, adopted the relatively new theories of democratic peace, calling for a revived Wilsonian commitment to democracy promotion. As Muravchik wrote in his 1991 book *Exporting Democracy*: "The more democratic the world, the more peaceful it is likely to be. *Various researchers have shown that war between democracies has almost never occurred in the modern world.*"[10] These thinkers claimed that the democratic peace thesis showed that there is no real gap between morality and interest in foreign policy, that it was high time to stop supporting local dictators in the name of stability, and that promoting democracy would broaden the zone of peace. Moreover, as Michael Williams points out, it was also the neoconservative vision of American exceptionalism that provided

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Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993): 22–49; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

[9] Irving Kristol, "Defining Our National Interest," *The National Interest* 21 (Fall 1990): 16–25. Even though Kristol opposes democratization policies, his bafflement is typical.

[10] Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny* (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1991), 8 (emphasis added). See also Carl Gershman, "Freedom Remains the Touchstone," *The National Interest* 19 (Spring 1990): 83–86. On the endorsing of the new agenda of democracy promotion, see also John Ehrman, *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945–1994* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 184; Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 76.

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the reasoning for the idea of promoting democracy.[11] By drawing the connection of the American present to the past, and especially to the founding era of the American republic, the neoconservatives were able to lend some continuity and coherence during the time of the identity crisis that succeeded the Cold War.

It is worth stressing, however, that neoconservatism is not a monolithic creed. Furthermore, not all neoconservatives endorsed the democratic peace thesis. As Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke rightly argue, with the end of the Cold War—and especially during the second half of the 1990s—an ideological gap, based mainly on generational lines, divided the neoconservatives.[12] The older cohorts of the neoconservatives, most notably Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer, aligned themselves with the realist cause, thus abandoning the Cold War rhetoric of anti-totalitarianism and pro-democratization. The younger cohorts, including Muravchik, Gershman, Krauthammer, and Kristol, aligned themselves with the interventionist cause of promoting democracy as a way to stabilize regions plagued by authoritarianism and war, although, as the example of Norman Podhoretz demonstrates, this ideological divide is not purely generational. While belonging to the older cohorts, Podhoretz did endorse, as we will see below, the democratic peace thesis. Many of the young cohorts even opted for a short-lived cooperation with Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential campaign, as they judged President George H.W. Bush to be a pragmatist and realist in foreign affairs. As can be learned from Muravchik's public endorsement of Clinton, it was the issue of promoting democracy abroad that became the point of convergence between Clinton and the neoconservatives.[13] Soon thereafter, however, the same issue drove them apart; the neoconservatives blamed Clinton for being a pragmatist and realist and for failing to commit the United States to promoting democracy.[14]

Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, two prominent Israeli rightist politicians mobilized the democratic peace thesis to delegitimize the agreements.

[11] Michael C. Williams, "What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory," *European Journal of International Relations* 26 (September 2005): 307–337.

[12] Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*, 98–103.

[13] Joshua Muravchik, "Conservatives for Clinton," *The New Republic*, 2 November 1992, 22.

[14] Joshua Muravchik, "Lament of a Clinton Supporter," *Commentary* 96 (August 1993): 15–22. The neoconservative commitment to the agenda of democracy promotion was reaffirmed again in 1997 with the establishment of The Project for a New American Century. This neoconservative think tank, chaired by William Kristol, declared in its statement of principles the "need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad." See "Statement of Principles," 3 June 1997, accessed at http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm, 7 March 2006. The think tank kept calling for democracy promotion, and, furthermore, linked this cause to the democratic peace. Its September 2000 report, "Rebuilding America's Defenses," called for "secure[ing] and expand[ing] the 'zones of democratic peace'" (p. 2). See "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century," September 2000, accessed at http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf, 7 March 2006.

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Netanyahu, who was soon to become prime minister, and Sharansky—the famous Soviet dissident and prisoner of the Gulag, associate of Andre Sakharov, recipient of the Congressional Gold Medal, and future cabinet minister—criticized Oslo on the grounds that peace with the Palestinians would be impossible until they had democratized. Netanyahu attributed his argument to Immanuel Kant,[15] and Sharansky credited Sakharov with the origins of his thinking.[16] Both of them, however, also relied on the democratic peace thesis.[17]

The neoconservatives lauded Netanyahu and Sharansky's position.[18] This led to a revival of their interest in the democratic peace thesis and particularly its application to the Middle East, specifically, the Palestinian Authority. The result was a neoconservative demand, adopted by President Bush in his roadmap announcement of 24 June 2002, that the Palestinians democratize prior to any Israeli concessions.

Toppling Saddam Hussein had long been on the neoconservative agenda, at least since the first Gulf War and—as they saw it—its untimely ending.[19]

[15] Benjamin Netanyahu, *A Place among the Nations: Israel and the World* (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), 243; Benjamin Netanyahu, "Fighting Terrorism" (presented at the eighteenth annual John M. Ashbrook memorial dinner, Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, Ashland University, Ashland, Ohio, 3 May 2002), accessed at http://www.ashbrook.org/events/memdin/netanyahu/home_speech.html, 21 November 2005.

[16] See, for example, Natan Sharansky, "Only Democracy Brings Peace," *Wall Street Journal*, 30 October 2000; Natan Sharansky with Ron Dermer, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), xix, 3.

[17] See, especially, Netanyahu's address as Prime Minister to the joint session of Congress on 10 July 1996, in which he declared: "I am not revealing a secret to the Members of this Chamber when I say that modern democracies do not initiate aggression. This has been the central lesson of the 20th century. States that respect the human rights of their citizens are not likely to provoke hostile action against their neighbors." "Address by His Excellency, Binyamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel," 10 July 1996, accessed at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=H7161&dbname=1996_record, 9 March 2006.

[18] See, for example, Charles Krauthammer, "Peace through Democracy," *The Washington Post*, 28 June 2002; Ira Stoll, "Israel's Reagan? Natan Sharansky Understands that Liberty Is the Only Guarantee of Peace," *The Wall Street Journal*, 13 December 2002. The praises for Sharansky increased following his 2004 book, *The Case for Democracy*, which had a significant impact on President Bush. See Arch Puddington, "Liberty for All," *Commentary* 118 (November 2004): 72–75; Meirav Wurmser, "Democracy Defended: Natan Sharansky Explains Why Democracy Makes the World Safer," *The Weekly Standard*, 6 December 2004, 28–29.

[19] For example: "The United States, which had mustered the world's most awesome military force to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, failed to see that mission through to its proper conclusion: the removal of Saddam from power in Baghdad." William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility" in Robert Kagan and William Kristol, eds., *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 6. It should be noted that the neoconservative views were not monolithic; Irving Kristol, for example, was a fierce opponent of continuing the war. See Irving Kristol, "Tongue-Tied in Washington," *The Wall Street Journal*, 15 April 1991.

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Initially, though, their demand for regime change in Iraq meant changing the leader and not necessarily the regime itself. But when the prospects for another war in Iraq increased in the early 2000s, the neoconservatives called for a regime change that went beyond personal cosmetics: they now championed the democratization of Iraq. For example, Gary Schmitt, executive director of the neoconservative think tank Project for the New American Century, declared: "A decade ago, the first Bush administration decided that leaving Saddam Hussein in power was acceptable. Now, a new Bush administration insists not only that Saddam's regime must go, but that, in its place, a decent, tolerant and representative government need arise."[20]

The neoconservatives adopted Netanyahu and Sharansky's creed: democracy was the antidote to terror. This notion does not stem directly from the democratic peace thesis,[21] but, rather, is an extension and, to some degree, a distortion of it, propelled by ideological reading and political needs. Looking for persuasive arguments to overthrow Saddam, the neoconservatives used the extended democratic peace thesis to proclaim that occupying and democratizing Iraq was vital for stabilizing the Middle East and defeating global terrorism. After the Iraq occupation was accomplished and other arguments for it, especially pertaining to WMD, were discredited, they only redoubled their use of the democratic reasoning.[22] Put differently, once WMD were not found in Iraq, a supplementary political value was added to the democratic peace thesis, namely that of post-facto rationalization and legitimization.

The effects of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on U.S. soil resembled, to some extent, those of the end of the Cold War: both were viewed as a sea change that necessitated new paradigms of strategic thinking. As Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol argued, "We thought it [the Cold War] would always be with us. And when we found during the 1990s that it no longer was, we took a holiday from history, presuming that we could rely on commerce and globalization to achieve peace and stability. But the complacent assumptions of the post-Cold War era were destroyed on September 11. That day brought

[20] Gary Schmitt, "A Case for Continuity," *The National Interest* 69 (Fall 2002): 11–13.

[21] For Sharansky's linkage between democratization and the end of terror, see Natan Sharansky, "Democracy for Peace," 20 June 2002, accessed at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.15187,filter.all/pub_detail.asp, 3 May 2006. For Netanyahu's linkage, see Benjamin Netanyahu, "The Root Cause of Terrorism Is Tyranny," *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 April 2002. For the neoconservatives' linkage, see Gerecht's remark: "The spread of democracy in the Muslim Middle East remains the only cure for the sacred terror of 9/11." Reuel Marc Gerecht, "Going Soft on Iraq," *The Weekly Standard*, 8 March 2004, 26–29. See also Joshua Muravchik, "Freedom and the Arab World," *The Weekly Standard*, 31 December 2001/7 January 2002, 15–16; Fred Barnes, "A Real Peace Process," *The Weekly Standard*, 5 May 2003, 9; Amir Taheri, "After the Arab League," *The Weekly Standard*, 3 May 2004, 20–22.

[22] See, for example, columns by Krauthammer: Charles Krauthammer, "Hoaxes, Hype and Humiliation," *The Washington Post*, 13 June 2003; Charles Krauthammer, "Iraq: A Moral Reckoning," *The Washington Post*, 16 May 2003.

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us to a new era, for which we need a new roadmap."[23] Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA specialist and prolific neoconservative writer, clarified the essence of this roadmap: "the spread of democracy in the Muslim Middle East remains the only cure for the sacred terror of 9/11."[24]

The search for a new paradigm of international politics was prompted by yet another source of perplexity: a debate among conservative intellectuals. Two famous works symbolize the end points of the conservative spectrum concerning international relations. At one point is the universalism and optimism of Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man*; at the other, the relativism and pessimism of Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Whereas Fukuyama claims the victory of Western/U.S. capitalism and liberal democracy, Huntington foresees the decline of the West/United States, and the rise of China with its civilization. And whereas Fukuyama believes in universal truth and morality, Huntington maintains that the various civilizations' systems of truth and morality are incompatible.

These two works represent not only the end points of conservative thinking but also the beginning and end of an era. Fukuyama's book (and the article that preceded it) stemmed from the end of the Cold War and the resultant sense of euphoria. Huntington's book (and preceding article), while published before 11 September 2001, reflected the awakening from this euphoria. According to Huntington, Fukuyama was not only optimistic to argue that perfection was *near*;[25] what was happening instead was a deterioration in international relations. It was not the Kantian eternal peace that was imminent, but a reversion to a Hobbesian state of affairs, this time even worse because it would involve the most fundamental human attachments, those of identities and civilizations, so that the wars would be even harsher than before. Indeed, the happy 1990s ended even before they really began, when the Balkans erupted in yet another round of their eternal conflicts.[26]

It was hard to reconcile these two modes of thought. It was even harder to come up with a strategy to counter the pessimism and sense of determinism (although there is also a sense of determinism in Fukuyama's works) of *The Clash of Civilizations*. The price of not finding such reconciliation, however, might have been too high in terms of the neoconservative self-identity and internal cohesiveness. Huntington and Fukuyama are both major thinkers of the

[23] Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, *The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission* (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2003), vii. See also William Kristol, "The 9/11 Election: Editorial," *The Weekly Standard*, 1 November/8 November 2004, 9.

[24] Gerecht, "Going Soft," 27. See also Reuel Marc Gerecht, "Not a Diversion," *The Weekly Standard*, 12 April/19 April 2004, 23–27.

[25] Huntington was one of the early critics of Fukuyama; see Samuel Huntington, "No Exit—The Errors of Endism," *The National Interest* 17 (Fall 1989): 3–11.

[26] Josef Joffe made this point in *Commentary* in criticizing Fukuyama's position; see Josef Joffe, "Bosnia: The Return of History," *Commentary* 94 (October 1992): 24–29.

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American right, and their arguments found much resonance. Indeed, both books made the *New York Times* bestseller list, a rarity for academic works.

Moreover, each of their theses fits well with certain conservative and neoconservative premises. Fukuyama's position is palatable to the conservative belief in a teleological history that actualizes a historical scheme devised by some higher rationality. It also reinforces the belief in the supremacy of the free market. Huntington's thesis jibes with the conservative conviction that individuals are circumscribed by their communities and that those communities evolve historically and gradually—that is, as civilizations; and it resonates with Edmund Burke's philosophy of historical rights and, even more so, with the Fichteian conflictual version of Johann Gottfried von Herder's historiography. Huntington's thesis is also amenable to the neoconservative view of international politics as a Manichean battle between the democratic world and the world of terror. Hence, neoconservatives are torn between these two thinkers and their conflicting theses.

As evident in many of their writings, the neoconservatives indeed accept Huntington's arguments. They deem the values and norms of the various civilizations incompatible with their own, including their democratic norms. This is especially true with regard to the Islamic or Arabic civilization. William Kristol, for example, gives a Straussian reading of President Bush. He quotes Bush: "'Anyone in the world, including the Arab world, who works and sacrifices for freedom has a loyal friend in the United States,'" and then adds: "Why 'including the Arab world'? Because that world—or better, perhaps, the Middle East or the Islamic world—is the heart of the problem."[27] Kristol asserts that this is the true meaning of Bush's declaration, despite Bush's need to conceal it for political reasons. Thus, through a Straussian methodology, Kristol seeks to rescue Bush's true, esoteric meaning—to which Kristol himself subscribes—of the cultural and normative incompatibility between the West and the Islamic world.

Cultural incompatibility is also a theme in Muravchik's writings. As he asserted in *Commentary*: "[the Middle East] region [is] characterized by paranoia, apocalypticism, tyranny, and violence, a region where differences are settled by the sword."[28] This cultural clash is a common motif in neoconservative writings.[29]

[27] William Kristol, "The End of the Beginning," *The Weekly Standard*, 12 May 2003, 9. In a similar spirit, Stanley Kurtz asserted: "Islamic society may still adapt itself to democracy and capitalism. Yet at this point, to ignore the incompatibility between Islam and modernity is willful blindness." See Stanley Kurtz, "The Terror of Islam," *The Weekly Standard*, 27 May 2002, 37–38.

[28] Joshua Muravchik, "The Bush Manifesto," *Commentary* 114 (December 2002): 29. See also Joshua Muravchik, "Hearts, Minds, and the War against Terror," *Commentary* 113 (May 2002): 25–30; Joshua Muravchik, "The Richard Clarke Show," *Commentary* 117 (May 2004): 32–41.

[29] Norman Podhoretz, "How to Win World War IV," *Commentary* 113 (February 2002): 19–29; Ephraim Karsh, "Making Iraq Safe for Democracy," *Commentary* 115 (April 2003): 22–28; Kurtz, "Terror of Islam," 38.

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But while accepting this aspect of Huntington, neoconservatives refused to surrender to his pessimism and vision of the "decline of the West/United States."[30] They kept heeding Fukuyama's optimism about the expected—if not determined—victory of the West led by America. This emerged most clearly when neoconservatives compared the two works. For example, in his 1997 *Commentary* review of Huntington's book, Richard Pipes claims it was written in response to Fukuyama's argument.[31] He then asserts that whereas Huntington is right in stressing the role of civilizations in world politics,[32] his pessimism is misplaced because the West is not declining.[33] Pipes's concluding remarks are especially enlightening: "I suspect that the truth lies somewhere between Fukuyama and Huntington: the two books complement each other. Fukuyama seems to be correct in predicting the ultimate triumph of westernization, but he is oblivious of the immense difficulties which the west will have to overcome—difficulties which Huntington spells out in a very persuasive manner."[34]

Five and a half years later, in September 2002, Pipes's more theoretical perspective took a political and strategic turn in an article by former *Commentary* editor Podhoretz. Podhoretz praises the strategic shift that President Bush underwent following 11 September 2001, defining it as a shift from realism to idealism—namely, Bush's new endorsement of democracy promotion. Analyzing the series of addresses in which Bush reacted to the terror attacks and presented a new U.S. strategy, Podhoretz writes:

> Then, in a fascinating leap into the great theoretical debate of the post-cold-war era (though without identifying the main participants), Bush came down squarely on the side of Francis Fukuyama against Samuel Huntington.... Having endorsed Fukuyama's much-misunderstood view of "the end of history," Bush now brushed off Huntington's rival theory of a "clash of civilizations."... All this was fully consistent with the two previous speeches Bush had made on September 20 and January 29. But—a very big but—it was not consistent with the realities on the ground in the Middle East. In the Islamic world, and particularly the Arab countries (including such of our "friends" as Saudi Arabia and Egypt), mothers and fathers were *celebrating* Palestinian children (including their own) who blew themselves up as a way of killing as many Israeli Jews as possible.[35]

[30] This is also evident in the February 24, 1997, special issue of the *The Weekly Standard* devoted to the rising power of China. The issue immediately followed a harsh review article on Huntington's determinism and pessimism that embodied the neoconservatives' disagreements with him; see Robert Kagan, "Harvard Hates America," *The Weekly Standard*, 9 December 1996, 24–27.

[31] Richard Pipes, "The West and the Rest," *Commentary* 103 (March 1997): 62–65.

[32] Ibid., 63–64.

[33] Ibid., 64.

[34] Ibid., 65.

[35] Norman Podhoretz, "In Praise of the Bush Doctrine," *Commentary* 114 (September 2002): 19–28 (emphasis in original).

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Podhoretz further argues that Bush understands that these tendencies stem from hatred of the freedoms practiced in the United States.[36] Here, using the same Straussian methods as Kristol, Podhoretz claims that despite maintaining publicly that there is no real clash of civilizations, Bush is well aware that it indeed exists, and his political constraints prevent him from saying what he really thinks. This interpretational maneuver puts Bush in a kind of middle ground between Fukuyama and Huntington—the same place where, as I claim, the neoconservatives now stand as they try to reconcile the two viewpoints.

The Democratic Peace Thesis

Yet, however necessary for self-identity and internal cohesiveness, the question remains: how it is possible to hold such a middle ground between conflicting viewpoints? One way to reconcile Huntington's relativism and pessimism with Fukuyama's universalism and optimism is via the democratic peace thesis, and more specifically, its structural theories. I will briefly describe the various democratic peace theories, including the structural ones, before explaining how these offer relief to the neoconservatives' perplexities.

During the 1970s and 1980s, international relations researchers identified an interesting empirical phenomenon: democracies never (or, in a qualified version, rarely) go to war with one another.[37] Although over the years many harsh criticisms were leveled at the validity of this claim,[38] it steadily gained supporters, and two major theories tried to explain it. The

[36] Ibid.

[37] A useful, although not updated, historical background can be found in Nils Petter Gleiditsch, "Democracy and Peace," *Journal of Peace Research* 29 (November 1992): 369–376. Milestones in the early development of the democratic peace thesis are: the neglected first article by the criminologist Dean V. Babst, "Elective Governments: A Force for Peace," *The Wisconsin Sociologist* 3 (January 1964): 9–14; his second and somewhat more widely circulated article, although in a popular journal, Dean V. Babst, "A Force for Peace," *Industrial Research* 14 (April 1972): 55–58; and the first major publications in the international relations discipline: Peter Wallenstein, *Structure and War: On International Relations 1820–1868* (Stockholm: Raben & Sjogern, 1973); Rudolph J. Rummel, *Understanding Conflict and War*, vol. 4, *War, Power, Peace* (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 1979); Rudolph J. Rummel, *Understanding Conflict and War*, vol. 5, *The Just Peace* (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 1981); Rudolph J. Rummel, "Libertianism and Interstate Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (March 1983): 27–71; Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer 1983): 205–235; Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part II," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Autumn 1983): 323–353; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986): 1151–1169; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986," *American Political Science Review* 87 (September 1993): 624–638.

[38] See, for example, Christopher Lane, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace" in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace: An International Security Reader* (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1996), 157–201; David E.

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first explained the democratic peace phenomenon by focusing on the structural dimensions of democracy, claiming that the division of power, checks and balances, and the leaders' accountability to the public cause the decision-making process to be complex and slow, allowing the decision makers of democratic states to reach peaceful resolutions of the conflicts between them. The second theory highlights the normative dimensions of democratic societies, claiming that the norms of tolerance and openness within these states transcend into the level of the relations between them. Consequently, there is more willingness to reach compromises, and conflicts are settled peacefully.[39]

Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace" in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, *Debating the Democratic Peace*, 202–238; Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace" in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, *Debating the Democratic Peace*, 239–262; Ido Oren, "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic Peace': Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany" in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, *Debating the Democratic Peace*, 263–300; Joanne Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Kurt T. Gaubatz, *Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 1–3, 16–20, 104–124, 138–140; Raymond Cohen, "Pacific Union: A Reappraisal of the Theory that 'Democracies Do Not Go to War with Each Other,'" *Review of International Studies* 20 (July 1994): 207–223; Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *American Political Science Review* 97 (November 2003): 585–602.

[39] The division of the democratic peace theories into two major theories (or paradigms) holds true even when we examine specific explanatory variables shared by theories within the two different paradigms. Let us examine, for example, the explanatory reasoning operating in the variable of the abilities of the public in a democracy to translate their preferences into policies, and in our case, into peaceful resolution of conflict between democracies. This translation process is interpreted by structural theoreticians as incentives facing the elites, or better, as checks on the menu of policies available to the ruling elites. Hence, we find structuralists arguing that the survival of political leaders with large winning coalitions (namely, democracies) is dependent on successful policies. This means that democratic leaders will make larger efforts than will non-democratic leaders and hence, more often than not, will win against non-democrats and will not fight against other democrats. It should be noted that in this explanation, the preferences of the public are being translated into leaders' incentives via structural considerations. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 93 (December 1999): 791–807. James Fearon, who conceptualizes the same elites' incentives by the term 'audience costs,' employs a similar structural logic. See James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88 (September 1994): 577–592. Alternatively, the normative explanation of the democratic peace operationalizes the same translation process by focusing on its normative foundation, that is, transparency and bounded nature. The important elements in democracy, with regard to the translation from preferences to policies, are both the bounded nature of competition involved in deciding what policies will be chosen and executed, as well as the transparency of the process; both are democratic norms. Furthermore, this transparency is not limited to the democratic polity itself but is freely communicated between democratic polities. The translation of the public preferences to policies therefore causes pacification among democracies and is based on the democratic norms of the bounded and transparent nature of the political conflict. See William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 88 (March 1994): 14–32.

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What is of interest here is the association of the structural democratic peace theories with the more conservative understanding of democracy that defines it in structural terms of checks and balances, rather than in cultural terms of democratic political culture; in procedural terms of elections, rather than normative terms of democratic values; as an elite project (that is, of the elected elite) of leading the people, rather than a polity run by its deliberating citizens. The minimal structural definition of democracy is embedded in a conservative skepticism about human faculties. In this view, it is not rationality that drives human action but a mix of perennial desires, instincts, and communal traditions. This mix is extrarational and compels humans to strive for power. Two major consequences follow. First, because every person seeks power, there is a perpetual danger of destabilization of social and political organizations. Second, there is the opposite, constant danger of a dictatorial concentration of power in the hands of those individuals who succeed in gaining it. The conservative solution for these two dangers is a minimal, structural democracy. On the one hand, by regular elections, democracy guarantees that no power lasts forever, and no dictatorial concentration of power is available. On the other hand, by confining political participation to elections, democracy precludes political and social destabilization.

Related, more-practical questions arise concerning democratization, such as what qualifies as democratization and what sort of democratization is effective? The alternative paradigms of democracy, namely, structural versus normative, not only exist in the abstract; each of them can also lead to a discrete policy. Once one accepts that democracies do not fight each other, the policy implication should be to support democratization abroad. Allegedly, each state that becomes a democracy is no longer a security threat to other democracies. To enlarge the number of democracies is to enlarge the zone of peace.[40]

But how can other countries and societies be democratized? Broadly speaking, democratization policies can be divided into two types that derive directly from the definitions of democracy. If democracy means a structure of elections, division of powers, and checks and balances, democratization will mean *building this structure*; that is, emphasizing the formal, the procedural, and the structural. It will also mean investing efforts in the state apparatus, in the "old" or institutional politics. If, however, democracy means a culture and morality of the sort that create a civic community, democratization will mean *constructing this community*. It will mean the socialization and dissemination of democratic values so as to foster a democratic society and culture, mainly by facilitating domestic agents of political and social transformation in the target

[40] Yet, as Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argue, democratization is not necessarily the surest way to achieve stabilty and peace. If democratization is pursued in the absence of proper political institutions, it might lead to both domestic and international violence. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

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country. It will mean investing efforts on the social and individual levels, trying to construct a civil society of informed, involved, and participating citizens.

Understood thus, the structural theories of democratic peace and their ensuing policies of structural democracy promotion might seem neatly compatible with the conservative concept of democracy. If so, these theories can be well accommodated in the neoconservative understanding of world politics. Thus, they could be the remedy to the intellectual perplexity by offering a way to reconcile relativism and universalism, optimism and Huntington's warnings of decline. The democratic peace thesis implies that democratization, if somehow possible, can save us from the dangers of war, including civilizational war. As Krauthammer asserts, "To extend the peace by spreading democracy and free institutions ... is an unassailable goal and probably the most enduring method of promoting peace.... The zone of democracy is almost invariably a zone of peace."[41] And if democratization is *structural* rather than *normative*, then these enlarged zones can even encompass other civilizations.

Strategic Outputs and Policy Outcomes

The neoconservatives, endorsing democratic peace, preached democracy promotion for the sake of security. This was true of Krauthammer's "democratic realism,"[42] and also of the more global version favored by Kristol, who argued, along with Lawrence Kaplan, that "the strategic value of democracy is reflected in a truth of international politics: Democracies rarely, if ever, wage war against one another."[43]

Thus, neoconservatives view democratization as a tool to enhance U.S. security, but consider *structural* democratization the only viable option.[44] They assume that structural democratization can be grafted onto any civilization, any

[41] Charles Krauthammer, "The Bush Doctrine: ABM, Kyoto, and the New American Unilateralism," *The Weekly Standard*, 4 June 2001, 21.

[42] Charles Krauthammer, "In Defense of Democratic Realism," *The National Interest* 77 (Fall 2004): 15–25.

[43] Kaplan and Kristol, *War over Iraq*, 104. See also Puddington, "Liberty for All," 74; Adam Wolfson, "The Two Faces of Liberalism," *The Weekly Standard*, 18 October 2004, 20–22; Clifford Kupchan, "Real Democratik," *The National Interest* 77 (Fall 2004): 26–37; Max Boot, "What Next? The Bush Foreign Policy Agenda beyond Iraq," *The Weekly Standard*, 5 May 2003, 27–33; Charles Lane, "The Democracy Wave: Has It Crested?" *The Weekly Standard*, 17 January 2000, 29; Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Leftism on the Right," *The Weekly Standard*, 9 February 1998, 29; Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Dictatorship and No Standards," *The Weekly Standard*, 8 February 1999, 27–29; Todd Lindberg, "The Referendum on Neoconservatism," *The Weekly Standard*, 1 November/8 November 2004, 16–18; William E. Odom, "NATO's Expansion: Why the Critics Are Wrong," *The National Interest* 39 (Spring 1995): 38–49.

[44] Again, Krauthammer is a case in point: "until this administration conceived a radical war plan, executed it brilliantly, liberated the country and created from scratch the *structures* of democracy." Charles Krauthammer, "The Afghan Miracle: Why Isn't This Stunning U.S. Success Appreciated?" *The Washington Post*, 10 December 2004 (emphasis added).

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set of norms and values. This is based on the belief that democracy embodies the only truly universal human aspiration—for freedom; and that freedom can be guaranteed only in the structure of democracy, which limits state involvement in people's lives.[45] Both conservatives and neoconservatives assume that this universal aspiration for freedom is the sole normative foundation of democracy, and that the other foundations are structural: separation of powers, checks and balances, and periodic elections. And this structure can be transplanted to any civilization without affecting or damaging its cultural foundation.[46]

As noted earlier, this structural definition of democracy jibes well with the neoconservative view of human nature and politics, a view grounded in the traditional pessimism of conservatism. It also dictates adopting structural rather than normative theories of democratic peace. Thus, the neoconservatives can reconcile pessimism and optimism, relativism and universalism, with a cautious optimism and mild relativism, while also arming themselves against the despair of a deterministic process that supposedly dooms the United States to decline.

A further point, however, is the aggressiveness of the implied policies. Up to now, we have dealt with democratization as a goal, related to security concerns. But endorsing the structural theories of democratic peace also affects the means of achieving democratization; it entails using the military. If democratizing other countries is a vital U.S. interest, drawing them into the zone of peace, then this interest has to be attained even against severe resistance.

If, however, democratization is conceived of as a lengthy, intrasocietal process of learning and socialization, norm dissemination and consolidation—as it is understood by the normative paradigm of democracy and the normative theories of democratic peace—then imposing democratization from the outside is illegitimate and futile. For the neoconservatives, their conservative understanding of democracy as mainly a structure and an elite-driven set of responsible political behaviors, along with their acceptance of Huntington's civilizational relativism, affects their view of democratization; they see it as viable only in its elitist, institutional, and structural dimensions. They see it, in other words, as regime change, reforming the existing structure into one in which periodic elections take place and there is a type of checks and balances. And that structure can be built according to general guidelines that are applied from above and outside.

Hence, it is reasonable to expect the success of democratization at bayonet point.[47] It should not even take much effort. After all, the occupation unleashes the

[45] Charles Krauthammer, "Free to Dance in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 4 February 2005. See also Paula Dobriansky, "Advancing Democracy," *The National Interest* 77 (Fall 2004): 71–78.

[46] Dobriansky, "Advancing Democracy"; see also Peter Wehner, "The Wrong Time to Lose Our Nerve," *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 April 2006.

[47] See Boot, "What Next?" 29–30; Tom Donnelly and William Kristol, "More Caissons Rolling Along," *The Weekly Standard*, 9 February 2004, 7–8.

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universal aspiration to freedom, as the occupied people seize the opportunity to lock up their former oppressors and realize their yearnings. They will cooperate with the occupation in building the structure of democracy, and the occupying army will create the conditions for these reforms. This army may delegate more responsibility to local elites, or import an elite from the outside (such futile efforts are epitomized by the tragicomic experience of Ahmed Chalaby). Thus, the occupying army can graft democratic structure onto a nation that while readily welcoming it (or doing so with the help of a tamed elite), maintains what cannot be changed: its civilizational identity, norms, and culture.

Many neoconservatives were well positioned inside the Bush administration and as public intellectuals to market their agenda in the wake of the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. The self-proclaimed neorealist President Bush reemerged after the attacks as an idealist president with a new understanding of America's security problems, seeking a new strategy to fit it. The neoconservatives used the democratic peace thesis to convince him, along with the American public, that democratization is the key to security. They kept emphasizing the academic verification of the thesis, rhetorically invoking scientific objectivity in pressing their ideological agenda.[48]

To be sure, good marketing and a neoconservative persuasion were not the sole reasons for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Neither were these the only source of influence on President Bush and the formation of his doctrine, as is evident from his many speeches on these topics. In these speeches, we can identify themes that derive directly from the neoconservative persuasion, such as the unity of values and interests, the global appeal of freedom, and, not least, the power of freedom and democracy to bring peace. As he declared on 16 November 2005 in Kyoto, "Free Nations are peaceful nations, free nations do not threaten their neighbors, and free nations offer their citizens a hopeful vision for the future. By advancing the cause of liberty throughout this [Asia-Pacific] region, we will contribute to the prosperity of all—and deliver the peace and stability that can only come with freedom."[49] At the same time, some beliefs and views reflected in Bush's speeches transcend the neoconservative convictions, framing democracy in broader terms than the purely structural and elitist conceptualization. Bush discusses, for example, such themes as broad political participation, democratic reform from within, respect for rights and for minority rights, and the culture of reconciliation.[50]

[48] Kaplan and Kristol, *War over Iraq*, 104; Puddington "Liberty for All," 74; Wolfson, "The Two Faces of Liberalism," 20–22; Kupchan, "Real Democratik," 35; Boot, "What Next," 27; Lane, "The Democracy Wave," 29; Kaplan, "Leftism on the Right," 29; Kaplan, "Dictatorship and No Standards," 27–29; Lindberg, "Referendum on Neoconservatism," 16–18; Odom, "NATO's Expansion," 43.

[49] "President Discusses Freedom and Democracy in Kyoto, Japan," 16 November 2005, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051116-6.html, 6 March 2006.

[50] See, for example, "Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy," 1 June 2002, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/

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However, the democratic peace thesis, with its objective reputation (as advocated by neoconservatives), together with President Bush's self-proclaimed democratic commitment and a sense of confusion, rage, and urgency, combined to help democracy promotion become the backbone of the new Bush doctrine. Democracy promotion became the new creed, especially in the Middle East, as evident not only in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars but also in the roadmap, with its insistence on structural democratic reforms in the Palestinian Authority; in the Greater Middle East and North Africa project of building a democratic alliance; and in the U.S. National Security Strategy promulgated on 17 September 2002, which institutionalized democracy promotion as the main strategy in fighting global terrorism, aiming "to create a balance of power that favors human freedom."[51] No wonder William Kristol could boast, along with Tom Donnelly, in a *Weekly Standard* editorial, that "U.S. forces will be active and present in the region, in the service of furthering a decent alternative to the violent, corrupt, and anti-American status quo. Afghanistan and Iraq are the beginning, not the end, of what National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice described as a 'generational commitment.'"[52]

In sum, we have seen how the neoconservatives' attempts to reconcile Fukuyama's *The End of History* and Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* brought them to endorse the structural theories of democratic peace, and how their reading of these theories was conducive to ushering in a new grand strategy of forceful democratization. This has turned neoconservatism into what I metaphorically term the "civilization of clashes." A good marketing strategy succeeded, and their creed is now reflected in the Bush doctrine, and in an endless military crusade designed as a democratizing project.

Critique

Many criticisms can be raised against the Bush administration's current creed of democratization. The policies could be labeled as imperialistic, as

20020601-3.html, 6 March 2006; "Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy," 6 November 2003, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html, 6 March 2006; "Remarks by the President on Winston Churchill and the War on Terror," 4 February 2004, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040204-4.html, 6 March 2006; "Inauguration 2005," 20 January 2005, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html, 6 March 2006; "State of the Union Address," 2 February 2005, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.html, 6 March 2006; "President Discusses War on Terror and Upcoming Iraqi Elections," 12 December 2005, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051212-4.html, 6 March 2006; and "State of the Union Address," 31 January 2006, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html, 6 March 2006.

[51] White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," 17 September 2002, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, 1 October 2007.

[52] Donnelly and Kristol, "More Caissons," 7.

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paternalistic, as destabilizing crusades, as cynical demagogy masking self-aggrandizing interests, and as unlawful warmongering. Criticism can also be leveled at the futile efforts to democratize at bayonet point, and at the neoconservatives' misunderstanding of the essence of democracy. Additionally, critics can point to the unjust distribution of the burdens in American society of fighting and financing the war, as well as the unequal distribution of the profits arising from oil revenues and the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq, or they can point to the immorality of aggressiveness, invasions, and occupations.

These criticisms, however, are mainly external: their origins and rationale, their philosophical and moral premises, differ from those that drive the neoconservatives. Although it may be morally more significant and philosophically more interesting to engage in heated ideological debates about neoconservatism and Bush's policies, such arguments will only reemphasize how unbridgeable are the premises of the neoconservatives and their adversaries. The persuasive potential of such external criticism is weak in regard to publics that fail to question the underlying premises or share them, or are not committed to any ideological camp.

A stronger criticism, therefore, is internal, and entails exposing the incoherencies in the idea-structure. Such incoherencies may prove irremediable, invalidating the ideology and destabilizing the strategy based on it. Then and only then is the path cleared to presenting an alternative. Two powerful internal criticisms of neoconservative ideology and aggressive democracy promotion are first, the conservative belief in the power of culture and tradition and their distrust of "social engineering," and second, the conservative fear of dictatorial concentration of power.

Conservatives and neoconservatives alike look askance at "social engineering." They believe in the gradual evolvement of societies, trusting the wisdom of what already exists, as in Georg F.W. Hegel's "what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational."[53] Conservative programs of change rely on incremental reforms that take into account the historical—even organic—nature of society. Dismantling the structure of society in a quick attempt at change is seen as radicalism based on the hubris of the Enlightenment, and on excessive belief in human rationality, leading inevitably to destabilization. In this light, neoconservatives view welfare policies and other centrist governmental programs as "social engineering" that is bound to fail and cause damage.

Does not the project of democratizing other countries entail at least as much trust in rationalism and "social engineering" as the domestic welfare state? Is not the idea of building democracy, in a country that has never experienced anything like it, founded on the same Enlightenment presumptions? Is this not an exercise in radicalism and hastiness, involving hubris of the worst sort? If true to their creed, conservatives can only answer these questions

[53] Georg F.W. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 10.

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affirmatively. Indeed, Fukuyama was quick to criticize the neoconservative democracy-promotion agenda along these lines, pointing to its incoherence and the need to return to conservative humility.[54] Pursuing further this line of argumentation brought Fukuyama in 2006 to renounce his allegiance with neoconservatism.[55]

It is the aforementioned conservative fear of unchecked power that underlies their minimalist, elitist concept of democracy. Indeed, in the domestic arena, they uphold the virtues of checks and balances, and in the global arena, of the balance of power. Supposedly, these structures counteract dictatorial concentrations of power and foster prudence in politics. Nevertheless, the neoconservatives show a reluctance to respect other global powers, and not only call on the United States to act unilaterally, but favor unipolarity, a world in which the United States is the sole hegemon, unchecked and unbalanced.[56] The Bush doctrine followed suit, with a concentrated effort to prolong the unipolar moment,[57] ensuring America's ability to build structural democracies around the world that would liberate their citizens from unbalanced and unchecked domestic rulers, thus enhancing U.S. security by forging democratic zones of peace.

The internal contradiction is evident and did not escape the notice of the conservative Huntington[58] and of realist theoreticians.[59] If one wishes to build domestic checks and balances to prevent concentrated power, one should aspire to similar precautionary mechanisms globally, ensuring that no single power can rule without prudence-inducing restraints. After all, the logic of Lord Acton's warning that "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely"[60] applies globally as well as domestically.

[54] Francis Fukuyama, "The Neoconservative Moment," *The National Interest* 76 (Summer 2004): 57–68.

[55] Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2006).

[56] In an earlier article, Krauthammer called for "nothing short of universal dominion": Charles Krauthammer, "Universal Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World," *The National Interest* 18 (Winter 1989): 48–49. Since then, he has somewhat moderated his aspirations: Krauthammer, "In Defense of Democratic Realism," 15–25; Krauthammer, "Bush Doctrine," 21; see also Boot, "What Next?" 27–33.

[57] White House, *National Security*, 29.

[58] Samuel Huntington, "The Great American Myth," (paper presented at the Grano Lecture Series on American Empire, Toronto, 10 February 2005), accessed at http://www.macleans.ca/topstories/politics/article.jsp?content=20050214_100487_100487, 21 November 2005. Neither was it hidden from the conservative analysts of the Cato Institute; for their critique of the Bush administration's democracy promotion, see, for example "Rebuilding Iraq: Prospects for Democracy," September/October 2003, accessed at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v25n5/iraq.pdf, 1 October 2007.

[59] Prominent realist theorists, including Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer, formed the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy to argue against the policies promoted by neoconservatism. See http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org, accessed 1 October 2007.

[60] See his famous letter to Mandell Creighton published in John E.E. Dalberg-Acton, ed., *Historical Essays and Studies* (London: Macmillan, 1907), 504.

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These two internal incoherencies emerge once we understand how the neoconservatives came to adopt the democratic peace thesis, what they mean by it, and what roles it has played in shaping and marketing the democracy-promotion agenda. This grand strategy of promoting democracy so as to attain security, based on the academic structural theories of democratic peace, suffers from acute internal incoherencies. When identifying these internal incoherencies, we should expect some critical problems in implementing this grand strategy.

Beyond the internal criticism, two alternative—and more viable—strategies offer a better approach to current world affairs and the issue of democratization. The first alternative is to mend neoconservatism's incoherencies and steer it back to a prudent and conservative reliance on gradual reform and on the global balance of power—that is, to heed the realist critique. The second involves a more optimistic worldview, a more comprehensive understanding of democracy, a more rigorous concept of change, and a search for a global structure based on multilateral activism—in other words, a critical theory of both domestic and world affairs.

Realism shares many features with conservatism, including the fear of disorder, the fear of dictatorial concentration of power, the emphasis on prudence, and the reliance on multipolar structures as fostering prudence. In applying these tenets to the global arena, the realist remedy to the neoconservatives' strategy is a global balance of power in which the United States concentrates on its own vital interests while respecting the sovereignty and interests of other states and powers. This could generate prudent American policies while preventing the rise of an imperial power (including the United States) that would impose its wishes on other states, interfere with their sovereignty, and subvert their freedom of action. Under the realist critique, the United States must abandon its current policy of democracy promotion.

This realist vision, then, favors a nondictatorial, multipolar world order that prevents chaos and provides the conditions of global justice. Realists, of course, are the first to admit that this global justice is minimal. They assert, however, that it is the only kind that is viable in the international sphere, and that any attempt to advance a more comprehensive notion of justice will compromise states' sovereignty and produce war, chaos, and the danger of world dictatorship, even further dissipating the minimal justice that is sustainable under conditions of sovereignty and the balance of power.

The realist approach indeed remedies neoconservatism's internal incoherencies, steering it back from experimentalism and aggressiveness to conservative prudence. However, realism has its own democratic, moral, and political drawbacks. It propounds a minimal concept of democracy, defining it narrowly as a structural, procedural, and elite project that precludes participatory citizenship and the serious consideration of normative democracy. Morally speaking, realism espouses an overly restricted view of morality and justice, and of their importance and plausibility in world affairs. Consequentially, realists show indifference to the political fortunes and misfortunes of others,

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proclaiming that whether they live under democracy or autocracy is not our concern. This moral indifference gives rise to a political drawback in that it leaves the neoconservatives, with their talk of democratization, holding the rhetorical high ground.

The other opponents of neoconservatism, those espousing more-progressive and leftist visions of world order, are pushed into a corner where they—out of disdain for the neoconservatives' policies—advocate pacifism at any cost, including abandoning others to their political misfortunes no matter how severe. Today, the radical left preaches isolationism and, even more disturbing, a moral relativism that eschews any international effort at democratizing authoritarian regimes. Again, this leaves the neoconservatives to salvage the rhetoric of morality and project an image as defenders of democracy.[61] In other words, dictators can entrust their survival to the realists' moral indifference, the leftists' pacifism and relativism, and the neoconservatives' inadequate unilateral policies.

Therefore, an alternative strategy is needed that can address the inadequacies of neoconservatism; that is based on different philosophical premises and political commitments; that simultaneously and *coherently* favors deliberative democracy, notions of global morality and justice, and multilateral approaches to international problems; and that, furthermore, does not shy away from actively promoting domestic and international change. In other words, we need to elaborate a critical theory of both domestic and global realities. In the following I will outline a sketch of such a critical theory worthy of further exploration.

On the democratic front, this theory should endorse participatory paradigms of democracy that respect the citizen, her rationality, and her understanding of her self-interest and of collaborative democratic activity. These paradigms are congruous with global notions of morality and justice, meaning we should seek to spread human and political rights to those who lack them, entailing, among other measures, democracy promotion around the world. However, spreading democracy and human rights should not be done unilaterally, disrespecting the concerns of the democratized people and of other states; it should be done in ways that value democratic values, norms, and procedures. It should not be the province of any single power, no matter how mighty it is, how globally it views its interests, and how unipolar it believes the world to be. Democratization should be done multilaterally, involving intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and social movements, as well as individuals from the democratized countries.

Moreover, as argued earlier, the normative and cultural concepts of democratization (which are the same as the deliberative and participatory ones)

[61] A notable exception is Michael Ignatieff, who calls on the United States to meet its moral obligations, including by resorting to force. See Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* (London: Vintage, 2003).

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call for constructing a democratic society and culture primarily by facilitating domestic agents of political and social transformation in the target country. Constructing a civil society of informed, involved, and participating citizens is a long process that involves profound social and political changes. In that sense, democratization is a radical process aiming at the foundational level of society, its most deep-seated roots and attributes, and attempting to drastically change them. Forcing democratization from the outside and dictating a rapid tempo of superficial transformation may result in a backlash dynamic. It may lead to the rise to power—sometimes by means of elections—of fundamentalist and xenophobic groups. The sweeping victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections of 25 January 2006 is a case in point. Neither can democratization be implemented via military occupation, as laid out in the ineffective neoconservative strategy. The military can be employed to intervene in humanitarian crises, but not in the hope that it will become the agent of democratization or that occupation will quickly and easily result in democracy.

The critical theory, then, opens a political space between an international Hobbesian reality and a dictatorial neoconservative empire. In that space, it is possible to promote the institutionalization of international organizations and of a world order that respects the rights of individuals, the merits of social movements, and the sovereignty of states. Clearly, such a world does not yet exist, and our belief in actualizing it rests on our belief in the human capacity to ameliorate the current international reality.

Nevertheless, the inadequacies of the neoconservative strategy of regime change based on the structural theories of democratic peace, and the moral and political drawbacks of both realist moral indifference and leftist moral relativism, leave us no option but to further develop this critical theory that coherently seeks to spread democracy domestically and globally. This is a morally worthwhile goal, regardless of the academic validity or strategic value of the democratic peace theories.*

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From the "Red Juggernaut" to Iraqi WMD: Threat Inflation and How It Succeeds in the United States

JEFFREY M. CAVANAUGH

Of the powers entrusted by the people of the United States to their government, few are as important as the directive to "provide for the common defense." The Constitution, however, leaves the door open to significant principal–agent problems by vesting national security decision-making power into the hands of one person and his handpicked assistants. Symptoms of these problems are intelligence "failures" of the type seen in the run-up to the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Although of significant concern in and of itself, this incident is merely one episode in a larger pattern of executive branch threat inflation and policy manipulation since 1945. This essay discusses three instances of threat inflation: early estimates of the Soviet threat; the escalation of the Vietnam War; and the aforementioned case of Iraq. These cases are key because beyond their obvious importance, they were instances in which an administration had to make a substantive case on foreign policy to the people and Congress on national security grounds. They are examples of manipulation because the information presented stood in marked contrast to information held privately, giving the impression that administration policies stood a good chance of success or that alternatives were dangerous and impractical.

I theorize that the failure of Congress to challenge inflated threats is due to four factors. First, the relative ignorance of the average voter leaves the public, and therefore Congress, vulnerable to manipulation by the administration and its surrogates in civil society. This is especially problematic when doves are unable to use the mass media or when popular values are resistant to dove messages. Second, the bureaucracy has incentives to cooperate when an ad-

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ministration exaggerates threats, thus choking off a vital source of information to opponents. The third factor at work is the importance of trigger events that induce a "rally-'round-the-flag" effect and push the public into prospect theory's domain of losses. Fourth, the politicization of national security makes it difficult to challenge administration claims.

I am not arguing that intelligence on these threats was wrong, inaccurate, or ambiguous. This may have been the case, but problematic intelligence was often further compounded by extensive, systematic exaggeration when it was conveyed to the public. Thus, I argue that intelligence was presented publicly in a manner that either flatly contradicted what the intelligence community reported or did not relay any significant doubts that the community may have had. These cases, therefore, are instances in which administrations selectively released information in order to manipulate the public. They are important institutional failures because they represent a break in the link between a controlling principal and an agent responsible for carrying out the principal's wishes, which calls into question the system of checks and balances upon which the United States and other democracies function.

As such, threat inflation poses serious challenges that can potentially undermine U.S. values and security. It is doubtful, for instance, that foreign policy will reflect the will of the citizenry if it is the result of manipulation. While this is in itself undesirable, the possibility is raised that choices made by those determining policy will be incorrect and detrimental to U.S. interests. Psychologists, for instance, report that when decision-making power is kept within too small a body, "groupthink" can quickly set in, while rational-choice scholars note that small decision-making bodies face greater likelihood of reaching incorrect decisions in comparison with even relatively uninformed electorates.[1]

Methodologically, concentrating on three instances of threat exaggeration opens one up to charges of selecting only on the dependent variable. That is, examining only cases in which threats were exaggerated ignores cases in which threats were presented accurately or were underplayed. This type of analysis brings with it several problems, the most notable of which is the doubt it casts on the power of one's explanatory variables.[2] To overcome this problem, I briefly examine in pre–September 11 anti-terror intelligence and policy an extended episode during which a looming threat was largely ignored.

[1] Irving L. Janis, "Groupthink: The Desperate Drive for Consensus at Any Cost" in Jay M. Shafritz and J. Steven Ott, eds., *Classics of Organization Theory*. 4th ed. (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1996), 185–192; Dennis C. Mueller, *Public Choice III* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 128–133.

[2] Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 130.

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THE "RED JUGGERNAUT"

Recent scholarship on the Soviet postwar threat to Western Europe notes that the situation presented to U.S. lawmakers and the public was a grim one.[3] The administration of Harry S Truman argued that a well-equipped, well-trained army of 250 communist divisions could and would easily overrun Western Europe. So pervasive was this perception of Soviet superiority that the U.S. media reported that the overrunning of Europe by the USSR in a conventional war was taken for granted.[4] Indeed, public perception of the Soviets at the time was consistent—nearly all media sources estimated that the Soviets had 2.5 million men and 175 combat-ready divisions, with most slated for an invasion of Western Europe.[5] Furthermore, the threat posed by the Soviets was presented in sinister terms that made Soviet aggression and wider war seen inevitable.

Today, however, we know that this public perception of vastly superior Soviet forces and aggressive, rapacious expansionism was inaccurate. For instance, while the *official* view of the Soviet conventional threat *publicly* crumbled in the mid-60s,[6] earlier intelligence had indicated that the conventional balance in Europe and the larger strategic balance were not so clearly in Moscow's favor. These secret examinations of Soviet strength had cast the USSR as practically incapable of launching a successful offensive into Western Europe *at the same time* the Truman administration was maintaining that Soviet power was overwhelming. Nearly all estimates had concluded that the Soviet threat was political in nature, that the USSR suffered from fundamental weaknesses that could not be easily or quickly overcome, and that the primary risk of war stemmed from miscalculation over U.S. moves on the Eurasian periphery.

Intelligence obtained in 1946, for instance, indicated that the Soviets had retained the majority of their forces from the War, putting Moscow's ground forces at 3.2 million men in 208 divisions, with 66 occupying Eastern Europe. These forces were judged as being "commensurate with immediate occupation and security requirements."[7] Two years after this estimate, however, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that Soviet forces had fallen to the familiar 2.5 million men arranged in 175 divisions, with 31 in Eastern Europe. These new estimates represented a significant reduction in the number of forces

[3] Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," *International Security* 7 (Winter 1982–1983): 110–138; John S. Duffield, "The Soviet Military Threat to Western Europe: US Estimates in the 1950s and 1960s," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 15 (June 1992): 208–227.

[4] Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army," 110.

[5] Duffield, "The Soviet Military Threat," 209.

[6] Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969* (London: Harper and Row, 1971).

[7] Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army," 114.

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officials had earlier thought necessary for occupation duty. Now, they were the "offensively orientated" forces reported in the press.[8]

Thus, within the space of two years, officials went from believing that the Soviets would field an occupation army of 66 divisions capable of doing little more than holding down Eastern Europe to fielding a smaller *blitzkrieg* force with no occupation duties whatsoever. This was a serious contradiction of earlier and then-current estimates of Soviet occupation requirements. U.S. officials, for instance, believed that the political reliability of the satellites in the event of war was questionable and that large numbers of troops would be required to secure Eastern European rear areas.[9] Occupation, reparations, and reconstruction duty, not military training in preparation for an invasion, were also cited as the primary activities of the Soviet postwar army. Yet, the reduction in overall Soviet troop strength was omitted in the story told to the public, as were the occupation and reconstruction duties in which the Soviets were primarily engaged.[10]

Outright subterfuge, however, was the direct comparison of U.S. and Allied ground formations with their Soviet counterparts. Official numbers cited by the press indicated the 175 Soviet divisions were "line" divisions, presumably combat-ready units. CIA reports, however, indicated early on that U.S. officials knew that the manning level of Soviet divisions was not at full strength. In fact, only a third were at 70 percent strength or more, the rest being partial-strength and "cadre" divisions.[11] Western divisions were, in contrast, closer to full strength. The fearsomeness of Soviet conventional forces was also questionable even when fully manned. The CIA, for instance, again *publicly* recognized by 1960 that Soviet divisions were considerably smaller than Western divisions, but Defense Department reports in 1950 estimated the average wartime size of a Soviet division to be 11,000–13,000 men, significantly smaller than a U.S. division. Peacetime manning levels for "combat-ready" divisions were less than wartime levels as well, and the CIA estimated that these divisions had 8,000 men each. In terms of overall manpower, Western and Soviet ground forces were roughly equivalent, with perhaps a slight lead by the USSR.[12]

Soviet forces, moreover, had inferior equipment and organization. Soviet divisions lacked organic logistics elements such as supply, transport, and maintenance units, while support units were smaller and less capable than their Western equivalents. This smaller "tail-to-tooth" ratio meant that Soviet units were relatively fragile and less capable of engaging in sustained combat. Mechanized units also were not fully equipped and were still dependent on

[8] Ibid., 115.
[9] Duffield, "The Soviet Military Threat," 212–213, 217; Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army," 116.
[10] Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army," 113, 119, 125–133.
[11] Ibid.," 112.
[12] Duffield, "The Soviet Military Threat," 210–215; Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army," 117–119.

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U.S. lend-lease supplies obtained during the War. Reports indicated that Soviet ground forces relied on obsolete, World War II tanks well into the 1950s, while over half the Soviet army, 105 divisions, remained "foot" units or had so few vehicles as to make no difference. Perhaps most telling of how inaccurate public perception of the Soviet ground threat to Western Europe was were estimates by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that half of Soviet military transport was still horse-drawn as late as 1950.[13]

Critics of these revisionist accounts of the Soviet conventional strength in Europe note that U.S. intelligence got many things, such as the actual number of Soviet divisions, correct.[14] Indeed, they note that the careful way in which U.S. intelligence tracked Soviet manpower levels, and then changed their estimates to reflect what they then believed to be true, is evidence that contradicts claims of deliberate exaggeration by U.S. officials. It is clear, however, that the counterclaim of "no exaggeration" by members of the Truman administration cannot be substantiated. Indeed, U.S. military officers intimately involved in estimating Soviet conventional strength at the time admitted as much years afterward. General Lucius Clay, the U.S. military commander of Berlin, for instance, believed that his famous 1948 cable that war could come with "dramatic suddenness" was solicited by his superiors in order to aid them in their congressional budget testimony, and was not, as was then claimed, based on any change in Soviet behavior or strategy.[15] Similarly, a U.S. Air Force general attached to NATO in the early 1950s stated decades later that "there was no question" that the Soviet conventional threat was "intentionally overrated."[16] U.S. intelligence sometimes did offer a picture of Soviet conventional strength in Europe that was inaccurate—such is the nature of intelligence work—but what was then relayed to the public was again greatly exaggerated.[17]

Other facets of the Soviet threat were similarly inflated. Claims that the USSR was capable of striking the United States with nuclear weapons after their first atomic bomb test in 1949, for instance, neglected to mention Moscow's complete lack of delivery systems capable of reaching the United States. To reach U.S. targets, Air Force intelligence admitted, Soviet bombers would have been forced to make one-way suicide missions. In fact, the notion that the Soviet Air Force was capable of hitting the continental United States

[13] Duffield, "The Soviet Military Threat," 213–215; Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army," 120–123.

[14] Phillip Karber and Jerald Combs. "The United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat to Western Europe: Military Estimates and Policy Options, 1945-1963," *Diplomatic History* 22 (Summer 1998): 103–132.

[15] Jean Edward Smith, ed., *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 568–569.

[16] Matthew Evangelista, "Commentary: The 'Soviet Threat': Intentions, Capabilities, and Context," *Diplomatic History* 22 (Summer 1998): 447.

[17] John S. Duffield, "Commentary: Progress, Problems, and Prospects," *Diplomatic History* 22 (Summer 1998): 431–437; Evangelista, "Commentary: The 'Soviet Threat,'" 439–449.

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at all was discounted as "completely unrealistic" by the CIA between 1946 and 1949. The Air Force agreed, noting "subversion" was, at the time, the principle threat to the American homeland.[18]

As with the claims of overwhelming Soviet ground strength, Air Force estimates that the Soviets possessed a comparable aerial juggernaut of 40,000 long-range bombers, transport planes, and "modern" jet fighters as of 1947–1948 went "far beyond" their highest assessments of both Soviet aircraft production and technical capabilities.[19] Public perception that the Soviets had or had nearly "caught up" to the United States in air power and technology was simply at odds with what was known privately. The Air Force, for instance, noted in the late 1940s that the Soviet Air Force remained primarily "tactical" in nature, and suffered acute problems in such areas as base construction, fighter development, military electronics, and engine design—all critical if the Soviets were to fight effectively in the air against a far superior United States.[20]

In fact, nearly all secret estimates of both Soviet strength and intentions in the immediate years after the Second World War indicated that the USSR was neither prepared for war nor seeking a military confrontation. Intelligence noted that the USSR required at least fifteen years to overcome wartime economic losses, ten to build a scientific base, five to ten years to build a strategic air force, between fifteen and twenty-five to build a navy, ten to rebuild its military transport system, fifteen to twenty-five years to fortify the Soviet Far East, ten to pacify Eastern Europe, and three to ten years to develop an atomic bomb.[21] Military analysts knowledgeable about Soviet capabilities after the Second World War believed that U.S. offensive capabilities were so manifestly superior to those of the USSR that war would be far more costly for the Soviets than for the United States. Even the conquest of Europe, noted analysts, would not ensure victory, owing to the manifest inability of the Soviets to strike the United States and to U.S. superior industrial capabilities.

U.S. officials even privately recognized that Soviet statements and moves abroad were less threatening than noted publicly. The Soviets, for instance, willingly withdrew their forces from northern Norway, Manchuria, and, after moderate U.S. pressure, northern Iran. Free elections were allowed in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, while representative governments were established in Finland and Austria. Intelligence also indicated that there was

[18] Lawrence Aronsen, "Seeing Red: US Air Force Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1945-1949," *Intelligence and National Security* 16 (Summer 2001): 103–132.

[19] Ibid., 122. See also Frank Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

[20] Aronsen, "Seeing Red," 112, 115–116, 124; John Prados, *The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength* (New York: The Dial Press, 1982), 38, 41.

[21] Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-1948," *The American History Review* 89 (April 1984): 361–362; see also Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).

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no evidence that the Soviets were lending support to revolutionary movements in Greece, Southeast Asia, and China.[22] Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, privately admitted that it was difficult to find "direct evidence of literal violations" of U.S.–Soviet agreements by the USSR.[23] U.S. military officials in Germany even acknowledged that the Soviets had largely kept their promises, while other officials indicated that Paris was the main source of U.S. problems in Germany, not Moscow.[24]

This was not, however, the situation publicly presented by the administration. Indeed, regardless of Joseph Stalin's ultimate culpability in starting the Cold War,[25] the fact remains that the Truman administration's portrayal of Soviet military strength was grossly exaggerated and at odds with what administration officials privately read, wrote, and said to each other. Soviet consolidation of Eastern Europe and the attempt to pressure Turkey, for instance, were portrayed by U.S. officials as bolt-from-the-blue attempts by wild-eyed, fanatical ideologues at world conquest, not, as was acknowledged privately, as expected Soviet responses to U.S. moves in Germany.[26] Truman and his officials recognized that the public and their representatives needed to be "shocked" by facts that were "clearer than truth" if they were to support rearmament at home and Cold War abroad.[27]

VIETNAM

The decision to expand the war in Vietnam is a canonical example of administration manipulation. Although dissembling by U.S. policymakers began before the Gulf of Tonkin Affair and continued long after, Tonkin and the subsequent Americanization of the war in 1965 are the crucial episodes. It was Tonkin that allowed Lyndon B. Johnson to argue that war was necessary by giving him the opportunity to cite long-standing U.S. commitments to South Vietnam, belief that the insurgency in the south was aggression directed by Moscow, and understanding that Tonkin was unprovoked aggression on the high seas as precedent for U.S. involvement. The image conveyed by Johnson was one of a North Vietnamese bully attempting to overthrow a regime deserving of U.S. help, while other hawks inside and outside of the government highlighted the struggle against international communism. All played down the roots of the

[22] Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 133.

[23] Ibid., 133.

[24] Ibid., 132–133.

[25] John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Vojtech Mastny, "Stalin and the Militarization of the Cold War," *International Security* 9 (Winter 1984–1985): 109–129.

[26] Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 123–125; See also Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman*, 92–100.

[27] Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 145; Samuel F. Wells, "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat," *International Security* 4 (Autumn 1979): 116–158; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), 374–375.

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insurgency, the illegitimacy of the corrupt Saigon regime, and the nationalist character of Vietnamese communism, and simply lied about the context within which Tonkin took place and the prospects and consequences of intervention.

The Johnson administration, for instance, promoted the fraudulent claim that the Tonkin incident was unprovoked. At the time, U.S. officials maintained that North Vietnamese naval forces attacked U.S. ships while these were on routine patrol in international waters. Indeed, this was the story related to the American people during a televised address by Johnson himself on 4 August 1964.[28] Also stressing the unprovoked nature of the attack was Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who skillfully avoided questions challenging administration accounts of the attack. Skeptics pointed to "South Vietnamese" raids on the North before the August 4 attack and the possibility that Hanoi believed the United States was involved.[29] McNamara avoided connecting the naval mission and the attack, claiming they were unrelated.

History reports this interpretation as simply untrue. The Tonkin affair was actually two incidents, one public, one secret, and both connected to covert U.S. raids on North Vietnam. In January of 1964, Johnson agreed to plans drawn up by the Defense Department for raids manned by the South Vietnamese but planned, directed, equipped, and supported by the United States. Raids on North Vietnamese targets began in February, concentrating on sabotage, kidnapping, and psychological warfare.[30] Covert attacks escalated to the point where Thailand-based fighter-bombers attacked North Vietnamese villages near the Laotian border on 1 and 2 August, nearly the same time events in the Gulf of Tonkin were unfolding.

Of direct significance was a covert raid by South Vietnamese patrol boats against the North Vietnamese offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu on the night of 30–31 July 1964.[31] Days later, a U.S. destroyer arrived in the vicinity on an intelligence-gathering mission that, officially, was separate from the earlier raid. Although the North Vietnamese had reinforced the area with naval units in response to the raid, the U.S. mission continued and came under fire from the North's patrol boats on 3 August. Despite later administration claims, radio intercepts cabled to Washington by the patrol commander indicated that the North Vietnamese believed the earlier raids and the U.S. intelligence mission were related.[32] Once the North Vietnamese were repulsed, the U.S. patrol was

[28] Fredrick Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 199.

[29] Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 136–137.

[30] Neil Sheehan, "The Covert War and Tonkin Gulf: February – August, 1964" in Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E.W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, eds., *The Pentagon Papers* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 234–242.

[31] Dale Andrade and Kenneth Conboy, "The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident," *Naval History Magazine* 13 (August 1999): 27–33.

[32] David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Ballentine Books, 1993), 412.

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reinforced and ordered to continue. On 4 August, the patrol reported that they were under attack, and aircraft were once again dispatched in support. Confirmation of the attack was slow in coming and details sketchy when Johnson ordered a reprisal strike on North Vietnamese naval facilities later that day. Indeed, eight months later, the President joked about the uncertainty, saying, "For all I know the Navy was shooting at whales out there."[33]

All of this went unreported in the debate over the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in Congress. McNamara evaded questions attempting to link the "South Vietnamese" raids with the attack on U.S. ships, and Congress remained ignorant of the truth. There is clear evidence, however, that major executive-branch decision makers with knowledge of the raids realized that Hanoi had connected the covert attacks with the Tonkin mission. CIA director John McCone, for instance, advised Johnson that the North was "reacting defensively to our attacks."[34] When Johnson suspended the raids, Maxwell Taylor, U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk dissented. Both believed the raids had put pressure on Hanoi.

The Gulf of Tonkin incident is unfortunately the most poignant example of deception and manipulation in a war where the public and Congress were consistently lied to by those charged with defending them.[35] From the earliest days of U.S. involvement, reports indicating the ineptitude of South Vietnamese units were ignored by the Pentagon, as were State Department analyses reporting that the insurgency was a continuation of the nationalist revolt interrupted by the 1954 Geneva Accords.[36] Indeed, the conclusion reached by the authors of *The Pentagon Papers* was that Hanoi did not come to directly control the insurgency until 1959, suggesting that the inept Saigon regime was responsible for creating the problems, insurgency included, that it faced.[37] Significant analyses by mid-ranking U.S. advisers in South Vietnam and the U.S. Department of State questioning the validity of Pentagon assessments on the progress of the war were buried.[38] Once the

[33] Ibid.

[34] Andrade and Conboy, "The Secret Side," 31.

[35] H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997); David Kaiser, *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2000); Logevall, *Choosing War*; Daniel Ellsberg, *Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers* (New York: Viking Adult, 2002); Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1991).

[36] Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988), 686–690.

[37] Fox Butterfield, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam" in Sheehan, Smith, Kenworthy, and Butterfield, eds., *The Pentagon Papers*, 67–79.

[38] Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie*, 127–200, 267–386; Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, 256–259.

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United States had committed combat troops and began to bomb North Vietnamese targets, innumerable analyses predicted and then reported their ineffectiveness.[39] All was kept hidden.

IRAQ

Events leading up to the 2003 U.S. war with Iraq are still fresh, and information concerning it will remain uncertain until scholars examine classified documents decades hence. Evidence, however, suggests that the administration of George W. Bush was not honest about the Iraq threat and about what the United States could expect once it achieved military victory. In one of the best examinations of the march to war with Iraq, one analyst noted that "the administration supplied a steady stream of unreliable statements" that were contradicted by the press.[40] Another states that there is now "broad agreement" that Bush's rationale for war was "exaggerated" and "wholly baseless."[41]

A brief review of the administration's behavior is illustrative. Public statements on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and purported Iraqi links to terror organizations, widely accepted by the public at the time, are now known to be false.[42] Indeed, Bush himself considered intelligence on Iraq weak and unconvincing.[43] The administration claimed, for instance, that Iraq had purchased aluminum tubes and planned to use them to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. However, UN inspectors and U.S. centrifuge experts had concluded before the war that the tubes were consistent with those used for rockets and could not easily be modified to serve as centrifuges; nor was there evidence that Iraq had purchased other equipment needed for a centrifuge.[44] Bush's claim in his 2003 State of the Union Address that British intelligence had evidence that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium from Niger, which

[39] Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, 355–358; George Herring, ed. *The Pentagon Papers*. Abr. ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1993), 118–120, 134–137, 148–155, 186, 191, 200.

[40] Louis Fisher, "Deciding on War Against Iraq: Institutional Failures," *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (Fall 2003): 389–410.

[41] Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *International Security* 29 (Summer 2004): 5; see also Jon Western, *Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 175–219.

[42] Fisher, "Deciding on War," 400–401; Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation," 16–29; John Prados, *Hoodwinked: The Documents that Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War* (New York: The New Press, 2004); James Bamford, *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies* (New York: Doubleday, 2004).

[43] Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 247–249.

[44] Fisher, "Deciding on War," 401; Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation," 19–28; David Barstow, "How White House Embraced Suspect Iraq Arms Intelligence," *The New York Times*, 3 October 2004; Bamford, *A Pretext for War*, 324, 325–336, 333–337, 360–361; Prados, *Hoodwinked*, 28–29; 95, 96–98, 171–170, 190, 193.

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suggested that Saddam Hussein was already on his way to building nuclear weapons, was unsubstantiated and based on fabricated documents.[45]

The administration also attempted to draw a direct link between al Qaeda and the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 and Iraq. On 25 September 2002, Bush claimed that Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda worked "in concert," and the following day, he claimed that Iraq had "long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist organizations," and that there were "[al Qaeda] terrorists inside Iraq." Similarly, on 7 October, Bush said that Iraq "trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gasses." Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld also announced that the administration had "bulletproof" evidence of Iraqi links to al Qaeda, and indicated that al Qaeda members had recently been in Baghdad. Rumsfeld's claims later turned out to be unsubstantiated. Administration claims about Mohammed Atta, leader of the September 11 attacks, meeting with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in April 2001 were also without foundation. Czech intelligence and the CIA have since said that there was no evidence that the meeting took place. Even the 9/11 Commission Report, the official U.S. investigation into the tragedies of 11 September 2001, has been unable to substantiate claims that al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's Iraq worked closely together. What links there are point to a series of opaque meetings over the course of the 1990s that, as far as can be currently determined, resulted in no working relationship of the type suggested by the administration.[46]

In addition to exaggerating the threat from Iraq, the administration also downplayed the difficulties and costs that an invasion and occupation would entail. According to the administration, there was no indication of the problems the United States would face after the war. Indeed, after the war, Pentagon hawks claimed there was no memo that "once written, that if we had only listened to that memo, all would be well in Iraq."[47] Numerous reports, studies, and analyses by groups within and outside the government, however, envisioned scenarios remarkably similar to what actually transpired after the war. All were available to Bush administration officials and ignored by them in their public argument for war. The administration, for instance, ignored the State Department's "Future of Iraq" project, a document commissioned a full year before the war and providing an extensive analysis on postwar Iraq.[48] Also ignored were CIA war games and planning exercises on

[45] Fisher, "Deciding on War," 402; Bamford, *A Pretext for War*, 298–307; Prados, *Hoodwinked*, 125–127, 155.

[46] Fisher, "Deciding on War," 399–400; Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation," 16–19; Prados, *Hoodwinked*, 113, 118–119, 236–237; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, *9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 334–336; Bamford, *A Pretext for War*, 285–286.

[47] James Fallows, "Blind Into Baghdad," *The Atlantic Monthly* 01 (January/February 2004): 52–73.

[48] Ibid., 56–58.

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postwar Iraq that had begun a year earlier and ran up to the beginning of the U.S. invasion. Indeed, top Pentagon officials had been reprimanded for attending these war games.[49] U.S. government relief agencies responsible for postwar reconstruction, in conjunction with nongovernmental relief agencies, also warned the administration on what might be expected.[50] Military officers responsible for planning for postwar needs and responsibilities were ignored, while the administration downplayed estimates of what war with Iraq would cost, although the Army and others privately estimated its costs would amount to "tens of billions" of dollars.[51]

There is thus substantial evidence that the Bush administration exaggerated the Iraq threat and downplayed the dangers and costs of an occupation in order to manipulate public opinion. Ambiguity or contrasting evidence reported by U.S. intelligence agencies was disregarded. Inconvenient facts were denied. Warnings about the likelihood of an insurgency developing were ignored. Intelligence regarding Iraq was, as is now acknowledged by the then head of Britain's MI6 intelligence service, simply "fixed round the policy" of the Bush administration.[52]

Why Threat Inflation Succeeded

How did these administrations get away with presenting a case that was either blatantly at odds with intelligence held secretly or was otherwise contradicted by the press? While a comprehensive answer is not possible here, I sketch out an explanation below involving four interrelated factors.

Ignorance, Values, and Cueing

Public ignorance and apathy is the first factor likely to have a large impact on an administration's ability to engage in threat inflation. Studies consistently show the public to be ignorant of and apathetic toward foreign affairs, while the sources of what information they do have are generally of low quality.[53] Apathy, ignorance, and the cost of acquiring quality sources of information are disincentives mitigating public willingness to examine an administration's

[49] Ibid., 58.

[50] Ibid., 62–63.

[51] Ibid., 62–73.

[52] Nick Fielding, "MI6 Chief Told PM: Americans 'Fixed' Case for War," 20 March 2005, accessed on the website of *The Times Online* at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/, 6 April 2005.

[53] Michael X. Delli Caprini and Scott Keeter, *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippman Consensus, Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (November 1992): 439–466; Matthew Baum, "Sex, Lies, and War: How Soft News Brings Foreign Policy to the Inattentive Public," *American Political Science Review* 96 (March 2003): 91–109.

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foreign policy in detail. Ignorance, however, does not mean the mass public is a blank slate. The public, for instance, uses "values," or stable, individual-level ideological predispositions as cognitive aids to help bring new information or argumentation into line with what is already known, while research indicates that elites "cue" the public on what opinions they should hold on particular issues.[54] Being more informed than the mass public, elites represent a source that can signal what is or is not true about foreign affairs. Elites, however, often hold differing opinions about what the proper course of action should be or what the true state of affairs really is, and compete with one another to influence the public. Competing elites, therefore, convey information to the mass public that is then filtered through individuals' "value" systems. Threat inflation can succeed if elites conveying the manipulative message are more effective than their opponents, or if popular values are at odds with content conveyed in dove cues, or both.

Bureaucratic Incentives

If an attempt at manipulation is to succeed, then dissent within the bureaucracy must be controlled or eliminated. This is crucial because the security bureaucracies are the primary collectors and analysts of intelligence and are ultimately responsible for national defense. As such, their expertise lends credibility to administration claims and their acquiescence limits information available to opponents. Since perception of threat is correlated with department budgets, prestige, and opportunities in the private sector, many bureaucrats have incentives to cooperate in order to advance either department or personal interests.[55] This is especially true for the Defense Department, as perceived threat is highly correlated with defense outlays. The Department of State and the CIA may be less inclined to present hawkish information, but their institutional relationship with the president and Congress and their small size give them few resources with which to sustain opposition. Bureaucrats thus have incentives to "play ball" in order to maintain their position and prospects when threat inflation is underway.

Trigger Events

Threat inflation cannot rely solely on hot air alone; it must incorporate and use accounts of menacing events abroad that make administration claims plausible. Such triggering events tend to produce a situation in which the public rallies

[54] Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," 445–457; John Zaller, "Information, Values, and Opinion," *American Political Science Review* 85 (December 1991): 1215–1237.

[55] Mueller, *Public Choice*, 359–385; Ronald Wintrobe, "Modern Bureaucratic Theory" in Dennis C. Mueller, *Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States.*

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around whoever is currently president, thus facilitating an attempt at manipulation. Although evidence on what presidents do with this short-term advantage is indeterminate, it is believed that they can use it to push through their preferred agenda.[56] Also critical is the way in which security issues are framed. Prospect theory suggests that individuals will risk and pay much to prevent losses, much more than is rational as predicted by rational choice theory, but will risk or pay little to make gains.[57] Security issues are presented to the public in terms that often promise to prevent damage or loss, suggesting that if hawks can frame policy as loss-preventing, then the public may accept it even if the price is high. The synergy created by the interplay of the rally-'round-the-flag effect and policy framing when a trigger event or events occur may thus make even extreme policy temporarily acceptable.

The Politicization of National Security

Finally, if manipulation is to succeed, political opponents must be neutralized. Despite claims that partisanship stops at the water's edge, national security is a contentious, politically incendiary issue, and ideologues in the United States have not shown great constraint in using it when attacking opponents. The Republican Party, for example, did little to restrain the politically useful demagoguery of Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s. The result is that doves are often painted as being sympathetic toward U.S. enemies or ignorant of world affairs, and when the public feels threatened, doves must combat these claims in a charged political environment. It is also difficult for legislators concerned with securing reelection to hold dove positions, because these are difficult to quantify, and the results are hard to identify and impossible to claim credit for. Negotiations, for instance, are risky, time-consuming exercises conducted by bureaucratic experts over whom Congress has little direct influence. The gains from these policies are not easily quantifiable or even readily tangible, and doves cannot point out "X-amount of peace produced" as evidence that dove policies are working. Hawkish policies are tangible, quan-

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2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979), 139–144; C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[56] Bradley Lian and John Oneal, "Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19 (June 1993): 277–300; John R. Oneal and Annal Lillian Bryan, "The Rally Round the Flag Effect in US Foreign Policy Crises, 1950-1985," *Political Behavior* 17 (December 1995): 379–401; Patrick James and James Rioux, "International Crises and Linkage Politics: The Experience of the United States, 1953–1994," *Political Research Quarterly* 51 (September 1998): 781–812; David H. Clark, "Agreeing to Disagree: Domestic Institutional Congruence and US Dispute Behavior," *Political Research Quarterly* 53 (June 2000): 375–400.

[57] Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," *Econometrica* 47 (1979): 263-291; Miroslav Nincic, "Loss Aversion and the Domestic Context of Military Intervention," *Political Research Quarterly* 50 (March 1997): 97–120.

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tifiable, and distributable, and therefore serve as convincing props and lucrative pork for reelection purposes.

Explaining Institutional Failure

To what extent were these factors present in these cases? Were advocates of hawkish policies in the media more capable of spreading their message, and was the audience receptive to that message? Was dissent in the bureaucracy stifled? What role did the framing of issues by the administration and rally-'round-the-flag effects play? Were doves in Congress pressured to accept hawkish policies for political reasons?

Ignorance, Values, and Cueing

The Red Juggernaut. Public knowledge regarding the USSR was extremely limited during the early years of the Cold War. Information outlets taken for granted today simply did not exist, and expertise was confined to Ivy League universities, elite think tanks, and, of course, government. Objective information on the USSR was only available in classified reports produced by and for the government. If quality information was scarce and the public ignorant, available sources were monolithic in their presentation. The press viewed the USSR as a danger, and major media outlets, including newspapers, radio and television networks, and movie studios, cooperated with the federal government to produce what was, in essence, propaganda that portrayed the Soviet Union as an imminent, mortal threat.[58] Media dissent was extremely limited and became even more so as the Cold War deepened after 1950. Whether it was the elite media, small-town newspapers, or leftist publications, the range and scope of media debate over the Cold War narrowed to the point where questioning the assumption that the USSR was a military threat was unacceptable.[59]

The distribution of values among the members of the mass public also aided elite attempts to paint the Soviets as a threat. Contemporary polls that indicated the public's willingness to cooperate with Moscow masked an underlying historical mistrust and loathing of communism and the USSR.[60]

[58] Nancy Bernhard, *US Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960* (Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 69–93.

[59] Ibid., 155–177; John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism & the Culture of the Cold War* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 419–462.

[60] Ted Morgan, *Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: Random House, 2002); Lisle Rose, *The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).

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These feelings, in turn, could be exploited to the full in a media environment that relegated dovish opinion to the fringes of acceptable political debate. Furthermore, the postwar demobilization of veterans also released into the general population large numbers of young men socialized to military life, trust in the state, and the necessity of using force, all attributes making them susceptible to the new ideology of national security being promulgated by anti-communist elites.[61] The pump was primed, in other words, for the public to accept hawkish views of the USSR in a way that quickly transformed the public's perception of a recent ally into that of a recently defeated enemy.[62]

Vietnam. The early years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam went surprisingly unnoticed by most of the major media outlets in the United States.[63] A few of the larger outlets had offices in-country, and, as admitted in *The Pentagon Papers*, produced objective pieces on U.S. involvement in South Vietnam.[64] Unfortunately, media presence in pre-Tonkin Vietnam was such that it was difficult to cover every aspect of the war in detail. Media reports on particular engagements, guerilla activity, and Saigon's corruption could only capture small slices of the war at any given time. Pre-Tonkin reporting failed to ask "big questions," such as the end goal of the U.S. commitment, whether the United States should have been in Vietnam at all, or whether Hanoi represented a legitimate form of Vietnamese nationalism.[65]

After Tonkin and U.S. troop commitments in 1965, U.S. media presence in the country increased. Print outlets already in Vietnam expanded their bureaus to increase coverage, while newspapers previously content to use wire feed opened their own bureaus in Saigon. The introduction of widespread television news coverage also brought home the immediacy of the war to the American public in a way print and radio outlets had not been able to accomplish. The expansion of higher education brought on by the baby boom also opened up a source of information and expertise, the academy, to a larger, more diverse audience than had previously been the case. As the war went on and costs began to mount, an increasingly interested public was able to keep abreast of events in a way it had not been able to a decade earlier.

In 1964, however, the established print media still controlled public discourse on foreign policy, while television was restricted by technology in what

[61] Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 1–22; Michael Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1–30, 353, 376.

[62] Les K. Adler and Thomas Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s-1950s," *American Historical Review* 75 (April 1970): 1046–1064.

[63] William Prochnau, *Once Upon a Distant War* (New York: Times Books, 1995); McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 37.

[64] Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie*, 686–690.

[65] Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, 670; Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie*, 685–686.

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it could report. This meant that the voices of dissent coming from Southeast Asia did little to overturn entrenched hawkish views. Indeed, the major U.S. print and broadcast outlets uncritically parroted the administration's line that the Tonkin incident was the result of an unprovoked attack by the North Vietnamese, showing that the established media's dependence on official sources inside Washington and in South Vietnam, as in the Iraq case, meant it could not stray far from the official line when confronted by a seemingly united administration.[66] In terms of the public's values, the generation that fought and came of age during the Second World War had now attained positions of influence within American society. The "silent majority" Nixon later appealed to represented not so much any one political party so much as the members of this generation who had committed to avoiding a repetition of the perceived mistakes of the 1930s.[67]

Iraq. If information with which to judge the merits of policy was scarce in the previous cases, the same cannot be said about Iraq. Media coverage included 24-hour television news, widespread print coverage, and Internet-based reporting. Media sources were diverse, and the Internet provided a platform for the presentation and dissemination of views that might not have otherwise made it into the public domain. Experts were called upon to debate Iraq policy, and nongovernmental sources of information on the pros and cons of war with Iraq were widely available. The U.S.–Iraq war in 1991 and U.S. involvement there since also gave the public a sense of familiarity with Iraq.

Cracks in the established U.S. media first seen in Vietnam had by now, however, widened into a divide separated not so much by technology as by ideology. The reemergence of a political press in the United States provided more platforms for dissent, but also segmented recipients of news by political ideology. Individuals discount news and information coming from outside their ideological milieu, making it no surprise that press reports from "liberal" outlets that questioned administration evidence on Iraq had little impact on public opinion. Conservative media, in fact, insulated war supporters from these reports. One study, for instance, reported that viewers of conservative FOX News would not only be more likely to hold factually incorrect beliefs about the Iraq war after the war's conclusion, but actually had become less informed the more they watched.[68] Finally, as in Vietnam, the U.S. media's overreliance on government sources and relative lack of access to and expertise on Iraq meant that the media in general and conservative media in particular served as an echo chamber that reverberated "myths of empire" to a public

[66] Daniel C. Hallin, *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

[67] Kaiser, *American Tragedy*, 7–9, 485–487.

[68] Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis, "Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War," *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (Winter 2003–04): 569–598.

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long comfortable with viewing U.S. power as a unique, righteous force for good in world affairs.[69]

Bureaucratic Incentives

The Red Juggernaut. The Soviet threat created the modern U.S. national security bureaucracy. Previous U.S. wars had been followed by periods of foreign retrenchment; thus, those wishing to prevent this needed to highlight potential postwar threats to national security.[70] The effort to identify the USSR as the nation's primary enemy coincided with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the creation of new institutional arrangements for the nation's military services. Defense unification under a weak defense secretary and the emergence of an independent Air Force resulted in acute interservice rivalry, leading to services that could neither agree on basic strategy nor coordinate their budget requests to Congress. When rearmament was authorized in the crisis atmosphere of the Korean War, these interservice disputes were transferred from an environment of financial scarcity to one of financial plenty, with funds lavished on services that still had not reconciled their policy differences. What resulted was a process of capabilities–resources ratcheting, a situation wherein an expansion of capabilities brought with it an expansion of responsibilities that due to service-defined military necessity, required the acquisition of new resources. This, along with secrecy that prevented outsiders from reviewing military planning, and the sidelining of bureaucratic economizers opposed to massive rearmament, produced the atomic Air Force, overkill, and a tripling of the annual military budget from $13.5 billion to $45 billion between 1949 and 1951, of which only a portion went to support the war in Korea.[71]

Vietnam. The acute interservice rivalry that facilitated the massive expansion of the U.S. armed forces in the late '40s and early '50s similarly prevented the military chiefs from effectively opposing Johnson's policy in Vietnam. Instead, the chiefs accepted Johnson and McNamara's policy of "gradual escalation" despite their misgivings about its ultimate efficacy, and

[69] Michael Massing, *Now They Tell Us: The American Press and Iraq* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2004); Paul T. McCartney, "American Nationalism and US Foreign Policy: From September 11th to the Iraq War," *Political Science Quarterly* 119 (Fall 2004): 399–423; Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

[70] Leffler, "The American Conception," 348–349.

[71] David Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," *International Security* 7 (Spring 1983): 3–71; Benjamin O. Fordham, *Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of US National Security Policy, 1949-1951* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 25–74; Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 23–68, 159–208, 264–366.

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instead fought to increase their respective shares of the Vietnam "pie."[72] The bureaucracy, furthermore, buried those who disagreed with or documented the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam. Indeed, military officers and administration officials expressing doubt were often ignored and punished, as were Vice President Hubert Humphrey, CIA director McCone, and even Defense Secretary McNamara.

Iraq. The end of the Cold War brought significant budget cuts in national security spending, while bureaucratic inertia and the lack of a clear threat prevented resources from being reallocated quickly or efficiently.[73] This general malaise in the intelligence community, especially the perception that the CIA was mired in decline, provided hawkish policy entrepreneurs newly ensconced within the bureaucracy the unique opportunity to influence policy on Iraq. These individuals and their associates outside government were able to collectively direct attention toward Iraq after the attacks of September 11 and then use their influence and the low reputation of U.S. intelligence agencies to suppress doubts about the veracity of administration statements on Iraq. Once it became apparent that war was inevitable, there were few incentives, despite uneasiness among many military and civilian officials, for bureaucrats to voice dissent. Those expressing doubt as to the viability of the postwar occupation plan or the cost of the invasion were, like in the Vietnam case, fired or reprimanded.

Trigger Events

The Red Juggernaut. Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe, the loss of China to Mao Zedong in 1949, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 contributed to a hardening of public opinion toward communism in general and the USSR in particular. These events confirmed in the minds of the U.S. public that the communist threat was real and gaining strength, framing future policy toward the Soviet Union in terms of loss prevention. The "Long Telegram" and "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* articulated containment's loss-prevention strategy,[74] while U.S. policymakers focused on denying communism further strategic gains regardless of whether local circumstances, such as in Indochina, suggested that a looser interpretation of containment might be more appropriate. Indeed, the Korean War allowed the conflict in Indochina

[72] McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 327–328.

[73] *9/11 Commission Report*, 71–134; Bamford, *A Pretext for War*, 129, 157–161.

[74] George Kennan as "X", "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* XXV (July 1947): 575–576; U.S. embassy (Moscow) cable, "Answer to Department's 284, Feb 3 [13]" (Sources of Conduct), 22 February 1946, Secret, accessed at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm, 4 October 2005.

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to be reinterpreted as a free-world struggle against worldwide communism relatively quickly. Less than a month after the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, the Truman administration authorized the dispatch of military aid and advisers to aid the French in Vietnam. By 1954, what effectively had been a colonial war between aspiring Vietnamese, albeit communist, nationalists and French colonialism had been transformed into a front in the U.S. "global war" on communism, resulting in the eventual deployment of over 4,600 troops to French Indochina and the supplying of 80 percent of French war materiel at a total cost of over $3 billion.[75] Finally, the bunker mentality permeating containment, moreover, necessitated tracking U.S.–Soviet relations as a win/lose situation in which the slightest loss might lead to catastrophe. Direct involvement in Korea also facilitated this change in framing, and dramatically recast public perception of the Cold War. Indeed, the dispatch of troops to the peninsula made questioning U.S. Cold War policy unpatriotic and dangerous because it signaled weak resolve.

Vietnam. The Tonkin incident similarly refashioned public perception of the conflict in Vietnam. Whereas before Tonkin, U.S. commitments to Saigon were seen in terms of efficacy of policy, the attacks recast the conflict as a direct challenge to the United States. U.S. forces had been attacked, and honor dictated a response behind which a patriotic public rallied. Questioning the wisdom of bombing or troop deployments manifested itself in public only well after U.S. actions had proven both ineffective and costly.[76] Avoiding defeat in Vietnam in order to avoid an even larger loss through the fall of the whole of Southeast Asia was also an important factor in galvanizing support.

Escalation, however, was painstaking and slow, and the invasion and occupation of the North was never considered for fear of widening the conflict. Intervention on the ground in South Vietnam thus represented a risky, costly gamble that was undertaken to avoid a loss.

Iraq. Consideration of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq cannot be made without reference to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The public rallied behind the President, and opposition to the campaign to topple the Taliban was nonexistent. Measures taken to combat terrorism at home, such as creation of the Department of Homeland Security and passage of the Patriot Act, were widely supported. Crucially, consensus that the root cause of Islamic terror threatening the United States could be found in the oppressive regimes

[75] Robert Mann, *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 87–92; Tim Kane, *Global US Troop Deployment: 1950-2003. Center for Data Analysis Report #04-11* (Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, 2004).

[76] Frank Newport and Joseph Carroll, "Iraq versus Vietnam: A Comparison of Public Opinion," *The Gallup Poll*, 24 August 2005, accessed on the website of The Gallup Poll at http://galluppole.com/content//?ci=18097, 5 September 2005.

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of the Middle East laid the foundation for war against Iraq. The "enemy" was not merely al Qaeda, but had expanded to include most of the regimes in the region. Arguments for the invasion were also cast in "loss-prevention" frames during public debate, that is, Saddam Hussein posed a threat that in the future the United States *might* suffer devastating losses. Implicit in this assertion was a link between Iraq's alleged WMD possession and the Iraqi state to al Qaeda. The administration carefully crafted its war message to argue that war would remove an imminent danger. An argument not emphasized in the public debate before the war, however, was the notion that installing democracy and freeing the Iraqi people from Saddam's rule was a legitimate justification for war—which the consensus over the root cause of the September 11 terror attacks would have suggested. Instead, officials apparently decided that the public reason for war would be the potential WMD threat and the future losses that it could entail, rather than the gains from removing Saddam and installing a democratic regime.[77]

The Politicization of National Security

The Red Juggernaut. The early Cold War saw the heavy politicization of national security in a manner that still affected U.S. politics decades later. Politicians advocating dovish positions on foreign policy and a lessening of Cold War tensions were targets for slanderous attacks by both the right and the political center. The atmosphere of paranoia and cheap political demagoguery permeating the late '40s and '50s made it difficult for politicians and others to openly question the nature of the Soviet threat.[78] Policies adopted to mitigate the threat—political and security ties abroad and rearmament at home—were also more lucrative and substantive than negotiations and peaceful coexistence. Military spending brought jobs and income to districts and states containing defense industries and bases, while Marshall Plan aid to Europe invigorated U.S. industry.[79] The benefits of lessened tensions with the USSR, in theory no less substantial, were diffuse and hard to measure or verify, while the costs were concentrated on groups benefiting most from competition with Moscow.

Vietnam. Johnson was keen on avoiding a defeat in Vietnam for fear of what defeat abroad would do to his prospects for reelection and, after re-

[77] Rodger D. Hodge, "Weekly Review," 28 May 2003, accessed on the website of *Harpers Magazine* at http://harpers.org/WeeklyReview2003-06-03.html, 15 April 2004.

[78] Morgan, *Reds*; David Caute, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978).

[79] Fordham, *Building the Cold War Consensus*; Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman*; Ann Markusen, Scott Campbell, Peter Hall, and Sabrina Dietrick, *The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

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election, his chances to pass his Great Society legislation. While Johnson's *machismo*, strident anti-communism, his and his advisers' misguided desire to project credibility, bureaucratic lethargy and policy inertia, and global power imbalances in favor of the United States may all have ultimately been responsible for his decision for war, domestic political considerations played a crucial role in the way he went about committing the United States in Southeast Asia.[80] Johnson, for instance, had little foreign policy experience upon taking office after the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963, and he banked upon the credibility of Kennedy advisers like McNamara, Maxwell Taylor, and McGeorge Bundy in order to lend himself legitimacy on national security. Indeed, Johnson was well aware of the perils that awaited a president when confronted with a seemingly unsuccessful foreign policy, having witnessed the diminishment of Truman's political capital after the loss of China in 1949 and the stalemate in Korea.

As the front-runner in the 1964 election, Johnson desired to keep Vietnam on the back burner, avoiding decisions that might force him into a position of either losing Vietnam or stumbling into war. To do this, Johnson adopted a "holding" strategy that kept pressure on the North through covert action in order to hide the growing scale and depth of the U.S. commitment. When Barry Goldwater, his Republican challenger, attacked Johnson for being "soft" and "irresolute" in dealing with the communist North, the President deftly used the opportunity presented by Tonkin to rebut those charges. Indeed, it is clear that domestic political considerations topped Johnson's list of concerns when he ordered the strike. Retaliatory options, for instance, were judged according to how the Republicans, the Congress, and the press would react, and the President's announcement of U.S. retaliation was timed so as to not miss the deadlines of the Eastern papers, not for reasons of operational security; the announcement came well before U.S. planes hit their targets.[81] The political motivation for the Tonkin air strikes is highlighted by the fact that a month later, a similarly ambiguous naval action in the Gulf of Tonkin failed to elicit a military response from Johnson. Having already proven his credibility, Johnson had no desire to spook voters so close to the November elections when, in his opinion, "those dumb, stupid sailors were probably just shooting at flying fish."[82]

This concern with credibility and the calculus of domestic politics laced Johnson's decision making throughout the period of deepening U.S. involvement after the election. Throughout 1965, Johnson kept the growing commitment in Vietnam hidden, skillfully using the credibility of McNamara, the

[80] Kaiser, *American Tragedy*, 485–493; Logevall, *Choosing War*, 375–413; McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 300–322; Gareth Porter, *Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

[81] McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 128, 132–133.

[82] Ibid., 161.

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Joint Chiefs, and even former Presidents Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower to deflect criticism. The Viet Cong attack on the U.S. installation at Pleiku was used to justify troop deployments and an aerial bombardment of the North that had been planned but was delayed because of the election.[83] Johnson always sent enough troops and materiel to Vietnam to meet immediate needs—but only enough—to avoid a real debate on Vietnam that might have undermined support for his expensive Great Society reforms and threatened the political coalition he and his party had built.[84]

Iraq. Despite the end of the Cold War, national security remained a topic for vitriolic debate. Conservatives claimed that the Ronald Reagan-era military buildup had "defeated" the Soviets, thus giving them credibility with the public when advocating *realpolitik*. Those advocating dovish policies were discredited by the seeming success of the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush in dealing with the Soviets. In this environment, doves advocating multilateralism and international institution building were cast as being "soft" on defense, and willing to expend American lives in unfruitful nation-building exercises abroad.

Critics described liberal policies as "weakening" the military, and painted doves as unwilling to use force to protect American interests abroad. The Bill Clinton administration's response to terror attacks against U.S. targets were, in particular, painted as being "soft" despite the lack of realistic alternatives then acceptable to the U.S. electorate. The attacks of September 11, therefore, did not occur in a political vacuum. Rather, they occurred at a time when dovish positions were castigated by hawks as being ineffective and dangerous. Since the fruits of multilateral diplomacy and global institution building were not readily measurable or easily discernible to an ignorant and skeptical public, doves could not point to an "X-amount of peace and security" produced. Hawks, on the other hand, used this inability to measure the product of dovish policy as being an indicator of failure, and were able to cite terrorist attacks as evidence of that failure. The attacks of September 11 made this standing critique more poignant and difficult to deflect.

Negative Case: Pre–September 11 Anti-terror Policy

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were the largest mass-casualty attacks in U.S. history, and warnings collected by the bureaucracy in the years, months, and weeks preceding them indicated that the al Qaeda threat was real, growing, and likely to strike U.S. soil. Why was so little done to prevent these attacks? It is surprising that the threat from al Qaeda and the specter of mass-

[83] Ibid., 174, 240–241.
[84] Ibid., 312, 316–317, 320.

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casualty terrorism didn't move officials to do anything, let alone use it as the leading prop in an attempt at threat inflation and policy manipulation. Why was inaction, possibly even threat deflation, the result?

First, terrorism, unlike the threats in the previous cases, was something of which even U.S. elites, let alone the public, were only dimly aware. The nature of terrorism and the lack of a clear enemy presented the public and cueing elites alike with a subject that could not be easily incorporated into the old state-centered threat matrix of the Cold War. Terrorism's amorphous nature, multiple players, and differing goals presented no consistent theme that could be used to justify rearmament, bureaucratic reorganization, or an aggressive foreign policy. If terrorism was a threat far distant from the everyday experience of the U.S. public and elite to begin with, then Islamic fundamentalism and groups like al Qaeda were almost exclusively the preserve of dedicated government and academic experts and policy entrepreneurs. Terrorism prior to September 11 and, specifically, al Qaeda's distant exoticness made them too implausible an enemy with which to either galvanize support for an anti-terrorism campaign abroad or as the central character in any scare story peddled by a manipulative administration.

Second, the bureaucratic agents responsible for tracking and defending against the terrorist threat were ill-prepared to handle a transnational organization like al Qaeda, while rivalry over jurisdiction, assets, and information prevented bureaucratic coordination. The CIA and State Department, for instance, suffered from budget cutbacks, morale problems, and a critical lack of assets and expertise in transnational terrorism, while the Department of Defense was institutionally averse to taking on counter-terrorism missions that held potential for significant mission creep. The FBI, although skilled in investigation of terrorist incidents, remained focused on law enforcement activities that could lead to legal prosecution, not on threat detection and prevention. With no agency or department having much to gain from focusing national attention on terrorism, it is not surprising that the pre–September 11 national security bureaucracies did not focus on the threat, absent White House direction.

Third, although there were a series of terrorist attacks against U.S. targets by Islamic fundamentalist groups in the 1990s, there was no dramatic attack on the scale of September 11 that could galvanize a rally-'round-the-flag effect or push the population into the domain of losses. Without either, risky and expensive loss-avoiding policies that could have been sold to the public as effective in either containing or eliminating al Qaeda before September 11 were never floated, for lack of obvious public support. This was, again, probably owing to the fact that the most dramatic al Qaeda attacks, such as the attempted sinking of the USS Cole in October 2000 and the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, were far away and failed to kill more Americans than the bombing by domestic terrorists of the Oklahoma City federal building. There were no terror attacks prior to September 11 powerful enough to make threat inflation centered on terrorism credible.

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Fourth, the relaxation of international tensions brought about by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union made political attacks on liberal-leaning foreign policy far less acute. Without an enemy, charges that doves were weak or soft on national security simply had far less traction with the public. Indeed, with no clear enemy, foreign affairs was even more absent than usual during the 2000 election. Furthermore, the only significant use of U.S. military force abroad at the time was in the Balkans, a situation that led traditional defense hawks to criticize a military intervention led by a liberal internationalist on the grounds that the conflict posed no threat to U.S. security and might develop into an open-ended nation-building exercise.

Analysis

Table 1 summarizes the cases and factors discussed above. The limited number of cases, of course, necessarily requires a significant degree of caution when interpreting and drawing inferences from them, but analysis suggests that the conditions under which threat inflation occurs are varied and the results of inflation dependent upon the context in which it takes place. So how and why does threat inflation succeed?

First, the public's lack of knowledge is, surprisingly, relatively unimportant. The public was arguably best informed on Vietnam and Iraq, but threat inflation still took place and succeeded, whereas the public was arguably least informed about the Red Juggernaut and pre–September 11 terrorism, yet threat inflation occurred in the former case but not the latter. Clearly, public knowledge is only relevant within the context of elite cueing and existing public values. Here, we see the polar cases of monolithic cueing and monolithic values in favor of opposing communism crystallizing into the Cold War consensus and the domestic "Red Scare," while divided elites and divided values prior to September 11 are associated with policy inaction and apathy. Iraq and Vietnam were middling cases. Vietnam can best be characterized as a time when both elites and the mass public were weakly monolithic as to the need to confront and contain communism in Southeast Asia, with division occurring over the proper policy to adopt and whether military intervention by U.S. forces was practical. Iraq, on the other hand, was a case in which both elites and the public could be characterized as weakly divided over the need, practicality, and appropriateness of a U.S. invasion of Iraq in the wider campaign against terrorism.

Second, executive branch capture of the bureaucracy occurred in all three cases of threat inflation, although the extent to which and the method of how control was established differed. The case of the early Cold War saw the complete capture of the bureaucracy by hawks, which was facilitated by the congruence of agency incentives with administration policy and coupled to heavy policing of dissent. Vietnam saw strong but not complete capture of the bureaucracy, largely because, despite heavy policing, not all bureaucratic agents or agencies were in agreement on the efficacy of U.S. intervention. The

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TABLE 1

Threat Inflation in Four Cases

	Red Juggernaut	*Vietnam*	*Iraq*	*Pre–September 11*
Information Availability	1	2	3	1
Elite cueing	Monolithic	Weakly monolithic	Weakly divided	Divided
Public values	Monolithic	Weakly monolithic	Weakly divided	Divided
Bureaucracy	Total capture	Strong capture	Modest capture	No capture
Trigger event	2–3	1–2	3	1
National security politicization	3	2	2	1
Threat inflation	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Result	Cold War consensus	Gradual escalation	Iraq invasion	September 11

1, weak/little; 2, medium/some; 3, strong/a great deal.

Iraq case, on the other hand, saw only moderate capture of the bureaucracy, largely owing to the inability of the administration to adequately police those unhappy with either the invasion itself or the manner of its implementation. In the pre–September 11 case, on the other hand, not only was there wide bureaucratic disagreement over the proper U.S. response to terrorism, there were few attempts to police the bureaucracy through either coercion or cooptation. Weak coordination at the top failed to bring either order or consistency to U.S. anti-terror policy.

Third, the occurrence of a precipitating trigger event or events that sets the stage for a later attempt at threat inflation is, unsurprisingly, a critical precondition. Iraq arguably had the strongest precipitating event, September 11, while the Red Juggernaut case saw a string of menacing events abroad culminate in the invasion of South Korea. Vietnam and the pre–September 11 era had the weakest precipitating events, but these differed in context. Tonkin and subsequent guerrilla attacks against U.S. advisory forces in South Vietnam occurred during the Cold War and could plausibly be linked to U.S. rivals. Terrorism prior to September 11, on the other hand, did not occur during a period of geopolitical rivalry and could not be linked to a plausible enemy.

Finally, the politicization of national security was a significant factor in all three cases of threat inflation. Opposition to hawkish policy was the most politically dangerous in the early Cold War era for several reasons. The USSR appeared menacing, elite cueing and public opinion indicated anti-communism abroad was both popular and legitimate, bureaucratic allies were few, and, finally, massive military spending was useful for reelection purposes. Vietnam and Iraq likewise saw the politicization of national security, but politicization was less heavy than during the initial years of the Cold War for different reasons. Vietnam had significant elite and popular support, as evidenced by the weakly monolithic consensus over Vietnamese policy, and there were initially few bureaucratic agents that dovish lawmakers could use as allies, but the weakness of the precipitating events that contextualized U.S. involvement and

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the paucity of electoral pork that came with Vietnam did not turn opposition into a political dead end. The precipitating event in the Iraq case, on the other hand, was such a shock that even a weakly divided elite and mass public, a fair degree of bureaucratic opposition, and next to no political pork were unable to overcome the political disadvantages of opposition. The pre–September 11 era, in contrast to all three positive cases, saw relatively little politicization of anti-terrorism policy because widespread disagreement among elites, the bureaucracy, and the mass public provided ample space for political opposition.

These differences, in turn, explain the relative success of threat inflation in each case, and answer the question of how these administrations "got away with it." Truman's threat inflation was an overwhelming success; it literally brought into existence the modern U.S. national security state and legitimized a half-century of Cold War. It succeeded because of a unique set of circumstances: monolithic elite and popular opinion that was mutually agreeable on foreign policy, an almost complete absence of bureaucratic dissent, and a series of menacing events abroad that first pushed the public into the domain of losses and then created a rally-'round-the-flag effect during the Korean War. The Truman administration may have produced the play, but events abroad provided the stage, bureaucrats the script, and elites the direction, while the public largely applauded. Political opposition was simply impossible in such a situation.

Vietnam and Iraq, in contrast, were far less successful instances of threat inflation. In Vietnam, moderate consensus over the legitimacy of U.S. actions in Southeast Asia allowed Johnson to use Tonkin as a pretext for further U.S. intervention, but the weakness of Tonkin as a precipitating event did not allow him to send hundreds of thousands of troops immediately nor, in the end, invade and occupy North Vietnam. Capturing the bureaucracy, in turn, merely allowed administration policy to go farther and lies to be hidden for longer than might have otherwise been the case. Vietnam was a case in which commitment increased secretly and slowly, while initial support dwindled over time.

Threat inflation in Iraq was, in the end, even less successful than in Vietnam. True, the Bush administration was able to spin lurid tales of Iraqi WMD in the hands of terrorists into a successful invasion, but it has not been able to sustain support in the face of significant opposition from large segments of the elite, the public, and the national security bureaucracy itself. Indeed, support has dwindled far more quickly for the Iraq intervention than it did for Vietnam. Thus, Iraq is something of a fluke, largely caused by the shock of September 11. Without September 11, it is doubtful whether threat inflation and invasion would have been remotely feasible. Finally, the lack of all these factors contributed to the absence of threat inflation, possibly even contributed to threat *deflation*, in the years prior to September 11. Elite and public values were divided, the threat indistinct and shadowy, and the bureaucracy uninterested and weakly policed. In such an environment, political opposition could thrive and thwart any attempt to use terrorism as the central prop in threat inflation.

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Conclusion: Trust ... but Verify

The picture presented here as to the efficacy of U.S. institutions in preventing threat inflation or rationally confronting threats to U.S. security is not a pretty one. Given strong enough trigger events and the presence of some degree of elite and popular consensus, secrecy, and the president's commanding position over the security bureaucracies provide significant opportunities to engage in threat inflation. More disturbing still is that threat inflation has succeeded not just once, but at least three times in the past half century and has resulted in the unneeded expenditure of vast amounts of blood and treasure. A communist Vietnam proved inconsequential to U.S. security, while Iraq, as of yet, has increased antipathy toward U.S. policy abroad, failed to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, has not brought significant political liberalization to the Middle East, and has, moreover, increased terrorism and unleashed chaos in the heart of the world's most important oil-producing region. The Cold War, although probably inevitable, was made more dangerous and more expensive by fear mongering that demonized the Soviet Union. All this suggests that the way in which the United States formulates its foreign policy is deeply flawed. Current emphasis on intelligence reorganization will probably solve little, because the ultimate sources of threat inflation or deflation lie outside the purview of intelligence collection and analysis. Threat inflation or deflation occurs and succeeds because it is politically feasible, even beneficial, to instigate or go along with it. It is at heart a political act, and only political reform will make engaging in it more difficult.

First and fundamentally, Congress's devolution of power and deference to the executive branch in the area of national security is unconscionable, yet its subservience continues because it is politically expedient. Its committee system has produced a large number of oversight committees on national security and foreign affairs that do little other than promote legislative baronies that create inefficiency, produce pork, contribute to legislative shirking, and provide bureaucratic agents numberless opportunities to play congressional actors against one another. It makes little sense to have separate committees and subcommittees for intelligence, foreign affairs, and the armed services when, in the real world, a substantive grasp of foreign policy requires expertise in all three areas. Consolidating these into one expanded, strictly bipartisan committee with significant oversight and funding authority for all the national security bureaucracies is a first step that would simultaneously expand and make accountable congressional power. The adoption of a rotating chairmanship, in addition to strict bipartisanship, would also help promote partisan comity and cooperation in an area that has far too often been politicized at the nation's expense.

These particular reforms would no doubt be difficult to enact, as they would ruffle the feathers of the many vested interests that would lose influence if the current system of congressional oversight were to be significantly changed. However, expecting congressional members to suddenly find under

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the current system the political will to overcome the entrenched disincentives to overseeing executive branch stewardship of national security is simply putting hope before experience. A good deal of the president's legitimacy, for instance, is derived from the fact that he or she is clearly the head of the executive branch. If something goes wrong, he or she can be held accountable. Who is responsible for congressional oversight, on the other hand, is not evident at all. Congressional oversight, as a collective endeavor, is susceptible to collective-action problems and, obviously, has failed quite often. Committee consolidation would clearly delineate who is responsible and, indeed, increase overall expertise. The same committee determining whether the army should be increased will also hear testimony from intelligence officials as to what threats that army will have to face. Furthermore, institutionalized bipartisanship will make substantive congressional oversight more credible and, therefore, a greater deterrent to administration malfeasance. No one, for instance, expects a congressional inquiry into executive branch activities to amount to more than a televised whitewash when the same party controls both branches.

Expansion of congressional power and the institution of practices that are designed to increase bipartisanship, however, will only help constrain the executive if lawmakers are more informed. Congress, at present, receives a hodge-podge of information through its oversight committees that presents lawmakers with, at best, a highly biased overview of U.S. intelligence assessments. Indeed, it is apparent that the oversight hearings in the above cases rather quickly devolved into meaningless dog-and-pony shows wherein bureaucratic and administration officials easily evaded answering tough questions by a Congress either too uninformed, too cowed, or too lazy to press further. Clearly, Congress needs better access to timely, high-quality information.

One way this might be achieved is to distribute to members of the relevant committee or committees congressional versions of the President's Daily Brief, thereby giving legislative overseers as much information as is available to the president. Other remedies, however, should focus on weakening presidential control of bureaucratic agents in order to prevent retribution for informing Congress of malfeasance. Whistle-blower protection, for instance, should be strengthened even further, while bureaucratic agents should be given the right to anonymously give testimony to or otherwise secretly inform Congress of administration wrongdoing through a congressional–executive ombudsman. The extension of the length of service of the directors of central and, now, national intelligence beyond one presidential term, as well as the establishment of supermajority requirements for Senate approval of major appointments to the national security bureaucracy, would make these bureaucrats less creatures of the administration and more public servants accountable to both the president and Congress. Finally, a series of sunshine laws should be adopted that place limits on what documents can be classified, require that public and private papers of all high administration officials be made public, and make more-efficient Freedom of Information Act requests in the area of national security.

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These reforms will not end the problem of threat inflation, but strengthening and depoliticizing congressional power and weakening the president's hold over the bureaucracy may free up information held in the deep recesses of these agencies that could make political opposition to threat inflation more feasible. Executive power would thus be curtailed, but the possibility that the president would be unduly subject to the will of the legislature is small. The president would retain the ability to command troops, would still set the national security agenda, and would still be responsible for the overall thrust of foreign policy. All that these initial reforms would do is ensure that the person hired to do the job is honest about the job needing to be done.

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Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq's Missing WMD

RICHARD K. BETTS

Al Qaeda's surprise attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were the U.S.'s second Pearl Harbor. The shocks jolted Americans out of the complacency about national security that they had enjoyed during the dozen years after the Cold War and launched them into a worldwide war against terrorists. When this shock was followed by the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) after the invasion of Iraq, recriminations over intelligence failure provoked the most radical reorganization of the intelligence system since the post–Pearl Harbor National Security Act. In one case, the intelligence community failed to provide enough warning; in the other, it failed by providing too much.

The discussions that follow are not complete case studies of the two failures; lengthy examinations are available in definitive official investigations, as well as in the memoirs of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet.[1]

[1] The main sources for September 11 are the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report: Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001*, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 2002, hereafter cited as Congressional Joint Inquiry Report; and *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, authorized edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), especially chapters 8, 11, and 13. The main sources for U.S. performance on Iraq are U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq*, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 2004 (hereafter SSCI Report); Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Report to the President of the United States* (N.p.: March 2005), hereafter cited as WMD Commission Report; and Iraq Survey Group, *Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD*, 30 September 2004, 3 vols. (cited hereafter as

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This article uses the main points in the two most prominent failures of recent times to illustrate the barriers to success and the dilemmas that bedevil intelligence in many other cases. Both of these cases were dramas more complex than is generally understood, and included much good intelligence work despite the failures at the bottom line. In both cases, hindsight reveals mistakes that could have been avoided, but also mistakes that were tragic yet natural.

Critics often assume that because the United States spends huge amounts on intelligence (now probably around $50 billion annually), failures must be due to negligence, treachery, or stupidity. All of these have played a role at some point, but not often. The fundamental problem is that strategic intelligence is not a fight against nature, where the odds of success rise in direct proportion to the attention, resources, and effort applied to improving protection, and in which overwhelming effort may make the odds of disaster negligible. Rather, it is a fight against cunning outside enemies looking for ways to circumvent our efforts. The existence of other political interests that sometimes conflict with intelligence collection (for example, constitutional rights to privacy) may also limit the results of even massive efforts, making good things, paradoxically, innocent enemies of intelligence. The complexity of modern government creates confusion in communication and coordination and tradeoffs among objectives that conflict with each other, leaving a large roster of impersonal enemies of effective intelligence that are inherent in the process. American intelligence often succeeds very well—and the successes get far less attention and are harder to recognize than dramatic failures—but some incidence of failure is inevitable.[2]

The two cases compared here reflect the ample roles of all the enemies of intelligence. Most of all, the outside enemies—al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's government—concealed their capabilities and strategic intentions and misled the American intelligence system. Their deception was compounded by the innocent and inherent enemies within the U.S. system. At a few points, law enforcement officials' concerns about legal backing held back maximally intrusive domestic intelligence collection, or political officials with strong views tried to bend the interpretation of data to those views. And as always, problems of bureaucratic confusion, breakdown in communication, analysts' and

Duelfer Report). British and Australian perspectives on their intelligence failures regarding Iraq can be found in Rt Hon Lord Butler of Brockwell et al., *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors* (London: The Stationery Office, July 2004) and Philip Flood et al., *Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies* (Canberra: Australian Government, July 2004). See also George Tenet with Bill Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), chapters 11, 16, 17, and 19. A more-detailed analysis of the September 11 failure, and one more critical than mine, is Amy Zegart, *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[2] For discussion of these general patterns, see Richard K. Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

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policymakers' cognitive processes, and difficult choices between competing risks got in the way of the right actions.

LIMITS OF WARNING: 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

Conventional wisdom after the strikes on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was that U.S. intelligence had failed egregiously. One CIA retiree described the failure as worse than Pearl Harbor, because in 1941, we "did not have a director of central intelligence or 13 intelligence agencies or a combined intelligence budget of more than $30bn to provide early warning of enemy attack."[3] True. Yet before September 11, as before Pearl Harbor, the U.S. intelligence system succeeded in providing timely warning of a sort, and as before Pearl Harbor, the sort of strategic warning that was given proved absolutely useless. In the weeks beforehand, the system detected and trumpeted a raft of indications that a major attack was imminent. The system could not get beyond that stage to the level of tactical warning, however, because it did not uncover or link specific information that might have made it possible to intercept the strikes. The system warned clearly about *whether* an attack was coming soon, but could not say *where*, *how*, or exactly *when*. The warning was voluminous but too vague to be "actionable."

In the mission to provide usable warning, performance before September 11 failed in all phases of the intelligence cycle. The system failed in collection, since it did not discover the particular perpetrators, plans, or means of attack that lay beneath the "chatter" in signals intelligence that indicated an imminent action. It failed in processing and dissemination, as some pieces of information were not correlated in ways that would have raised the odds of identifying individuals involved in the plot or the instruments they planned to use. It failed in analysis, by not finding the right pattern by which to "connect the dots" in the array of clues that was both incomplete and full of clutter. And policymakers also failed. The administration of George W. Bush had not made terrorism as high a priority as had either the intelligence community or the administration of Bill Clinton: the position of National Coordinator for Counterterrorism on the National Security Council (NSC) staff was downgraded, the Deputies Committee (one notch below the top level of interagency coordination) did not meet to discuss counterterrorism until three months into the administration, and the Principals Committee (the top level) met for the first time on the subject four months after that, only one week before the attacks occurred.[4]

[3] Melvin A. Goodman, "9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 18 (Winter 2003): 59.

[4] Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004), xxiv, 197–201, 229–232; Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America* (New York: Random House, 2003), 329, 382.

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Errors of Omission

Before the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the intelligence community was slow to focus on al Qaeda. A 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on terrorism and a 1997 update barely mentioned Osama bin Laden. After 1999, the Counter-Terrorism Center of the Director of Central Intelligence had some success in penetrating al Qaeda, but the agents were not at a high level in the organization.[5]

Throughout 2001, nonetheless, attention, collection, and warnings of action by al Qaeda escalated precipitously. There were more than 40 articles relating to Bin Laden in the president's daily brief in the first eight months of the year, and in the spring, reporting on terrorist threats reached the highest level since the alert before the turn of the millennium. In May, there were several reports of attacks planned within the United States, and in June and July, other reports poured in, although they indicated action in the Middle East or Rome. At the end of June, the official on the staff of the NSC who was in charge of counterterrorism warned the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Condoleezza Rice, that indications of attack planning "had reached a crescendo." Most attention focused on probable strikes abroad, but several times in mid-2001, President Bush asked "whether any of the threats pointed to the United States." The CIA answered on 6 August with an article in the president's daily brief titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US." As DCI Tenet later described the situation in that summer, "the system was blinking red,"[6] and he was running around Washington with his hair on fire. Two months before September 11, an official briefing said that Bin Laden "will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties."[7] These warnings remained limited by the problem that, as Tenet had warned Congress the previous spring, "We will generally not have *specific time and place warning* of terrorist attacks."[8]

Technical intelligence collection through photographic reconnaissance could not uncover al Qaeda attack preparations as it could have those for a conventional military assault, which requires mobilization, loading, and movement of large forces. Signals intelligence, however, detected many communications, and an upsurge of "chatter" among suspected terrorists was much of the reason for the intense sense of urgency during the summer. On the day

[5] Richard Clarke testimony quoted in Congressional Joint Inquiry Report, 90–91. Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 160; Tenet reports that "by September 2001, we had two unilateral agents successfully penetrate terrorist training camps in Afghanistan."

[6] *9/11 Commission Report*, 254–260.

[7] Quoted in James Risen, "U.S. Failed to Act on Warnings in '98 of a Plane Attack," *The New York Times*, 19 September 2002.

[8] Quoted in Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 145 (emphasis added).

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before the attacks, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted messages "in which suspected terrorists said, 'The match is about to begin' and 'Tomorrow is zero hour.'" The messages were not translated until 12 September, but they would not have in themselves made a crucial difference anyway, because they did not mention details of where a strike might occur, that airplanes would be used, or what the targets might be. The director of NSA at the time, Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, "also noted that more than 30 similar cryptic warnings or declarations had been intercepted in the months before 9/11 and were not followed by any terrorist attack."[9]

The "cry wolf syndrome" is a chronic problem for effective intelligence services; excellent collection gets information about threatening indicators, but when an attack does not occur immediately, the effect is to dull receptivity in the future.[10] Or multiple warnings may set off a raft of expensive defensive counteractions that exhaust the system, even if one or two of the multiple warnings does yield an actual incident. In December of 1999, for example, American intelligence told President Clinton that "Usama bin Ladin was planning between five and fifteen attacks around the world during the millennium and that some of these might be inside the United States. This set off a frenzy of activity. CIA launched operations *in fifty-five countries against thirty-eight separate targets*." A year later, Tenet warned of indicators that "the next several weeks will bring an increased risk of attacks," but they did not happen. After September 11, the system was deluged with indicators of attacks that did not come off.[11]

If the collection of strong but nonspecific warnings before September 11 could have been supplemented by detection and tracking of the plotters, the odds of blocking the attack would have gone up. The discovery that might have been most telling was shunted aside. Two months before the attacks, an FBI agent who had noticed the "inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest" attending flight schools in Arizona wrote the "Phoenix memo," which warned that Bin Laden might be orchestrating a project, and recommended closer investigation of the situation at the flight schools. The memo was sent to one field office. Although it also went to the units at FBI headquarters that were focused on Bin Laden and radical fundamentalism, investigators there did not see it until after September 11.[12] Intelligence discovered some travel patterns of two of the future hijackers, Khlaid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, but organizational boundaries and differences in procedure prevented piecing together some of the meetings of the two and handing off the job of monitoring

[9] Congressional Joint Inquiry Report, 375; Walter Pincus and Dana Priest, "NSA Intercepts On Eve of 9/11 Sent a Warning," *The Washington Post*, 20 June 2002; quotations in Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 215.

[10] Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1982), chapter 4.

[11] Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 125, 128–129, 155–156 (emphasis added).

[12] *9/11 Commission Report*, chapter 6, and 266–272, 352–354.

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from the CIA to the FBI when they entered the United States from Southeast Asia. The CIA took too long to put Khalid al-Midhar on the State Department watch list of suspected terrorists and did not notify the FBI that he had gotten a visa allowing repeated travel to the United States. FBI did not give CIA the Phoenix memo, and the CIA did not effectively publicize al-Midhar's and al-Hazmi's connections to al Qaeda, which might have alerted other agencies to check on connections to flight schools.[13] Some of the crucial breakdowns occurred not because of rules or because of decisions not to share intelligence, but because of accidents. At one point, instructions were issued at CIA to transmit crucial information about al-Midhar to the FBI, and messages mistakenly indicated that it had been sent when it had not. In another instance, CIA officers in the field sent important information about al-Hazmi to Washington, but put it at the end of a cable that contained routine information and was mistakenly not marked for "action."[14]

The FBI fell down the most. In its regular priorities, the Bureau focused overwhelmingly on investigating for criminal prosecution rather than for general intelligence gathering, and confusion about legal requirements blocked sharing of information between those involved in the two missions. The FBI failed to mount a full investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui, a student at a Minnesota flight school. Agents found that he had jihadist beliefs, a large amount of money in the bank, and a suspicious record of travel in and around Pakistan. Reports from the French government provided evidence of his association with Chechen rebels. Nevertheless, FBI agents did not obtain a warrant to conduct a search of Moussaoui's computer because they could not find "probable cause" sufficient to meet what they thought were required legal standards—an understanding of legal limitations that was later revealed to be incorrect. FBI headquarters also believed that Minneapolis agents were exaggerating the danger posed by Moussaoui. The chief of the Bureau's international terrorism section did not even know that agent Harry Samit had sent a report three weeks before September 11 warning that Moussaoui might be involved in a hijacking plot.[15] An unlimited effort to investigate Moussaoui might have uncovered his ties to the other plotters and forced immediate concentration on the potential for an attack involving airliners.[16]

[13] Jeff Gerth, "C.I.A. Chief Won't Name Officials Who Failed to Add Hijackers to Watch List," *The New York Times*, 15 May 2003; David Johnston and Elizabeth Becker, "C.I.A. Was Tracking Hijacker Months Earlier Than It Had Said," *The New York Times*, 3 June 2002; Elisabeth Bumiller and Alison Mitchell, "Bush and His Aides Accuse Democrats of Second-Guessing," *The New York Times*, 18 May 2002.

[14] Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 195–197.

[15] Neil A. Lewis, "Superior Says He Didn't See Agent's Report on Moussaoui," *The New York Times*, 22 March 2006. See also Neil A. Lewis et al., "F.B.I. Inaction Blurred Picture Before Sept. 11," *The New York Times*, 27 May 2002.

[16] *9/11 Commission Report*, 273–276; Congressional Joint Inquiry Report, 96–97, 319–321, 366–367.

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The intelligence community's organization was not optimized for coordinating efforts on counterterrorism. For example, the NSA analyzed communications among several suspected terrorists who they thought might be up to something, but did not attempt to establish the identities of the individuals in detail. The NSA assumed that it was supposed to respond to requests from consumers or analytical agencies such as the CIA. If the identities had been researched, more "dots" might have been accurately connected. (And of course they might not have been.)[17] Overall management of the community did not designate a single point of responsibility for coordinating efforts; instead, all involved were assumed to have the responsibility, but the field units more than others. As a result, in the view of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), CIA "headquarters never really took responsibility for the successful management of this case."[18]

Mistaken Priorities or Impossible Choices?

Did the intelligence system fail to make counterterrorism a high enough priority before September 11? Yes and no, but mainly no. Relative to other foreign policy issues, the emphasis on counterterrorism went up significantly after the Cold War. More and better measures could have been taken to interdict or defend against the attacks, but reasons to bear all of the costs—both absolute expense and opportunity costs—are clearer in hindsight than they could have been before the fact.

A superpower will always have more than one major potential threat to its interests, and it will seldom have clear grounds for concentrating single-mindedly on one. Lack of focus or diffusion of effort accounts for some failures in hindsight, but before the fact, too much focus on one priority increases vulnerability to threats that are second or third on the list. Resources are always limited, and when there are numerous claims, even those with high priority get fewer than they might profitably use. To maximize protection against a potential threat—that is, to do *everything possible* to prevent or defend against it—will seem prohibitively expensive as long as the threat is potential rather than both certain and immediate. If the advent of Hurricane Katrina had been assumed to be certain, for example, the costs of a stronger levee system around New Orleans would have been borne. If the political

[17] The acting director of the FBI at the time, Thomas J. Pickard, was later asked what difference it would have made if he had known of Moussaoui's extremism, the presence of two al Qaeda terrorists in the United States, and the Phoenix memo report of Middle Eastern men in flight schools and the danger of a hijacking plot. "He replied that given the thousands of terrorism leads the bureau was evaluating in the summer of 2001, 'I don't know, with all the information the F.B.I. collects, whether we would have had the ability to hone in on those three items.'" Neil A. Lewis, "Defense Tries to Undo Damage Moussaoui Did," *The New York Times*, 29 March 2006.

[18] *9/11 Commission Report*, 353–356.

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system decides not to undertake costly defensive measures in response to ample but imperfect warning, the failure is one of policy at least as much as one of intelligence.

The Silberman-Robb WMD Commission concluded that the problem before September 11 was "dispersal of effort on too many priorities," and the joint congressional investigation concluded that "for much of the Intelligence Community everything became a priority since its customers in the U.S. Government wanted to know everything about everything all the time." For example, NSA had 1,500 formal requirements covering "virtually every situation and target."[19] This was hardly surprising at the turn of the century, however, when post-Cold War foreign policy chose to engage the United States actively in most of the problems of the world, from the Balkans to the Arab–Israeli conflict, to rogue states, to humanitarian crises in Africa, to reform in Russia and China, and so on.

Nevertheless, terrorism was near the top of the U.S. government's list of priorities. In 1995, Presidential Decision Directive 35, the guidance on priorities for the intelligence community, included terrorism among the top few. Between the end of the Cold War and September 11, the aggregate intelligence budget fell, but funding for counterterrorism grew—in most agencies, it doubled.[20] These trends do not suggest that insufficient concern over terrorism caused the failure.

In December of 1998, DCI George Tenet issued a directive saying, "We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community." The directive had little effect, however, in mobilizing new efforts in agencies beyond the CIA.[21] The system took the first step in identifying the priority of counterterrorism in principle. It took part of the second step: giving that priority a larger share of available intelligence resources in the early and mid-1990s. It did not succeed in the third step: inducing policymakers to respond fully and make costly choices to hedge against a potential threat of the sort that exploded on September 11. For example, Tenet's December 1998 directive was not addressed to agencies beyond CIA and the deputy director for community management.[22] The faltering in the third step is especially reflected in reactions to recommendations to tighten airline security procedures.

In 1995, the NIE on terrorism "highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target." But when the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) arranged a briefing for senior figures in the aviation industry by the chief analyst at the Counter-Terrorism Center and his FBI counterpart, the warning

[19] WMD Commission Report, 282; Congressional Joint Inquiry Report, 49.
[20] Congressional Joint Inquiry Report, 46–48.
[21] *9/11 Commission Report*, 341, 357.
[22] Douglas Jehl, "'98 Terror Memo Disregarded, Report Says," *The New York Times*, 15 April 2004.

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failed to convince the industry to pay the price of expensive new security measures.[23] In 1996, in response to the mysterious crash of TWA Flight 800, Vice President Al Gore led a commission on aviation security. The commission concentrated on the danger of bombs placed aboard aircraft and criticized the laxness of existing procedures for screening passengers. In the next few years, various threat reports noted possible uses of aircraft loaded with explosives. Still no move was made to overhaul the airline security system. The FAA's intelligence unit considered the possibility of suicide hijacking but wrote it off because it would not serve what they thought would be the aim of hijackers—to get hostages in order to negotiate the release of imprisoned Islamic radicals.[24]

Inaction is not an unusual response to warnings of dire threats that are plausible yet uncertain. Before September 11, the Federal Emergency Management Agency identified the three most probable disasters: a terrorist attack in New York, an earthquake in San Francisco, and an extreme hurricane in New Orleans. By 2005, two of the three had come to pass. In none of the three cases did government or other major organizations undertake maximum efforts to prevent or prepare to mitigate the consequences. If Louisiana and the federal government had undertaken every project recommended to cope with New Orleans's vulnerability, the price tag would have been an estimated $14 billion.[25] While the future costs of doing less than the maximum possible to deal with these future threats were uncertain, the immediate costs to other interests of doing everything possible were certain.[26]

Collection and Connection

The main failure before September 11 was insufficient collection of unambiguous information. Dots must be collected before they can be connected. The more dots there are, the more likely it is that two or three will show directly when, where, or how an assault might come. As Roberta Wohlstetter made so tragically clear, however, increases in the amount of information available can create "noise" that obscures the most meaningful data.[27] Most ambiguous warnings turn out to be erroneous, and paying full attention to every one produced by a system that excels in collection could bring the system to a halt in processing and evaluation. For example, "by

[23] Paul R. Pillar, "A Scapegoat Is Not a Solution," *The New York Times*, 4 June 2004.

[24] *9/11 Commission Report*, 344–345. See also Max H. Bazerman and Michael D. Watkins, *Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming and How to Prevent Them* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2004), 18–33.

[25] Paul Krugman, "A Can't Do Government," *The New York Times*, 2 September 2005; Mark Fischetti, "They Saw It Coming," *The New York Times*, 2 September 2005.

[26] Bazerman and Watkins, *Predictable Surprises*, 6.

[27] Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 3, 55–56, 130, 228, 387, 393.

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September 2001 the F.A.A. was receiving some 200 pieces a day of intelligence from other agencies about possible threats, and it had opened more than 1,200 files to track possible threats."[28]

Few observers want to admit the trade-off between maximizing collection and losing focus. The Robb-Silberman Commission, for example, complained that "channels conveying terrorism intelligence are clogged with trivia," in part because bureaucrats pass all information on to avoid "later accusations that data was not taken seriously. As one official complained, this behavior is ... 'preparing for the next 9/11 Commission instead of preparing for the next 9/11.'"[29] But can we have it both ways? Can the handling of information be streamlined for manageability without risking failure to convey the critical "dots" that analysts or policymakers might connect?

Maximizing collection can have catastrophic side effects. Paradoxically, the purpose of intelligence is to protect against disaster, but the lust for intelligence can cause disaster. Risky collection ventures can produce provocations or accidents with major diplomatic and military reverberations. This has happened numerous times. In 1960, the Soviet downing of Gary Powers's U-2 spyplane led to cancellation of a summit meeting between Dwight Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev; in 1967, the *U.S.S. Liberty* was destroyed and dozens of its crew killed by Israeli aircraft while the ship was collecting signals intelligence during the Six Day War; the following year, the U.S.S. *Pueblo*, on a similar mission, was captured by North Korea, and its crew was imprisoned for a year; in 1969, an EC-121 collecting electronic intelligence was shot down off the coast of North Korea; in 2001, an American EP-3 aircraft was knocked down by a Chinese pilot, leading to a tense and prolonged international incident between Washington and Beijing. Exploitation of human sources poses similar trade-offs. If a spy is directed to take risks to get all information possible, rather than lying low and waiting for a high-priority task, she may be caught, and then the source is lost and unavailable when needed most. In short, maximizing collection cannot automatically be assumed to be a benefit; when things go wrong, it can cause far more damage to national security than it averts.

If more dots had been collected before September 11, the odds are higher that they might have been connected in a manner that provided usable warning. Yet the more dots there are, the more ways they can be connected—and which way is correct may become evident only when it is too late, when disaster clarifies which indicators were the salient ones. Analysis failed before September 11, perhaps for the reason cited by the 9/11 Commission—ignoring

[28] Eric Lichtblau, "F.A.A. Alerted on Qaeda in '98, 9/11 Panel Said," *The New York Times*, 14 September 2005.

[29] WMD Commission Report, 422.

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certain methods that had been developed to facilitate warning.[30] One need not make excuses for various failures, however, to believe that laymen may come to expect too much of intelligence—"like expecting the FBI to stop bank robberies before they occur."[31] A different reading of the record led Richard Posner to conclude, in opposition to the 9/11 Commission, that the answer is "something different, banal and deeply disturbing: that it is almost impossible to take effective action to prevent something that hasn't occurred previously."[32]

The special difficulty of tactical warning makes it particularly important for policymakers to consider what they should do with strategic warning. If tactical warning that will prevent attacks from being launched cannot be expected, the premium on measures to blunt their impact goes up. This means translating the warning of potential threats into programs for coping with them when they burst forth. But is there reason for confidence that the lesson of September 11 will make this happen better than in the past? A number of severe potential threats were clearly identified in recent years, ones for which a number of defensive measures have been available. As with aviation security before September 11, however, the costs or negative side effects of some of these defensive options led authorities to decide against them, and to wait for development of alternative measures that would pose fewer costs. As long as the threats do not eventuate, these choices to do less than the maximum possible as soon as possible will seem prudent. The day after one of the threats does eventuate, however, few in the public will forgive authorities for not having made the hard choice to pay the costs and accept the side effects.

One example is the potential for terrorists to mount coordinated strikes on civilian airliners with shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADS, or man-portable air defense systems). This risk has been understood at least since the mid-1990s. Precautions of various sorts were heightened, but the main defensive option—installation of flare or laser systems on airliners to deflect or destroy missiles in flight—was not adopted immediately. The cost would not only have been many billions of dollars, but the risk as well that false alarms would cause dangerous side effects, such as fires started by flares, or people on the ground being blinded by lasers. So the government decided to await technological development of safer and more economical defense systems. By the time these lines are read, new and better defensive countermeasures may have been put in place, but that will only mean that the gamble to leave this

[30] Ibid., 347. *9/11 Commission Report*, 346–348. For example, although the possible use of aircraft as a weapon had been identified, the Counter-Terrorism Center did not analyze how this might be done, and "did not develop a set of telltale indicators for this method of attack."

[31] *Intelligence and Policy: The Evolving Relationship*, Roundtable Report (Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, June 2004), 8.

[32] Richard A. Posner, "The 9/11 Report: A Dissent," *New York Times Book Review*, 29 August 2004, 9.

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vulnerability incompletely covered for a decade or more paid off, not that the risk in the interim was insignificant. Another example is the efficient dissemination of aerosolized anthrax over several cities. Timely public health response might minimize fatalities through distribution of antibiotics, but deficiencies in stockpiles or procedures for contacting and treating millions of exposed people in untested situations might still yield thousands of fatalities. Yet the government has not mounted a crash program to overcome the obstacles to mass vaccination against anthrax—for many good reasons, such as problems in production of vaccine, limitations on its efficacy over time, or risk to the health of some fraction of those vaccinated. For however long there are no effective anthrax attacks, the choice not to promote mass vaccination seems wise, but if the scenario of successful attack plays out, the choice will seem as mistaken as the failure to beef up airline security measures before September 11.[33] The list of hard choices about which strategic warnings warrant action is long.

Seeing the failure to go far enough in exploring the potential for the kamikaze hijacking tactic ultimately used on September 11, and the failure of intelligence organizations to connect the dots more creatively, the 9/11 Commission opined that it is "crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination."[34] This is an oxymoronic notion, but on the mark. It can be attempted in various ways, such as instituting "Red Teams," devil's advocates, analytical kibitzers, or other mechanisms for thinking "outside the box." Multiplying the number of scenarios given serious rather than cursory attention, however, runs up against the need for focus on priorities and probable threats. Such innovations prove hard to sustain in practice and rarely provide the remedies anticipated, but periodic revival of the attempts at least focuses attention on challenging assumptions for some span of time.

Wrong for the Right Reason? WMD in Iraq

Having failed to connect the dots before September 11, American intelligence made the opposite mistake on Iraq—it connected the dots too well. In two ways, the mistaken estimate that Iraq maintained stocks of chemical and biological weapons and an active program to acquire nuclear weapons was the worst intelligence failure since the founding of the modern intelligence community.

The less damaging effect was the spillover that tarnished the credibility of U.S. intelligence in general. When U.S. armed forces invaded Iraq but did not find the weapons so confidently attributed to Saddam Hussein by U.S.

[33] See James Chow, James Chiesa, Paul Dreyer, Mel Eisman, Theodore W. Karasik, Joel Kvitky, Sherrill Lingel, David Ochmanek, and Chad Shirley, *Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005); and Richard K. Betts, "How to Think About Terrorism," *Wilson Quarterly* 30 (Winter 2006): 48–49.

[34] *9/11 Commission Report*, 344.

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intelligence,[35] the shock struck many in the public as evidence of fundamental incompetence or chicanery in the intelligence system.

The failure distracted attention completely from the creditable performance of the intelligence community on other issues, including Iraq. For example, a post-mortem led by Richard Kerr, retired head of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, concluded that pre-war intelligence on many issues concerning Iraq was quite accurate—for example, on predictions about "how the war would develop and how Iraqi forces would or would not fight," connections between Iraq and al Qaeda, "the impact of the war on oil markets," and "reactions of the ethnic and tribal factions in Iraq." Most relevant was anticipation of an awful aftermath to war: "assessments on post-Saddam issues were particularly insightful." Ironically, policymakers heeded technical intelligence about weaponry, which was wrong, "but apparently paid little attention to intelligence on cultural and political issues (post-Saddam Iraq), where the analysis was right."[36] In a September 2002 Camp David meeting of top national security officials to discuss going to war, a CIA paper titled "The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences of Invading Iraq" was included in the briefing books. The summary flagged the possibility of post-war anarchy, fragmentation of the country, instability in other Arab states, disruption of oil supplies, diplomatic conflict with European allies, and a spurt of Islamic terrorism around the world.[37] Yet ultimately, the administration "went to war without requesting ... any strategic-level intelligence assessments on any aspect of Iraq."[38]

[35] It is not literally true that no WMD were found in Iraq. After 2003, according to a U.S. Army report, "approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve agent" were discovered. These were decaying remnants of pre-1991 stockpiles, found in scattered "small numbers," not the types maintained in operational condition that were expected. Quotations in "Officials Discuss Report on Munitions," *The New York Times*, 23 June 2006.

[36] Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, and Aris Pappas, "Collection and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the U.S. Intelligence Community," originally written in July 2004, reprinted in *Studies in Intelligence* (unclassified ed.) 49 (2005): 48. See also Paul Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 85 (March/April 2006): 16, 18–19.

[37] Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 317–318. Given the number of questions and complexity of the issues regarding Iraq, the record was of course mixed, and some saw the glass as half-full, others as half-empty: "Agencies Warned Bush Aides of Postwar Iraq Resistance," *The Washington Post*, 9 September 2003; Michael R. Gordon, "Poor Intelligence Misled Troops About Risk of Drawn-Out War," *The New York Times*, 10 October 2004. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 498: "The CIA in particular was not only wrong on WMD, but failed to identify the importance of the Fedayeen or to uncover the tons of arms that had been cached."

[38] Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq," 18: "I was in charge of coordinating all of the intelligence community's assessments regarding Iraq; the first request I received from any administration policymaker for any such assessment was not until a year into the war."

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The worst effect of the estimate was that it provided the warrant for war against Iraq, an unnecessary war that cost far more in blood and treasure than had the attacks of September 11. If we are to believe President Bush, mistaken intelligence did not cause his decision for war, because he had other reasons for wanting to destroy the Saddam Hussein regime. Bush later claimed that he would have launched the war even if he had known that Iraq did not have WMD. The presumed existence of such weapons, however, was the only reason that the administration could secure public support to make the war politically feasible. Had Bush presented the case for war in 2002 as he did a few years later, denying that neutralizing WMD was a necessary condition, no one but fanatics would have lined up behind him. To this extent, the intelligence failure bears responsibility for the war.[39]

At the same time, it is fair to say that the intelligence failure was tragic but not egregious. It was a failure in both collection and analysis. Although the bottom-line analytic conclusion was wrong and the caveats were insufficient, in the absence of adequate collection, *it was the proper estimate to make from the evidence then available.* No responsible analyst could have concluded in 2002 that Iraq did *not* have concealed stocks of chemical and biological weapons. The principal mistakes were in the confident presentation of the analysis, and the failure to make clear how weak the direct evidence was for reaching any conclusion and how much the conclusion depended on logic and deduction from behavior. In effect, available intelligence might have served to convict Saddam Hussein of holding WMD if the standard of civil law were applied (requiring decision on the basis of the preponderance of evidence) but could not have convicted him under the standard of criminal law (which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt).

Roots of Error

Bob Woodward famously reported that DCI George Tenet, when questioned at a White House meeting about how solid was the intelligence that indicated Iraq had WMD, said, "Don't worry, it's a slam dunk!"[40] (Tenet admits saying those words, but says that the context and connotations of the utterance were misrepresented.)[41] How could the intelligence community have been so

[39] Tenet ironically defends the intelligence community by citing its lack of influence on the matter: "An NIE has never been relied upon as a basis for going to war... . The greatest exaggeration is the profound effect the NIE supposedly had on decision makers... . *The Washington Post* reported, 'No more than six senators and a handful of House members who did not serve on the house and senate Intelligence Committees read beyond the five-page National Intelligence Estimate executive summary." Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 337.

[40] Quoted in Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 249.

[41] Tenet's memoirs devote a whole chapter to the incident: Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, chapter 19.

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confident about a conclusion that turned out to be so wrong, especially when it had hardly any direct evidence of the existence of the weapons? The essential reason is that the conclusion was deduced from Iraqi behavior and the motives assumed to be consistent with that behavior. To people paying attention to the issue, the conclusion seemed *utterly obvious*, based on the accumulated observations and experience of the preceding decade. Indeed, "apparently all intelligence services in all countries and most private analysts came to roughly the same conclusions."[42] This nearly universal consensus was rooted in the experiences following the 1991 war.

After the first Persian Gulf War, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) uncovered in Iraq a huge infrastructure of facilities and programs for producing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that had been hidden from pre-war Western intelligence. Forced by the surrender agreement at the end of the war to allow continuing intrusion by UNSCOM, and caught short when early inspections revealed prohibited activities, the Iraqis fought back. An Iraqi government committee gave instructions to conceal WMD activities from inspectors (this was revealed by a document that the inspectors obtained). Another document retrieved from a nuclear installation showed "how it carried out this order. According to UNSCOM's final report, 'The facility was instructed to remove evidence of the true activities at the facility, evacuate documents to hide sites, make physical alterations to the site to hide its true purpose, develop cover stories, and conduct mock inspections to prepare for UN inspectors.'"[43]

From 1992 to 1998, when Saddam finally compelled UNSCOM to leave the country, the Commission was regularly frustrated in its inspections by a game of cat and mouse, Iraqi delays and obstructions that seemed consistent only with attempts to conceal activities they did not want discovered.[44] Iraq admitted having stocks of chemical and biological weapons at the end of the war and claimed to have destroyed them later, but never provided a credible accounting or evidence of such destruction. Since it *seemed* obvious that it was in Saddam's interest to demonstrate compliance with legal obligations if it were possible to do so, this failure to account seemed necessarily to indicate that the stocks had been retained and hidden. UNSCOM also got figures on imports of equipment appropriate for WMD programs and could not get the

[42] Robert Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29 (February 2006): 18. This article was based on an investigation of lessons that Jervis led (and in which I participated) for the Central Intelligence Agency.

[43] Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong," *The Atlantic* (January–February 2004): 81.

[44] For details, see the accounts by UNSCOM staff member Tim Trevan, *Saddam's Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons* (London: HarperCollins, 1999) and UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler, *The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Crisis of Global Security* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2000).

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Iraqis to account for what had happened to such materials. This too appeared to confirm that they must be up to no good.[45] As the Silberman-Robb Commission concluded, "When someone acts like he is hiding something, it is hard to entertain the conclusion that he really has nothing to hide."[46] Moreover, the shock of discovering how much had been successfully concealed before the 1991 war had convinced Western intelligence that the Iraqis were masters of deception, so absence of evidence of WMD in subsequent years, or any negative indications, were explained away as due to denial and deception (D&D). Assumptions that Iraq had ambitious WMD projects and a major D&D program "were tied together into a self-reinforcing premise that explained away the lack of strong evidence of either."[47]

The assessment process reflected errors in method, but ones common among analysts of any sort. It is well known from cognitive psychology that people tend to look for information that confirms what they already believe and discount information that is inconsistent with those predispositions. Instructions to collectors compounded this tendency by telling them to "seek information about Iraq's progress toward obtaining WMD," rather than about *whether* Iraq was trying to get WMD. This may have led agents to "ignore reports of lack of activity." Similarly, one major negative report from an important source was downplayed. Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, defected and told his debriefers much about Iraq's WMD programs, but said that they did not amount to much, and that old stocks had been destroyed.[48] The apparent lack of interest in this aspect of the defector's testimony may be the most damning example of ignoring negative evidence.

One of the principal disputes about evidence concerned Iraq's illegal importation of aluminum tubes. The CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the NSA, and the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency concluded that the tubes were for use in centrifuges, to produce enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE) disagreed. Ironically, CIA and DIA would not have firmly asserted that the nuclear program was being reconstituted if they had not had the apparent evidence of the tubes, but DOE agreed on the conclusion of reconstitution despite writing off the tubes.[49]

In the context of seemingly obvious guilt, "analysts shifted the burden of proof, requiring evidence that Iraq did *not* have WMD," and in effect "erected

[45] Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons," 86.

[46] WMD Commission Report, 155.

[47] SSCI Report, 22; see also Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons," 85, and WMD Commission Report, 92.

[48] Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures," 24–25, 40.

[49] WMD Commission Report, 183. See also David Barstow, William J. Broad, and Jeff Gerth, "How White House Embraced Iraq Arms Intelligence," *The New York Times*, 23 October 2004.

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a theory that almost could not be disproved."[50] The October 2002 NIE was rushed to completion in an extraordinarily short time because it had been requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the period that appeared to be the countdown toward war. Because of the time pressure, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) did not circulate the draft for peer review or comment by outsiders. This did not seem to be a risky omission, however, because as the vice chair of the NIC said, "I think all you could have called in is an amen chorus on this thing, because there was nobody out there with different views."[51]

However obvious the answer seemed, the fact remained that the intelligence community had virtually no hard evidence that Iraq was retaining the chemical and biological weapons that it had at the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, had manufactured new ones, or was reassembling its nuclear weapons program. Collection failed in two crucial ways. First, it failed to uncover much new information after UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq in 1998. Second, much of the information it did get came from defector reports that turned out to be fabricated or unreliable. The procedure for protecting sources also misled analysts into thinking that the number of human sources was greater than it was, because clandestine reporting often identified the same source in different ways.[52]

The Senate Intelligence Committee investigation stated that American intelligence "did not have a single HUMINT [human intelligence] source collecting against Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq after 1998," although there were sources on other subjects, such as political developments.[53] (Tenet later reported that he was especially influenced "by a very sensitive, highly placed source in Iraq" not previously discussed in public.)[54] Technical intelligence collection existed, but errors resulted from "over-reliance on dubious imagery ... breakdowns in communication between collectors and analysts," and inadequate signals intelligence.[55] Until late 2002, shortly before the war was launched, North Korean and Iranian weapons programs had a higher priority than Iraq's; what technical collection there was

[50] WMD Commission Report, 49–50.

[51] SSCI Report, 11–13. As one of the outsiders occasionally called on to review draft estimates, I must confess that I would probably have been part of the amen chorus if I had been consulted, although I was surprised later to find how thin the base of direct evidence on the subject was.

[52] Kerr, Wolfe, Donegan, and Pappas, "Collection and Analysis on Iraq," 51.

[53] SSCI Report, 24–25.

[54] "Every once in a while, doubts would creep in about why so much of our evidence was indirect or why it had been so long since inspectors had found something. Right about then, this source would pop up with something incredibly specific that would not only affirm our intelligence but eliminate the doubts we might be having." Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 329–330.

[55] WMD Commission Report, 112–113, 116.

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in Iraq focused on the air defense system, because of U.S. air operations over the southern part of the country.[56]

The biggest mistakes were reliance on unreliable human intelligence, and failure to correct disseminated reports when they were found to be dubious. On chemical weapons, none of the reports from human sources "was considered 'highly reliable' ... and only six were deemed 'moderately reliable.'"[57] Most notorious was "Curveball," the code name for a chemical engineer from Baghdad who had emigrated to Germany and whose reports on biological weapons (BW) development were funneled through the German intelligence service. In May of 2004, a full year after the invasion of Iraq, the CIA determined that Curveball's reporting was fabricated.[58] When the NIE was being done, Curveball's allegations about BW programs appeared to be corroborated by three other sources, but one later recanted, and another had already been branded a fabricator by the Defense Intelligence Agency in May of 2002. Nevertheless, owing to bureaucratic miscommunication, allegations about biological weapons programs from that source still found their way into the October 2002 NIE and Secretary of State Colin Powell's February 2003 speech before the UN Security Council.[59]

These mistakes in validating collection were egregious, but apparently not the fault of the analysts who produced the NIE. Given the thin amount of direct evidence, even erroneous evidence, judgments remained driven by the circumstantial evidence of Iraqi behavior and logical deductions from it. Only when no WMD turned up after the invasion did hindsight make it easy to see other explanations for Iraqi deception. For example, Iraq had frequently tried to import dual-use materials (items that could be applied either to innocent or to forbidden uses) through illicit channels such as front companies. Analysts assumed this meant that the materials were going to WMD programs, since there appeared to be no other reason to hide the transactions. Iraq did this as standard operating procedure even for some legitimate imports, however, precisely because the UN sanctions monitors sometimes denied permission for innocent items because the materials could be used for WMD. The UN bureaucracy for approving imports was also ponderous and required more time and effort to use than illegal channels, and working through front companies facilitated corrupt skimming of profits.[60]

[56] Some of the limitations on collection were due to the overall decline in intelligence resources following the Cold War. Kerr, Wolfe, Donegan, and Pappas, "Collection and Analysis on Iraq," 49–50.

[57] WMD Commission Report, 117.

[58] Douglas Jehl, "C.I.A. Chief Orders 'Curveball' Review," *The New York Times*, 8 April 2005; SSCI Report, 152–160; WMD Commission Report, 84. See also Bob Drogin and John Goetz, "How U.S. Fell Under the Spell of 'Curveball,'" *Los Angeles Times*, 20 November 2005.

[59] SSCI Report, 161; WMD Commission Report, 84–85; Drogin and Goetz, "How U.S. Fell Under the Spell."

[60] SSCI Report, 20.

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Hindsight also made it easier to entertain rationales for Saddam's encouraging his opponents to believe in the nonexistent weapons. In the new light, his strategy appeared to be an attempt to have his cake and eat it too—to claim the high ground in the court of world opinion by asserting compliance with disarmament obligations, while exercising deterrence against the United States and Iran by abetting the inference that he still had the forbidden weapons. FBI interrogation of Saddam after his capture suggested this rationale, and that Saddam was particularly worried that inspections would "expose Iraq's vulnerability in comparison with Iran." Saddam even deceived his own government, suggesting to high officials that Iraq had WMD.[61]

The most fundamental obstacle to success in the estimate was that "*it is particularly difficult for analysts to get it right when the truth is implausible.*"[62] Hindsight always reminds us not to assume that what appears irrational to observers does not have a rationale. When estimating, however, what analyst will ever predict that the subject will act stupidly rather than sensibly? In 1962, the NIE was wrong about missiles in Cuba because analysts did not believe that Khrushchev would shoot himself in the foot.[63] Forty years later, the NIE on Iraq made the same mistake about Saddam Hussein. In October of 2002, attributing to Saddam the strategy of pretending to have WMD would have seemed too clever by half, since it was assumed that he would see his survival as more threatened by non-compliance with legal obligations. The correct but counterintuitive rationale for Saddam's behavior might have been included in a pre-war estimate, but only as an alternative interpretation to the consensus judgment. Before the fact, it would inevitably have seemed to be an imaginative stretch made by a devil's advocate fulfilling the requirement to think out of the box—and it would have been dismissed.

What the 2002 NIE Did, Should Have Done, and Could Have Done

The full text of the October 2002 NIE included caveats about the limits of the evidence on which it was based, as well as extensive discussion of the reasons that the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) disagreed with the conclusion. (INR's dissent is sometimes wrongly characterized as a judgment that Saddam did not harbor WMD. INR simply remained agnostic, neither endorsing nor opposing that conclusion.) The dissenting views were highlighted in color and boxed text, not buried in footnotes as was the norm during the Cold War, and the dissents in this case were, as Tenet noted, "an unprecedented sixteen pages of the ninety-page NIE." Tenet also pointed out that "the phrase 'we do not know' appears some thirty times across ninety pages.

[61] See Duelfer Report, vol. I; WMD Commission Report, 121.

[62] Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures," 42 (emphasis added).

[63] Sherman Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived," reprinted in *Studies in Intelligence* (unclassified ed.) 36 (1992): 118.

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The words 'we know' appear in only three instances. Unfortunately, we were not as cautious in the 'Key Judgments.'"[64]

The tone of the NIE was confident, and the Key Judgments—the summary of conclusions that is all that many consumers read—did not convey the limitations with sufficient force. Apart from directing readers to see the two long paragraphs summarizing INR's alternative view at the end, and stating, "We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD programs," the Key Judgments mainly enumerated estimated Iraqi programs and capabilities, leaving the impression that the estimates derived from observed activities as much as deduction from behavior and assumed intentions.[65] As Sherman Kent recalled, the same thing had happened in the Cuban crisis estimate: "How could we have misjudged? The short answer is that, lacking the direct evidence, we went to the next best thing, namely information which might *indicate* the true course of developments."[66]

With the benefit of hindsight, one might argue that the strictly correct estimate in 2002 should have been that the intelligence community simply did not know whether Iraq retained WMD or programs to obtain WMD. That would have been intellectually valid but would have abdicated the responsibility to provide the best support possible to the policy process. As Kent reminisced about Cuba in 1962, when dealing with something that cannot be known for sure "there is a strong temptation to make no estimate at all. In the absence of directly guiding evidence, why not say the Soviets might do this, they might do that, or yet again they might do the other—and leave it at that?" Foreswearing any educated guess "has the attractions of judicious caution and an exposed neck, but it can scarcely be of use to the policy man and planner who must prepare for future contingencies."[67]

Conscious of responsibility to contribute to decision, managers of the analytic process did not err on the side of caution. They wanted to avoid equivocation to keep the estimate from sounding useless. They believed that good analysis needed "to go beyond certain knowledge" even if this meant occasionally being wrong. As Mark Lowenthal, former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence, put it, "willingness to take such risks is undermined by fears of 'failure.' No one wants intelligence that is brash and wrong; pusil-

[64] Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 327.

[65] The Key Judgments were declassified and made available to the public on 18 July 2003 and posted on the Internet at http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html. One official document will provide the public with a sober, detailed, and informative explanation of the process that produced the mistaken NIE, whenever it is declassified: *How the Intelligence Community Arrived at the Judgments in the October 2002 NIE on Iraq's WMD Programs* (National Intelligence Council, March 2004), cited in WMD Commission Report, 197n3.

[66] Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived," 115 (emphasis in original).

[67] Ibid., 116.

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lanimous intelligence is not any better."[68] Moreover, the CIA and other elements of the intelligence community were still smarting from the criticism they had received from the 1990s Rumsfeld Commission on missile development in rogue states, when intelligence predictions were judged to be too optimistic. As Tenet lamented, "the remedy for one so-called intelligence failure can help set the stage for another."[69]

If estimators were to act realistically and earn their pay, yet remain accurate, given what was known and knowable at the time, they should have posed three Key Judgments in the October 2002 NIE:

- Iraq is probably hiding stocks of chemical and biological weapons and active programs to develop and produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
- That conclusion is deduced primarily from obstruction of UNSCOM, failure to account for destruction of stocks known to exist in 1991, and some other circumstantial evidence.
- There is very little direct evidence, and no highly reliable direct evidence, to back up the deduction.

This would have averted the irresponsibility of offering no judgment and could have fit within the one-page President's Summary.[70] It would also have been unwelcome to policymakers looking for the warrant for war, but would have been accurate, given what was known and knowable at the time. To most observers looking back after the invasion and the missing WMD, however, the difference between these and the actual Key Judgments would appear to be a matter of nuance rather than an acceptable analysis.

Was this failure a symptom of the system's core weakness? The context in which the October 2002 NIE is seen determines how awful it looks. If measured by its relation to the justification for invading Iraq, it looks epochally awful. If measured as an entry in the set of assessments related to counterproliferation in general, however, it looks different. This is what the British post-mortem on London's intelligence failure before the war did. The Butler Report investigated all proliferation-related intelligence projects, including those related to Libya, Iran, North Korea, and the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan, as well as Iraq. These other intelligence projects were more or less successful, which made the Iraq case "one failure against four successes. Hence, it was viewed as a failure due to Iraq-specific factors that somehow tripped up an otherwise effective system," not as evidence of thorough breakdown. The

[68] Mark M. Lowenthal, "The Burdensome Concept of Failure" in Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, and James M. Keagle, *Intelligence: Policy and Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 43. See also Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 196–197.

[69] Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 332.

[70] The actual President's Summary reportedly did not contain the caveats or dissents found in the full NIE. Douglas Jehl, "White House and C.I.A. Withhold Document on Prewar Intelligence Given to Bush," *The New York Times*, 14 July 2004.

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Ross-Silberman Commission also gave the U.S. system some credit for success on other proliferation cases. The Senate Intelligence Committee Report came out first in the United States, however, was unremitting in criticism, and set the tone for public understanding of the Iraq failure.[71]

The fact of being wrong is not in itself evidence of mistakes that could have been avoided or that show dereliction. The Senate Intelligence Committee post-mortem tended to make that mistaken inference, and most lay critics did as well.[72] Moreover, it is far from clear that the huge number of innovations in organization and procedure undertaken in the past several years, especially with the reform legislation of 2004, will cure more problems than they cause, or will endure under the perpetual time pressures and other constraints facing intelligence professionals from day to day. Perversely, then, measured against realistic standards, and awful as the failure of the Iraq WMD intelligence was, the system did not do as badly as common sense implies.[73] But so what? It is good news to find "that the system was not horribly broken, but bad news in that there are few fixes that will produce more than marginal (but still significant) improvements."[74] Being wrong for the right reasons means little to citizens who must live with the result, but it does provide a caution against drawing too many lessons from a single failure.

[71] Philip H.J. Davies, "A Critical Look at Britain's Spy Machinery," *Studies in Intelligence* (unclassified ed.) 49 (2005), 42. The official report, by a former Cabinet Secretary, was Lord Butler of Brockwell, *Review of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (London: The Stationery Office, 2004).

[72] Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures," 14. The SSCI report "almost always equates reasonable, well-grounded inferences with those that proved to be correct. We can see the problem by asking the obvious counterfactual: would the same report have been written if the estimates turned out to be correct? This is implausible, yet it is what SSCI implies."

[73] For elaboration of arguments in this vein, see Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence*, chapters 2, 3, and 6.

[74] Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures," 14.

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Credibility and the War on Terror

CHRISTOPHER J. FETTWEIS

Credibility is a nation's greatest asset in international affairs. It is the hardest to earn and the most difficult to maintain, but once possessed it makes it possible to compel changes in behavior.

—John McCain[1]

Were the United States to withdraw prematurely from Iraq, warned Donald Rumsfeld in August 2006, the consequences for global stability would be catastrophic. Dominoes would fall across the region, and then beyond. "The enemy would tell us to leave Afghanistan and then withdraw from the Middle East," he told the Senate Armed Services Committee. Then "they'd order us and all those who don't share their militant ideology to leave what they call the occupied Muslim lands from Spain to the Philippines." The harm to the credibility of the United States would be nearly irreparable, and before long, the American people would be forced "to make a stand nearer home."[2]

Clearly, Henry Kissinger's decades-old observation that no serious policymaker doubts the importance of prestige, honor, and credibility still applies today.[3] Experienced practitioners of foreign policy take for granted the notion that actions taken today can affect (and perhaps prevent) the crises of tomorrow. The messages sent by foreign policy actions can sometimes seem to be more important than the actions themselves, since other states—including current and potential enemies—are watching every move, making judgments about the credibility of U.S. threats and promises. To question the wisdom of the imperative may seem terribly naïve, and perhaps even dangerous.

This "credibility imperative," in historian Robert McMahon's words, has occupied a central position in every major foreign policy debate in the last

[1] John McCain, "No Time to Sleep," *The Washington Post*, 24 October 2002.

[2] "The Sound of One Domino Falling," *The New York Times*, 4 August 2006.

[3] Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1979), 228.

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50 years.[4] However, many scholars remain, for the most part, unconvinced. Since the war in Vietnam, a competing conventional wisdom has been building momentum in scholarly circles, one that considers the obsession with credibility to be an illusory waste of time at best, and a producer of profoundly destructive misguidance at worst. Few issues currently separate the policy community from scholars in a more profound and important way. Resolving this curious disconnect between the beliefs of scholars and those of practitioners could hardly be more urgent. For better or for worse, the credibility imperative will probably have an enormous effect on U.S. foreign policy throughout the "long war" on terror, shaping all of the most vital decisions that will have to be made.

At first glance, Islamic fundamentalists appear to pose a difficult challenge to the credibility imperative's many academic skeptics. Osama bin Laden and his allies apparently considered the United States to be a feckless, cowardly "paper tiger," which is a perception that may have emboldened them to strike. When attacked, effete Americans sue; they send lawyers, not soldiers. September 11 might even have been prevented, so this logic goes, if Washington had responded to previous al Qaeda attacks with a more determined show of force. Perhaps the war on terror will prove the conventional wisdom of the practitioner regarding the lessons of credibility to have much more value than scholars think. Did a lack of American "credibility" lead al Qaeda to believe that it could strike the United States with impunity? Would a reputation for resolve keep a country safer during the war on terror?

Surely it behooves both policymakers and scholars to re-assess occasionally the wisdom of even their most closely held assumptions. Few beliefs are more deeply ingrained in the foreign policy conventional wisdom, and more in need of re-examination, than the nearly universal belief in the vital importance of national credibility. This paper investigates this curious divergence between scholars and practitioners when it comes to credibility. It reviews conventional wisdoms and speculates on how they developed. After making a series of observations about the effect that the "credibility imperative" has on the foreign policy debates, the paper discusses the uses and abuses of the concept in the war on terror. In the end, it is hard to escape the conclusion, even during the current era, that credibility is an illusion—and an exceptionally dangerous illusion at that. Since it remains impossible for any state to control the perceptions of others, the continuing concern with credibility and reputation in the post-Cold War world is deeply misguided, and likely to cause many more problems than it solves. Keeping an eye on the future, although natural and comforting, often creates profound myopia in the present.

[4] Robert J. McMahon, "Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 15 (Fall 1991), 455–471.

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The Credibility Imperative in U.S. Foreign Policy

The term "credibility" has been used in so many contexts that it can at times seem to mean all things to all people. The credibility of a state is a mixture of its competence, legitimacy, resolve, trustworthiness, willingness to take casualties, and/or rigidity of purpose. In perhaps its most central and common usage, however, credibility is simply the capability to be believed or trusted. Perhaps most crucially for policymakers, credibility is often used as a code word for the prestige and reputation of a state.[5] It is, in Kissinger's words, "the coin with which we conduct our foreign policy," an intangible asset without which a state cannot influence the actions of others.[6] In periods of high credibility, a state can deter and compel behavior and accomplish goals short of war; when credibility is low, skeptical adversaries and allies may be tempted to ignore a state's threats and promises. To policymakers, therefore, solid credibility is worth many divisions at the negotiating table.

The credibility of a state forms the basis of its reputation, which is little more than an impression of fundamental national character that serves as a guide for others trying to anticipate future actions.[7] Classical deterrence theory holds that if a state fails to rise to a challenge or pursue a goal with sufficient resolve, it risks earning a reputation for weakness, which might encourage aggression from enemies and discourage the loyalty of allies.[8] Threats made by a state without credibility may not be believed, setting off a cascading "domino effect" of aggression from emboldened rivals, possibly until they challenge an interest that is truly vital, making a major war unavoidable. The credibility imperative is also clearly related to the post-war Western obsession with "appeasement," which is, of course, a code word for a show of weakness that inadvertently encourages an aggressor.

Credibility is a unique and complicated national asset. Perhaps some of the profound insecurity that some policymakers display regarding their credibility may be tied to the fact that its status is ultimately beyond their control. No state owns its reputation—it can be affected by the actions of a state to be sure, but

[5] Ibid., 455.

[6] Dan Williams and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Policy Lacks Focus, Critics Say: Bosnia Cited as Prime Case," *The Washington Post*, 24 April 1994.

[7] Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 6.

[8] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a New Theory of National Security* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Stein, eds., *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).

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in a very real and important sense, it exists in the minds of others. "Credibility exists," John McCain has noted, "only in the eye of the beholder."[9] Given this complexity, perhaps it is little wonder that scholars often omit the credibility imperative from their otherwise-parsimonious explanatory models of U.S. foreign policy behavior. All psychological variables are difficult to measure and inherently unquantifiable; credibility is no different. However, U.S. foreign policy is impossible to understand without it.

The Origin and Development of the Credibility Imperative, in Theory and Policy

A variety of explanations have been proposed to account for the power that the credibility imperative has had over U.S. policymakers since World War II. First, it is possible that concerns about reputation go hand in hand with great-power status.[10] Perhaps small powers, whose basic security is often not assured, have less need to worry about the messages that their actions send to potential enemies and allies. The weak do not fear the credibility of their commitments to the strong—no dominoes will fall if a small state fails to keep a promise. According to this explanation, as the power of the United States grew over the years, perhaps it was quite natural for its leaders to become more concerned with intangible assets. Credibility might be a concern only for those participating in geopolitics on a global scale.

Second, the nature of the Cold War surely helped the imperative to take root. Since both sides were for the most part interested in avoiding direct conflict, the contest for global supremacy was fought in nontraditional arenas. In a very important sense, the Cold War was a battle of ideas, pitting competing systems of socioeconomic organization against each other in the minds of the masses as much as on the field of battle. Intangible, psychological factors took on increased importance for security and stability, with success and failure often measured by perception as much as reality. Credibility for the United States was therefore also a measure of the viability of the system it espoused, so when it was low, policymakers worried that others might get the impression that history was on the side of the Soviets and communism. Walt Rostow, who was the director of policy planning in John F. Kennedy's State Department, was perhaps the strongest advocate of this argument. Rostow felt that since it was vitally important to convince the third world to follow a capitalist model of development, reverses in the periphery could be strategic disasters.[11] More than merely the "coin with which we run our foreign policy," credibility became the measuring stick by which to judge which side was winning the

[9] McCain, "No Time to Sleep."

[10] McMahon, "Credibility and World Power," 469.

[11] John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 208–209.

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struggle, and which camp the wise third parties would join. On the Cold War scorecard, credibility points were won each time Washington kept its commitments, and lost whenever it did not.

The dominant weaponry of the Cold War also enhanced the imperative to remain credible. The nuclear revolution changed not only how states acted, but also how policymakers thought about international relations.[12] Since much about the use of nuclear weapons seemed irrational—after all, only "madmen" would contemplate nuclear war—security professionals were forced to deal with basic questions about sanity and insanity. The psychology of the opponent, in particular, became a much more important point of emphasis. As McMahon has argued, "The very essence of security in the nuclear era has been based on conjectures about the cognitive process of others."[13] The wise policymaker took all possible steps to influence those cognitive processes in productive ways. Maintaining credible commitments was perhaps the most obvious way to do so.

Third, some scholars have suggested that there may be something in U.S. political culture that makes it particularly susceptible to the credibility imperative.[14] While all states are concerned to some degree about their reputations, no country seems to have taken the imperative to remain credible as seriously as has the United States since the Second World War. Scholars have not been able to detect similar levels of concern over credibility in any other state, even in the Soviet Union, which presumably faced many of the same challenges during the Cold War without exhibiting a similar influence of the imperative.[15] Jerome Slater has argued that "it does not occur to ordinary states to imagine that their 'vital interests' are integrally linked to outcomes of local wars in tiny countries thousands of miles away from their borders."[16] The United States, of course, has never been an "ordinary" state.[17]

Finally, the prevailing conventional wisdom in academia has helped to provide an intellectual justification for the belief in the importance of credibility. Deterrence theory, which was, of course, one of the major intellectual orthodoxies of the early Cold War, preached the essential *interdependence* of foreign policy actions across time and space. Since the actions of a state send messages to others about its probable behavior in the future, irresolution in crises can teach rivals and allies alike that the state is unlikely

[12] See Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[13] McMahon, "Credibility and World Power," 469.

[14] Ibid., 471.

[15] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*; McMahon, "Credibility and World Power," 471.

[16] Jerome Slater, "The Domino Theory and International Politics: The Case of Vietnam," *Security Studies* 3 (Winter 1993/94), 218.

[17] Robert H. Johnson, *Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); and Frances Fitzgerald, *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Touchstone, 2001).

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to respond to any challenges anywhere.[18] Emboldened by such perceptions, adversaries would be likely to press their advantage and engage in adventurism elsewhere. If, instead, the state is resolute in honoring its commitments, even in cases of seemingly small importance, potential aggressors will take note and serious future crises will be less likely. "Essentially," explained Thomas Schelling, "we tell the Soviets that we have to react here because, if we did not, they would not believe us when we say that we will react there."[19] The imperative to remain credible was part of the training of nearly every American foreign policy professional for decades. Its importance was taken as a given, almost as the political science equivalent of settled law.

Cold War policymakers often had deep backgrounds in academic theories of international relations. Indeed no policymaker provides a better example of the interdependence belief in practice than Henry Kissinger, a former academic who often seemed to interpret all international events through zero-sum, interdependent lenses. Kissinger was but the most visible of a brand of foreign policy generalist who, along with such men as Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze, Richard Nixon, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, tended to fit every event, no matter how local or peripheral it might have seemed, into a tightly knit framework of global competition. When India intervened in the Pakistani civil war in 1971, for example, Kissinger saw the hidden hand of the Soviets, which underlined the importance of maintaining the credibility of U.S. threats. "Had we acquiesced in such a power play," he wrote, "we would have sent a wrong signal to Moscow and unnerved all our allies, China, and the forces for restraint in other volatile areas of the world. This was, indeed, why the Soviets had made the Indian assault on Pakistan possible in the first place."[20] When the Soviets threatened to construct a submarine base in Cienfuego in 1970, Kissinger thought that "the Kremlin had perhaps been emboldened when we reacted to the dispatch of combat troops to the Middle East by pressing Israel for a cease-fire."[21] The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was only possible, thought Brzezinksi, Kissinger's successor and former academic, because the United States had lost credibility by not responding more forcefully to communist adventurism in the Horn of Africa, which, in turn, was a result of the abandonment of Saigon.[22] The belief in the importance of credibility may have partially begun in the academy—but the current skepticism of scholars, which began in earnest during the war in Vietnam, has not had similar real-world traction.

[18] Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 35–91.
[19] Ibid., 55.
[20] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 913–914.
[21] Ibid., 641.
[22] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983), 429.

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The Point of Divergence: Vietnam

The credibility imperative had become firmly embedded in the psyche of the U.S. foreign policy establishment by the time some of the crucial decisions regarding the war in Vietnam needed to be made. Without the imperative, the war would not have been fought. More than any other single factor, a fear of the message that a communist victory would send to the neighboring (and not-so-neighboring) states compelled the United States to try to prop up the corrupt, unpopular, Roman Catholic South Vietnamese rulers. In a 1965 memo released with the *Pentagon Papers*, Secretary of Defense John McNaughton described the reasons that the United States was in Vietnam as 70 percent "to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as guarantor)," 20 percent to prevent communism from overtaking South Vietnam, and only 10 percent to help the people of South Vietnam.[23] The damage that a failure in Vietnam could do to the reputation of the United States was potentially catastrophic. President Lyndon Johnson warned his cabinet that "if we run out on Southeast Asia, there will be trouble ahead in every part of the globe—not just in Asia, but in the Middle East and in Europe, in Africa and Latin America. I am convinced that our retreat from this challenge will open the path to World War III."[24] Kissinger agreed, warning that if South Vietnam were allowed to fall, it would represent a "fundamental threat, over a period of time, to the security of the United States."[25] Only when framed inside the prism of the credibility imperative did victory in Vietnam become a vital national interest.

Skepticism grew steadily as the war dragged on, and as the credibility imperative drove policymakers to believe that withdrawal from what seemed to be an unwinnable war would lead to national catastrophe. Intellectuals in the anti-war movement led the way, expressing moral outrage that a war would be fought primarily for the messages it would send to our enemies and allies.[26] Academic skepticism about the importance of credibility grew alongside questions about the tangible interests at stake, especially after it became clear that the costs in blood and treasure were not proportional to any potential benefits that could conceivably be gained from the survival of an anti-communist South Vietnam. To prominent realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, intervention in isolated, resource-poor Vietnam was irrational, "moralistic," and mistaken. Only "if developments in Vietnam might indeed tilt the world's balance in America's disfavor,"

[23] Quoted by Bruce W. Jentleson, "American Commitments in the Third World: Theory vs. Practice," *International Organization* 41 (Autumn 1987), 676.

[24] Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 147–148.

[25] Quoted by Barbara W. Tuchman, *March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1984), 375.

[26] Jonathan Schell, *The Time of Illusion* (New York: Knopf, 1976), 337–387.

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argued Waltz, would the war be worthwhile.[27] They did not, of course, since from a purely material perspective, Vietnam was next to irrelevant to U.S. national security. The cost of a loss to U.S. credibility, however, appeared incalculable.

The war in Vietnam marked the beginning of the current debate over the importance of credibility, and the point of divergence between scholars and practitioners. Despite dire warnings from many of its leaders, the United States not only withdrew its forces from Southeast Asia but also cut back on its aid and watched North Vietnamese troops overrun Saigon in 1975. Since this "cut-and-run" and subsequent loss of an ally were undoubtedly unmitigated disasters for the credibility of the United States, presumably a string of foreign policy setbacks should have followed. If international actions are truly interdependent, as policymakers believe, then the 1970s would probably have seen evidence of allies beginning to question U.S. commitments, dominoes falling where the reputation of the United States maintained the status quo, and increased levels of Soviet activity in the third world. The conventional wisdom suggests that the humiliating rooftop helicopter evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Saigon should have heralded a dark period for U.S. foreign policy.

However, no such string of catastrophes took place. Perhaps most obviously, there is no evidence that any allies of the United States were significantly demoralized, or that any questioned the wisdom of their allegiance. If anything, many of Washington's closest allies seemed relieved when the war ended, since many of them had doubted its importance in the first place and had feared that it distracted the United States from other, more pressing issues.[28] Certainly no state, not even any "client" states in the third world, changed its geopolitical orientation as a result of Vietnam.

The damage to U.S. credibility also did not lead to the long-predicted spread of communism throughout the region, as even Kissinger today grudgingly acknowledges.[29] On the contrary, in the ten years that followed the fall of Saigon, the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia enjoyed a period of unprecedented prosperity.[30] The only dominoes that fell were two countries that were even less relevant than Vietnam to the global balance of power—Cambodia and Laos, both of which were hardly major losses for the West,

[27] Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Politics of Peace," *International Studies Quarterly* 11 (September 1967), 206. See also Hans J. Morgenthau, *Vietnam and the United States* (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965).

[28] Johnson, *Improbable Dangers*, 160–161.

[29] Henry Kissinger, *Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 561. See also Shiping Tang, "Reputation, the Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict," *Security Studies* 14 (January–March 2005), 34–62; and Slater, "The Domino Theory and International Politics."

[30] George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf), 270.

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especially given the tragedies that followed. Nationalism proved to be a bulwark against the spread of communism that could not be overcome by any loss of confidence in U.S. commitments.

Most importantly, the Soviet Union apparently failed to become emboldened by the U.S. withdrawal, and did not appreciably increase its "adventurism" in the third world, compared to the 1950s and '60s, when U.S. credibility was high.[31] In an important and convincing study, Ted Hopf examined over 500 articles and 300 leadership speeches made by Soviet policymakers throughout the 1970s, and found that their public pronouncements did not show evidence of a belief that U.S. setbacks in the third world signaled a lack of resolution. "The most dominant inference Soviet leaders made after Vietnam," concluded Hopf, "was not about falling regional dominoes or bandwagoning American allies, but about the prospects of détente with the United States and Western Europe."[32] Soviet behavior did not change, despite the perception of incompetence that many Americans feared would inspire increased belligerence. Kissinger has referred to Soviet decisions to intervene in Angola and Ethiopia as evidence of the negative effect of Vietnam, but Hopf found no evidence that perceptions of U.S. credibility affected Soviet decision makers. It appears as if those interventions—which, of course, were in strategically irrelevant countries anyway—were independent events that probably would have occurred no matter what had happened in Vietnam. Other negative events in the 1970s, such as the fall of the Shah, seem even more independent of the catastrophe, despite half-hearted efforts to link them together.[33] As it turns out, Vietnam was all but irrelevant to international politics, which is of course exactly what critics of the war had maintained all along.

The immediate post-Vietnam era actually contains a good deal of evidence to bolster a conclusion opposite to the presumptions of deterrence theorists. Robert Jervis has argued that states often act more aggressively in periods of "low" credibility following a reversal, or in response to the perception of irresolution. The Soviets might well have expected the United States to act like a wounded animal, perhaps even more willing to defend its interests than before the withdrawal from Vietnam. "A statesman's willingness to resist," Jervis argued, "may be inversely related to how well he has done in the recent past."[34] Indeed, U.S. policymakers, believing that

[31] Ted Hopf, *Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).

[32] Ted Hopf, "Soviet Inferences from their Victories in the Periphery: Visions of Resistance or Cumulating Gains?" in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 167.

[33] Kissinger, *Ending the Vietnam War*, 561.

[34] Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior" in Jervis and Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons*, 37.

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the national credibility had been damaged, seemed eager to reverse such perceptions abroad. The seizure of the *Mayaguez*, which occurred immediately after the fall of Saigon, provided the opportunity to do so. The response of the administration of Gerald Ford was rapid, decisive, and belligerent. As the President said at the time, "I have to show some strength in order to help us ... with our credibility in the world." Kissinger had told reporters off the record that "the United States must carry out some act somewhere in the world which shows its determination to continue to be a world power." He wanted to react rapidly, arguing that "indecision and weakness can lead to demoralized friends and emboldened adversaries." Even though a rapid military response might have put the captured crew at risk, their lives were unfortunately a "secondary consideration," argued Kissinger, since the "real issue was international credibility and not the safe return of the crew."[35] As will be argued below, the credibility imperative rarely supports negotiated solutions. This was by no means an isolated incident. The invasion of Grenada, for example, cannot be understood without reference to the perceived loss of credibility that followed the removal of troops from Lebanon after the bombings of the embassy and Marine barracks. The intervention in Somalia was in large part a response to and cover for U.S. inaction in Bosnia.[36]

Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals. The short-term aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."[37] Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding *all* categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point—but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."[38] The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson.

[35] Christopher Jon Lamb, *Belief Systems and Decision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1989), 68, 72, 73, 81, 149.

[36] David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001), 250–252.

[37] Michael R. Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963* (New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991), 563; and Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History 1929-1969* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1973), 495–496.

[38] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 197 (emphasis in original).

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There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the *right* lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more *independent* than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.[39] While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic *dispositions* to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as *situational*, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.[40]

Mercer's larger conclusions were that states cannot control their reputations or level of credibility, and that target adversaries and allies will ultimately form their own perceptions. Sending messages for their consideration in future crises, therefore, is all but futile. These arguments echoed some of the broader critiques of the credibility imperative that had emerged in response to the war in Vietnam, both by realists like Morgenthau and Waltz and by so-called area specialists, who took issue with the interdependence beliefs of the generalists. As Jervis observed, a common axis of disagreement in American foreign policy has been between those who focus on the specific situation and the particular nations involved (often State Department officials or area experts), and those who take a global geopolitical perspective (often in the White House or outside foreign policy generalists). The former usually believe that states in a region are strongly driven by domestic concerns and local rivalries; the latter are predisposed to think that these states look to the major powers for their cues and have little control over their own fates.[41]

Throughout most of the Cold War, since those who argued that events are interdependent won most of the policy debates, U.S. foreign policy was obsessed with credibility.

A series of other studies have followed those of Hopf and Mercer, yielding similar results. The empirical record seems to suggest that there have been few instances of a setback in one arena influencing state behavior in a second arena.[42]

[39] Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics*.

[40] Ibid., 28–42.

[41] Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," 26.

[42] Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics* 36 (July 1984): 496–526. Also James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and

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Daryl Press began his recent study expecting to find that perceptions of the opponent's credibility would be an important variable affecting state behavior.[43] He chose three cases in which reputation would presumably have been vital to the outcome—the outbreak of the First World War, the Berlin Crisis of the late 1950s, and the Cuban Missile Crisis—and found, to his surprise, that in all three cases, leaders did not appear to be influenced at all by prior actions of their rivals, for better or for worse. Crisis behavior appeared to be entirely independent; credibility, therefore, was all but irrelevant. Mercer's conclusions about reputation seem to have amassed a good deal more supporting evidence in the time since he wrote.

Today the credibility imperative's academic defenders are small in number and influence.[44] In the policy world, however, the obsession with credibility lives on undiminished, and doubters are clearly in the minority. Shiping Tang considers the continued existence of the credibility imperative in spite of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary to be evidence of almost cultish behavior among policymakers.[45] The longevity of this cult seems to derive from a couple of foundations. First, since foreign policy is by necessity a worst-case-scenario business, prudence often counsels leaders to hedge against the most negative potential outcomes.[46] Since a loss of credibility offers a presumably plausible route to national ruin, the sagacious policymaker will often be very wary of damage to the reputation of the state, no matter what logic and the empirical evidence suggest. After all, while incorrect academics face virtually no consequences, missteps by leaders can be catastrophic.

Second, the current academic conventional wisdom is counterintuitive, and in some senses contradictory to normal daily experience. Individuals certainly develop reputations in their daily lives that influence the way that others treat them. Parents understand that they must carry through on their threats and promises if they want their children to take their future instructions seriously, and we all have friends whose repeated failures to deliver on past promises make us skeptical of their future assur-

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Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (June 1994): 236–269.

[43] Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), vii–viii.

[44] Recent defenders include Vaughn P. Shannon and Michael Dennis, "Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation," *Security Studies* 16 (April–June 2007): 287–317; Michael Lind, *Vietnam. The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1999); Dale C. Copeland, "Do Reputations Matter?" *Security Studies* 7 (Autumn 1997): 33–71; and Paul K. Huth, "Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment," *Security Studies* 7 (Autumn 1997): 72–99.

[45] Tang, "Reputation, the Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict."

[46] Jack Snyder, "Introduction," in Jervis and Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons*, 9–12.

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ances.[47] However, international relations differ drastically from interpersonal. As Press explains,

> Children use past actions when they evaluate their parents' credibility to punish them, and perhaps we all use past actions to assess whether a friend will show up at the movies. But there is no logical basis to generalize from these mundane situations to the most critical decisions made by national leaders during crises. In fact it would be odd—even irrational—if people relied on the same mental shortcuts that they use to make unimportant split-second decisions of daily life when they confront the most important decisions of their lives—decisions on which their country's survival depends.[48]

Press argues that national capabilities and interests—not past behavior—provide the foundation for the formation of perceptions. However, the credibility imperative has a powerful intuitive logic behind it, based upon lifetimes of interpersonal experience. There are therefore significant impediments in front of those who would challenge the wisdom of the policymaker's obsession with reputation.

This divergence in conventional wisdom between policy and scholarship would not be a major issue for twenty-first-century international politics if policies that are primarily based upon the need to appear credible were not often counterproductive, costly, and dangerous. The imperative has clear effects upon policy, and is employed in debates in predictable, measurable, and uniformly unhelpful ways.

The Post-Cold War Credibility Imperative

Today there is no competing superpower poised to take advantage of perceived U.S. irresolution, no revisionist state probing the "new world order" for weaknesses. Presumably, the credibility imperative should have waned in importance with the collapse of the Soviet Union, as neutrals were robbed of bandwagoning alternatives and as allies were relieved of any lingering fears that the United States might fail to come to their rescue in a crisis. But concerns for reputation have lingered throughout the post-Cold War period, and have returned with renewed vigor to misguide policymakers waging the war on terror.

The Soviet Union collapsed; the national obsession with credibility lived on, in defiance of logic and evidence. It has been difficult for the imperative's defenders to identify an instance in which a post-Cold War state (or independent actor) was either encouraged by a discredited United States or discouraged by its apparent resolution. Of course, one can always respond that such counterfactual argument is impossible. Successful deterrence is hard to

[47] Press, *Calculating Credibility*, 12.
[48] Ibid., 23.

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measure, since the analyst can never be sure that the aggressor was deterred from attacking or simply never planned to attack in the first place.[49] But the evidence thus far suggests that there is little reason to believe that post-Cold War international events are any more interdependent than were their predecessors.

Although many observers have argued that the administration of Bill Clinton damaged U.S. credibility in a number of ways, it is hard to identify a rival (or an opportunistic local leader) who took advantage of such an impression. When a semi-organized mob prevented the disembarkation of U.S. troops in Haiti in October of 1993, for example, critics like James Baker predictably accused the Clinton administration of "debas[ing] the currency of U.S. credibility."[50] Senator Tom Harkin worried that "if we can't stand up for democracy and human rights in our own hemisphere, then what do the Serbs have to fear? What do the Chinese have to fear?"[51] Less than a year later, however, a multinational force led by U.S. marines enforced a negotiated and peaceful resolution to the crisis without losing a single American life. No perceptible change in the behavior of any other state occurred, despite what Dick Cheney labeled the "abject national embarrassment" at the docks of Port-au-Prince.[52]

Kosovo proved to be an equally independent event. Administration officials routinely defended their actions there in terms of the risks to global order that a damaged credibility would entail. NATO's "fundamental strategic objectives" in Kosovo, as identified by a classified strategy report that was leaked to the *Washington Post*, were to "promote regional stability and protect our investment in Bosnia; prevent resumption of hostilities in Kosovo and renewed humanitarian crisis; [and] preserve U.S. and NATO credibility."[53] Senator McCain worried that "Pyongyang and Baghdad and Tripoli," were paying "close attention" to NATO actions, and that "if a military establishment that was defeated by the Croatian Army prevails, one led by a Balkan thug prevails, then we will be vulnerable to many challenges in many places."[54] It is, however, hard to sustain the argument that NATO's display of resolution in defense of its credibility affected the calculations of any other state. Just as no enemy stood waiting to take advantage of low U.S. credibility, none was cowed into acquiescence when Washington was resolute.

[49] George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 516–517.

[50] Ann Devroy and Daniel Williams, "GOP Attacks Clinton, Claims Incompetence in Foreign Relations," *The Washington Post*, 28 July 1994.

[51] Williams and Devroy, "U.S. Policy Lacks Focus."

[52] Devroy and Williams, "GOP Attacks Clinton."

[53] Barton Gellman, "The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War," *The Washington Post*, 18 April 1999.

[54] Alison Mitchell, "McCain Keeps Pressing Case for Troops," *The New York Times*, 4 April 1999.

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Credibility in Practice

The evidence seems to fall heavily on one side of the divide between scholars and practitioners over the importance of credibility. This division is not merely of academic interest. The credibility imperative has distinct and profound effects upon policymaking, all of which are apparent during the current war on terror. In order to assess more accurately the true value of a healthy reputation for resolve, policymakers ought to be aware of the following general rules about how the credibility imperative shapes national debate. Three such effects are presented below, more as arguments rather than testable hypotheses, owing to the nature of the subject. Although the supporting evidence is by necessity somewhat anecdotal, the arguments themselves should not be very controversial.

First, the credibility imperative is almost always employed to bolster the most hawkish position in a foreign policy debate. Cries of appeasement (and of the need to maintain credibility) arise almost every time the use of force is debated in the United States. Critics warned that U.S. credibility would be irreparably harmed if Washington failed to get involved in Vietnam, and then if it did not stay until the war was won; if it did not use air strikes against the Soviet missiles in Cuba; if it did not respond to Bosnian Serb provocations with sufficient force; if it failed to attack the leaders of the military coup in Haiti in 1994; and, of course, if it does not "stay the course" today in Iraq. At other times, hawks have employed the credibility imperative to urge two presidents to use military force to prevent nuclear proliferation in North Korea and to punish the recalcitrant Saddam Hussein.[55] The reputation of the United States is always endangered by inaction, not by action, no matter how peripheral the proposed war might be to tangible national interests. The reputation for good policy judgment never seems to be as important as the reputation for belligerence.

The credibility imperative not only urges the use of military force, but it encourages hawkish behavior at the negotiating table as well, supporting rigidity and decrying all compromise as demonstrations of weakness. Only victory can legitimate diplomacy; compromised settlements only encourage further challenges, and are synonymous with appeasement. Madeleine Albright reported a typical example in her memoirs, explaining that during Bosnia negotiations "the ordinarily hawkish Jamie Rubin urged me to compromise on a particular measure. I glared and said, 'Jamie, do you think we're in Munich?'"[56] After Jimmy Carter's now-famous mission helped find common

[55] On the former, see the floor speeches of Senator John McCain, such as "The Nuclear Ambitions of North Korea," 7 October 1994, accessed at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1994/s941007-dprk.htm, 22 May 2006; on the latter, see Eliot A. Cohen, "Sound and Fury," *The Washington Post*, 19 December 1998; and Charles Krauthammer, "Saddam: Round 3," *The Washington Post*, 13 November 1998.

[56] Madeleine Albright, *Madame Secretary* (New York: Miramax, 2003), 382.

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ground between Pyongyang and Washington in 1994, McCain worried that the deal "will have changed the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East. That it will have changed for the worse is obvious."[57] *Washington Post* columnist Charles Krauthammer labeled the compromise on the same peninsula in 2003 "an abject cave-in," which would prove to be a "threat to American credibility everywhere."[58]

This is not meant to suggest, of course, that individual cases of belligerence or intervention were not warranted; however, it is important to recognize that, for better or for worse, the credibility imperative is the rhetorical instrument of the hawk. The actors employing the imperative are not always the same, but their prescription never waivers. Many of the doves of the 1980s had become hawks by the 1990s, warning of the potential loss of credibility if strong action were not taken in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Haiti. For example, the *New York Times* cited "United States diplomats" warning President Clinton that a failure to act in Bosnia in 1993 would "badly damage U.S. credibility abroad."[59] Anthony Lake told the Council on Foreign Relations that among the reasons to act in Haiti was the need to defend American credibility in world affairs.[60] In general, the more a policymaker or strategist saw the credibility of the United States in peril, the more willing he or she was to use force to prevent its erosion.

The second observation on the use of the credibility imperative in policy debate is perhaps related to the first: the imperative often produces astonishing hyperbole, even in otherwise sober analysts. If the United States were to lose credibility, the floodgates would open to a variety of catastrophes, setting off dominoes that would eventually not only threaten vital interests and make war necessary, but perhaps even lead to the end of the Republic itself. The credibility imperative warns that momentum toward disaster can begin with the smallest demonstration of irresolution, thus sustaining the vision of an interdependent system in which there are no inconsequential events. In the words of Dale Copeland, "It is easier to stop a snowball before it begins to roll downhill than to intervene only after it has started to gain momentum."[61] Therefore, even the smallest of slips can lead to large-scale disaster.

Thus, although Quemoy and Matsu might have seemed like irrelevant, uninhabitable rocky atolls, if they fell to the Chinese without action from the United States, the resulting loss of credibility for the United States would enable the communists "to begin their objective of driving us out of the western Pacific, right back to Hawaii and even to the United States," according to John

[57] McCain, "Nuclear Ambitions."
[58] Charles Krauthammer, "Korea Follies," *The Washington Post*, 17 January 2003.
[59] R.W. Apple, Jr., "Testing a Commitment," *TheNew York Times*, 19 September 1993.
[60] Paraphrased by Jim Hoagland in "Don't Do It," *The Washington Post*, 15 September 1994.
[61] Copeland, "Do Reputations Matter," 43.

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Foster Dulles.[62] Ten years later, Dean Rusk wrote that if U.S. commitments became discredited because of a defeat in Vietnam, "the communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war."[63] Ronald Reagan told Congress that if the United States failed in Central America, "our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put at jeopardy."[64] The examples are legion—indeed, the tendency toward hyperbole seems almost irresistible. In a world where threats are interdependent, the loss of credibility in one area threatens U.S. goals everywhere. The fall of Vietnam, thought Nixon, "would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere."[65] Credibility is apparently the glue holding together the international system of dominoes.

Audiences often seem distressingly willing to accept such statements at face value. Rarely are policymakers or analysts asked to justify these visions, or pressed to examine the logic connecting the present decisions to such catastrophic future consequences. Could interdependence alone set off such enormous strings of disasters? Why should anyone believe that the loss of credibility would result in an unprecedented string of disasters? For those under the spell of the credibility imperative, the logic behind these statements seemed less relevant than establishing the potential, however slim, for catastrophe. Since foreign policy is a worst-case-scenario business, the sagacious policymaker hedges against disaster, no matter how absurdly remote the risk may seem. Who would oppose the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, if that defense might prevent a "catastrophic war"? Similarly, it was difficult to argue that aid to the Contras was not in the national interest once it became linked to the survival of NATO and the safety of "our homeland." Once policymakers accept the imperative to remain credible, logic and reason can become casualties of fear.

The third and final observation is that there is a loose inverse relationship between the rhetorical employment of the credibility imperative and the presence of vital, more tangible national interests. Franklin D. Roosevelt did not make reference to the reputation of the United States when he asked Congress for a declaration of war against Japan in 1941. Similarly, Winston Churchill's stirring speeches rallying his countrymen at their darkest hour did not mention the importance of maintaining the credibility of the realm. When a clear national interest is at stake, policymakers have no need to defend (or sell) their actions with reference to the national reputation or credibility. Simply

[62] Quoted by Gaddis in *Strategies of Containment*, 144.

[63] Ibid., 240.

[64] Steven R. Wiesman, "President Appeals before Congress for Aid to Latins," *The New York Times*, 28 April 1993.

[65] McMahon, "Credibility and World Power," 467.

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put, the more tangible the national interest, the smaller the role that intangible factors will play in either decisions or justifications for policy. The United States was willing to use force to ensure that Korea, Lebanon, Vietnam, Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua stayed in the camp of free nations despite the fact that none had any measurable impact upon the global balance of power. "El Salvador doesn't really matter," one of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy advisers admitted in 1981, but "we have to establish credibility because we are in very serious trouble."[66]

When credibility is the primary justification for action, the interest is usually not vital to the United States. Since Washington had no strategic interests at stake in the Balkans in the 1990s, for example, it was forced to invent some. Rather than sell the policy based solely on what it was—predominantly a humanitarian intervention—the Clinton administration repeatedly linked the fate of the Muslims of southeastern Europe to the credibility of the United States and NATO. By doing so, according to Owen Harries, the administration "managed to create a serious national interest in Bosnia where none before existed: an interest, that is, in the preservation of this country's prestige and credibility."[67] The credibility imperative rose to prominence precisely because no tangible U.S. interest in Bosnia existed.

In sum, when the credibility imperative drives policy, states fearful of hyperbolic future consequences are likely to follow hawkish recommendations in order to send messages that other states are unlikely to receive. Policymakers are thus wise to beware of the credibility imperative when devising policy, questioning the assumptions that it contains and remaining skeptical of the catastrophes of which it warns. They must recognize that the imperative is typically employed when no tangible national interest exists, used as a rhetorical smoke screen to win over otherwise-peaceful masses. Most importantly, it should perhaps give them pause that scholars can supply virtually no evidence supporting the conventional wisdom about its importance.

It might seem blasphemous, or at least dangerously naïve, to suggest that the blood and treasure spilled over the past six decades to preserve the credibility of the United States has been in vain. However, history offers little evidence to support one of the most deeply held beliefs of the makers of U.S. foreign policy. States cannot control their reputations or their credibility, since target adversaries and allies will ultimately form their own perceptions, often learning incorrect lessons. Even the best efforts to bolster the credibility of the United States ultimately serve little purpose.

[66] Quoted by William M. LeoGrande, "A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador," *International Security* 6 (Summer 1981): 27.

[67] Owen Harries, "An Anti-Interventionist No More: America's Credibility is Now at Stake," *The Washington Post*, 21 April 1994.

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The Credibility Imperative and the War on Terror

Does the preceding discussion remain relevant for the "war on terror"? Some observers have argued that concerns for credibility are justified in this post–September 11 era, since the United States faces an enemy that repeatedly refers to American irresolution as inspiration for its actions.[68] The current administration clearly believes in the importance of credibility, and often repeats that importance mantra-like in its talking points. Even a brief examination of the current challenges facing the United States, however, should be sufficient to demonstrate that there is no reason to believe that the credibility imperative will provide guidance to current policymakers any more sage than it gave to those of eras past.

Credibility and Terrorism

The leadership of al Qaeda has repeatedly cited a lack of resolution in Washington as inspiration for its actions. Bin Laden has accused America of being a "paper tiger," a state that will back away at the slightest use of force. "We have seen in the last decade," he has argued, "the decline of the American government and the weakness of the American soldier who is ready to wage Cold Wars and unprepared to fight long wars. This was proven in Beirut when the Marines fled after two explosions. It also proves they can run in less than 24 hours, and this was also repeated in Somalia."[69]

Some scholars have argued that if al Qaeda has drawn inspiration from perceptions of American irresolution, then the conclusions of Mercer and others regarding the ultimate unimportance of reputation and credibility are demonstrably false.[70] If decreased U.S. credibility has altered the calculations of militant fundamentalist groups, then indeed, states combating terrorism would be justified in worrying about the messages that their actions send, and should consider the probable impact that current decisions will have on future crises.

However, there are good reasons to doubt this conclusion. First of all, it is not clear that the United States can control the perceptions of non-state actors in the current era any more easily than it could those of states during the Cold War. It is quite a stretch to believe that if U.S. troops had not been pulled out of Lebanon or Somalia, al Qaeda would have acted any differently throughout the 1990s. Did the U.S. withdrawals really embolden al Qaeda? In order for the policymaker's conventional wisdom about the importance of credibility to be correct, al Qaeda's behavior would have to have been different if the United

[68] Shannon and Dennis, "Militant Islam."

[69] Osama bin Laden, in an interview with John Miller, in Laura Egendorf, ed., *Terrorism: Opposing Viewpoints* (San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 1999), 125.

[70] Shannon and Dennis, "Militant Islam."

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States had not pulled out of Somalia when it did. If the terrorists would have attacked either way—and it is certainly plausible to think that they would have—then concerns for reputation are still irrelevant, and it remains unwise for policymakers to look beyond the current crisis.

Second, there are good reasons to believe that al Qaeda's perceptions will remain unaffected by Washington's attempt to control them. In fact, it may well be that a strategy like that pursued by Islamic fundamentalists is almost necessary for the smaller participant in a case of extreme power asymmetry. Since they lacked the power to force a retreat, the *mujahadeen* in Afghanistan needed to preach that the Soviet Union would prove irresolute in order to convince its fighters that resistance was not utterly pointless; likewise, Bin Laden must paint the United States as a paper tiger or no one will rally to his cause. The strategy of a weak actor in extreme asymmetry must be based on the premise that although it may not be able to employ tangible assets to win the war, intangible, moral elements will prove decisive. Therefore, no matter what the behavior of the strong actually is, the weak are likely to accuse it of being irresolute. Since *jihadists* have no hope of success without a certain degree of superpower irresolution, it is unlikely that any amount of credibility will cause them to abandon that belief (or hope). Once again, Washington will probably not be able to control its reputation in the eyes of others. The future actions of these groups will probably remain unaffected by their perceptions of U.S. credibility.

Finally, it is quite possible that Bin Laden's pronouncements of American irresolution are less explanations for his behavior than tools for attracting new recruits. Although al Qaeda took credit for the Somalia adventure, for example, it disavowed any participation in the embassy bombings, perhaps since those incidents did not cause any change in U.S. behavior and therefore would not serve as well in recruitment.[71] Their preposterous exaggeration of both their involvement in and the scale of the battles in Somalia lend credence to the argument that the true importance of the event was for propaganda rather than for the actual formulation of strategy. Although there is little evidence that the battle in Mogadishu was fought by anyone other than Somalis, to listen to Bin Laden, one would think that the *mujahadeen* from all over the region had converged to oust the imperialists. He has repeatedly claimed that 300,000 Americans turned tail and fled after the battle, which is more than 10 times the number that were ever in the country and almost 100 times the number that actually left after Mogadishu. No matter what the United States did in Somalia, al Qaeda would probably have continued its tangible and intangible assaults, which even in extreme exaggeration, would have found eager ears among the disaffected, angry masses.

[71] Ibid., 36.

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Might resolute, credible superpowers be able to prevent *jihadists* from recruiting new generations of terrorists? Probably not, since al Qaeda and its allies have shown no particular interest in the accuracy of their statements. No matter what the United States and its allies do, Bin Laden is likely to twist the truth and argue that each succeeding action is further proof of his claims. Many regions of the world have populations quite sympathetic to the argument that despite its apparent strength, the United States is actually a weak, feminized, immoral, corrupt paper tiger. The Middle East, where conspiracy theories often find wide audiences, is seemingly fertile ground for Bin Laden's interpretation of U.S. irresolution. In other words, U.S. actions are not likely to have direct bearing on the interpretation of U.S. credibility in the region, or on the outcome of the war on terror, for better or for worse.

Credibility and the Post–September 11 Wars

The credibility imperative has affected debates about the response to the attacks of September 11 exactly as the preceding analysis would have predicted. It was almost entirely absent in the discussion leading up to the war in Afghanistan, since few disputed the belief that the terrorist leadership and training camps that were given sanctuary by the Taliban represented a clear and present danger to international security. It is hard to imagine that any president (or any leader of any country, for that matter) would have failed to use military force to address these tangible interests once negotiations proved ineffective.

The war that followed 17 months later, however, was different. Although regime change in Iraq was sold to the American public in terms of very tangible, vital national interests, the war was fought to send messages and influence the future behavior of other states at least as much as it was to address any threat posed by Saddam. Although Condoleezza Rice was fond of saying, "The smoking gun could be a mushroom cloud," many observers and scholars of U.S. foreign policy felt that the real reasons for the war were much less tangible, and in some ways much more ambitious.[72] In fact, it is hard to find a serious analyst who believed Saddam to be on the verge of using weapons of mass destruction in an assault on the United States or its allies. Some of the President's advisers had, of course, long supported the removal of Saddam for other, less-tangible reasons. Saddam's very existence seemed to some to be indicative of a failure of U.S. foreign policy, one that sent the wrong messages to the vague "others" that were biding their time, waiting for signs of U.S. irresolution to begin their own anti–status quo machinations. Neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and William Kristol ardently believed in a benign version of domino dynamics, in which a display of American resolve

[72] Todd S. Purdum, "Bush Administration Officials Say the Time has Come for Action on Iraq," *The New York Times*, 9 September 2002.

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and commitment would encourage regional liberalization and democratization, and would demonstrate that the United States would not allow further weapons proliferation. The crisis of the present was managed (or, in this case, created) primarily to address those of the future; it was fought for intangible interests but sold with reference to the tangible. Positive credibility would be the engine to drive desirable changes across the region, and indeed throughout the world.

Krauthammer argued that continuing the containment of Saddam would "shatter the credibility of post-9/11 American resolve that was achieved by the demonstration of American power and will in Afghanistan." He then went on to repeat the basic outlines of the credibility imperative, which has been passed down unchanged from the Cold War generation.

> Credibility matters deeply in a world of enemies—and of fence-sitters who must decide which side to choose. Particularly after the collapse of our position on North Korea, which can only be explained away as a temporary necessity while we gird ourselves for Iraq, the entire Bush Doctrine, which sees the conjunction of rogue states, terrorists and weapons of mass destruction as the great existential challenge of our age, would collapse. You cannot march up this hill and then march back down empty-handed without undermining American deterrence everywhere.[73]

Once again, foreign policy generalists rather than regional specialists were most concerned with the impact of Iraq on U.S. reputation. By punishing the recalcitrant Saddam, the United States would demonstrate to other states that the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction in particular, and opposition to U.S. policies in general, would be self-defeating. Future challengers then would be deterred from challenging U.S. interests.

As scholars of credibility would have predicted, once again an operation fought mostly for psychological reasons has not met its objectives. Like petulant children, target states (and non-state actors) have stubbornly refused to learn the lessons they were taught. As argued above, the precedent the United States hoped to set in proliferation matters has not seemed to change the behavior of Iran or North Korea, both of whom continue along the road to weapons development. The only success that the administration can point to, although it is surely not without controversy, is in Libya, where Muammar al-Qaddafi has declared his days as an international pariah to be over and has apparently put an end to his research into the development of weapons of mass destruction. "Our diplomacy with Libya was successful only because our word was credible," argued Vice President Cheney in January of 2004. "That kind of credibility can be earned in only one way—by keeping commitments, even when they bring difficulty and sacrifice; by leaving potential adversaries with no doubt that dangerous conduct will invite certain

[73] Charles Krauthammer, "No Turning Back Now," *The Washington Post*, 24 January 2003.

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consequences."[74] Skeptics have been quick to point out that negotiations with Qaddafi were in progress for two years before the invasion of Iraq, however, and that the two events were unrelated.[75] Presumably Qaddafi had little reason to fear a U.S. invasion. The credibility imperative, however, has no requirement for veracity.

Perhaps even more important than nonproliferation messages was the commitment to democracy and freedom that neoconservatives felt would be more credible after the invasion of Iraq. It will be some time before the results of this wager are in, for it still may be possible for Iraq to become a beacon of democracy and freedom for the region and begin a fundamental erosion of anti-American sentiment. Following that, perhaps within a few years, dominoes of democracy may fall, and the region may be fundamentally changed for the better. The terrorist swamp may yet be drained by the destruction of the Iraqi dike. But the early evidence is not encouraging. As Shibley Telhami and others have pointed out, thus far, the invasion has had quite the opposite effect—regional governments have been even more oppressive to their people than before, and levels of anti-Americanism have skyrocketed.[76] Both early reports and the recently declassified National Intelligence Estimate indicate that the war in Iraq has proved to be an aid to al Qaeda recruiting.[77] Through their attempts to distance themselves from (or find scapegoats for) a war they supported, it is clear that some leading neoconservatives share the pessimistic forecasts of the war's progress.[78] Since target audiences have once again failed to learn the right lessons, thus far, the war in Iraq seems to provide more support for the dangers in looking beyond the crisis at hand.

[74] "Remarks by the Vice President to the World Economic Forum," Davos, Switzerland, 24 January, 2004, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040124-1.html, 22 May 2006.

[75] Flynt Leverett, "Why Libya Gave Up the Bomb," *The New York Times*, 23 January 2004.

[76] Shibley Telhami, *The Stakes: America in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002). See also Shibley Telhami, "A Growing Muslim Identity," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 July 2004; and Shibley Telhami, "Double Blow to Mideast Democracy," *The Washington Post*, 1 May 2004.

[77] Neil MacFarquhar, "Rising Tide of Islamic Militants See Iraq as the Ultimate Battlefield," *The New York Times*, 13 August 2003; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2004/05* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2005); Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate 'Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,'" Washington DC, April 2006, accessed at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf, 18 October 2006.

[78] Robert Kagan and William Kristol, "Democracy Now," *The Weekly Standard*, 17 May 2004, accessed at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/056mvrqy.asp, 4 October 2007. ; Kenneth M. Pollack, "Mourning After: How They Screwed it Up," *The New Republic*, 28 June 2004, accessed at http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/pollack/20040628.htm, 4 October 2007.

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Credibility and Withdrawal from Iraq

The Nixon administration made it clear that extrication from the Vietnam quagmire would proceed if and only if it could be done without damage to the national honor. The South Vietnamese had to be capable of defending themselves before a pullout would be acceptable to Washington. Were the United States to withdraw its troops from Vietnam amidst defeat, it would suffer serious harm to its credibility, and global calamity would probably follow. Kissinger had long held that the United States could not pull its troops out of Vietnam without threatening "the political stability of Europe and Japan and the future evolution of the developing countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia," which depend on the perception of a United States "able to defend its interests and those of its friends. If the war in Vietnam eroded our willingness to back the security of free peoples with our military strength, untold millions would be in jeopardy."[79] The credibility imperative, as usual, counseled continued belligerence and warned of apocalyptic consequences that would follow a failure to pursue this course. As discussed above, however, the South Vietnamese house of cards collapsed soon after the American withdrawal, and although few policymakers seemed to notice at the time, the anticipated string of catastrophes failed to occur.

Today, the United States once again finds itself faced with decisions about how and when to withdraw from an ill-advised, increasingly unpopular, and probably unwinnable war. The credibility imperative has predictably been playing a key role in formulating those decisions regarding the endgame in Iraq. While the United States may well have tangible national interests in ensuring the successful transition to democratic governance in Iraq—surely no one stands to benefit if fundamentalists come to power in Baghdad, for instance—intangible factors will probably prove to be just as important. The "messages" that a pullout would send to future belligerents are playing an enormous role in current decision making, counseling hawkish, uncompromising behavior and threatening hyperbolic potential consequences for failure.

Once again, those in the policy community apparently believe that a string of unprecedented catastrophes would soon follow the loss of U.S. credibility. Kissinger has predictably warned that a premature pullout would be "disastrous" for "America's position in the world."

> Defeat would shrivel U.S. credibility around the world. Our leadership and the respect accorded to our views on other regional issues from Palestine to Iran would be weakened; the confidence of other major countries—China, Russia, Europe, Japan—in America's potential contribution would be diminished. The respite from military efforts would be brief before even greater crises descended upon us.[80]

[79] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 196.

[80] Henry Kissinger, "How to Exit Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 19 December 2005.

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Kissinger, who is apparently a close adviser to the Bush administration, is certainly not alone in this belief.[81] Rumsfeld, as discussed above, warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that a premature withdrawal would result in a string of catastrophes that would soon force the United States to make a stand nearer to home.[82] The editor of the *National Review* warns that "the consequences of that defeat would be remarkably similar to those in the wake of Vietnam. The prestige of the U.S. government would sink around the world, emboldening our enemies and creating a period of American doubt and retreat."[83] As was the case with Vietnam, global stability appears to be at stake; bigger wars, regional chaos, the end of unipolarity, and even the collapse of democracy in the United States would soon follow a withdrawal from Iraq. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has even warned that "the stakes could not be higher for the continued existence of our own democracy."[84] Thus, despite its historical underperformance, the credibility imperative is once again having an enormous, and poisonous, influence on a vitally important national debate. When credibility takes center stage in the discussion, rationality quickly recedes.

If the history of the U.S. experience with the credibility imperative is any guide, at the very least, one must conclude that no string of catastrophes is likely to follow a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. The credibility of U.S. commitments is not the glue that holds the world together, nor is it the bulwark preventing the fall of various harmful dominoes. The U.S. presence is also not the only force preventing a region-wide war. Presumably, the other states of the region, who have little interest in becoming embroiled in a self-defeating, self-immolating war, can imagine what specific consequences would follow. In fact, there is a case to be made that the U.S. presence is more accurately thought of as a destabilizing presence, making the spread of violence more likely.

Even if some states were to begin to doubt U.S. credibility, it is hard to believe that fundamentalism would sweep across the region somehow, or that our allies would become so disheartened that they would rethink their allegiance to the United States. During the Cold War, theoretically states had the option to "flip sides" and rely on the Soviets if they began to doubt the credibility of the United States (although none ever did so, of course). Today it is impossible to imagine that any state would flip sides in the war on terror. If anything, the perception that they could not rely on the United States would probably make other states intensify their effort to fight their local, anti-regime fundamentalists. Even if states of the region do begin to doubt the credibility of U.S. commitments, which is of course by no means inevitable,

[81] Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 406–410.

[82] "The Sound of One Domino Falling."

[83] Rich Lowry, "Bush's Vietnam," *National Review*, 15 August 2006.

[84] Melvin Laird, "Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (November/December 2005), 36.

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Islamic fundamentalist victories are not likely. And while it is obviously preposterous to suggest that the United States would soon have to fight them "nearer home," or that the continued existence of U.S. democracy is at stake, such statements are predictable products of the credibility imperative.

The only plausible enemies positioned to benefit from a U.S. display of irresolution are fundamentalist terrorist groups. Al Qaeda and its allies were apparently encouraged to some degree by the Soviet failure in Afghanistan, and a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq might provide a similar boost to recruiting. This is probably a near-inevitable consequence of the war no matter when it ends. Since fundamentalists have shown no interest in the veracity of their statements, and since asymmetric actors need to appear indomitable, they will always claim to have been the cause of the U.S. withdrawal. Unless the United States wishes to remain in Iraq indefinitely, it will at some point have to run the risk of aiding fundamentalist recruiting. However, this risk must be weighed against the amount of inspiration that terrorists receive by the continued U.S. occupation of Arab lands.

Global stability is certainly not at stake in Iraq. The preceding analysis suggests that if the United States were to withdraw its forces, the rest of the world might well view it as a wounded animal, and be fearful of its need to regain credibility in the next crisis. The United States, after all, did not go on the offensive following the Cuban Missile Crisis, nor did the Soviets after the fall of Saigon. Despite the nearly ubiquitous warnings from policymakers, a withdrawal from Iraq would not be catastrophic for the Middle East, for U.S. foreign policy, or for international stability itself.

Actions during the war on terror that are inspired by the imperative to remain credible will probably not lead to any better outcomes than they did in previous eras. Policymakers would do well to listen to the emerging conventional wisdom of scholars, and avoid thinking beyond the current situation. The future will take care of itself. Even when facing enemies that may doubt the credibility of U.S. commitments, foreign policy actions designed to send messages to third parties are unlikely to succeed. In the past, they have consistently marched the United States toward folly; there is little reason to doubt that they would do so again. Both logic and history suggest that the wise policymaker will disregard the worst-case, hyperbolic, belligerent advice from those under the spell of the credibility imperative.

Conclusion

The United States responded to the challenges of global communism and Islamic fundamentalism in many similar ways, despite obvious (if sometimes underappreciated) differences in the scale of the threats involved. Washington could once again find itself supporting a variety of unsavory regimes in the name of global competition. Fears of domestic infiltration by fifth columnists may cause domestic overreactions that restrict basic civil liberties; and a

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Manichean, us-versus-them, with-us-or-against-us mentality has once again overtaken the White House. Perhaps most importantly, *ideas* lie at the center of both the Cold War and the war on terror, making "hearts and minds" of neutral parties as important as tangible national security interests. The reputation and credibility of the combatants today seem to be as central to policymakers as they were during the Cold War. As a consequence, the war on terror may also inspire ill-conceived, debilitating wars in the periphery in misguided attempts to control the perceptions of others. History never repeats itself, as Mark Twain may or may not have said, but at times it does rhyme.

Both logic and a preponderance of the evidence suggest that the current U.S. obsession with credibility is as insecure, misplaced, and malinformed as all that have preceded it. Whether it will result in the kind of counterproductive policies that accompanied the Cold War credibility imperative remains to be seen. What is more assured is that there is no clear way to control the perceptions of others, whether they are superpowers, small states, or loosely connected non-state groups. The impression that *their* thoughts can be controlled by *our* actions may be comforting, springing perhaps from basic human psychological needs, but in reality, their perception of us is largely outside of our influence. The messages we hope to send through our actions are unlikely to be successfully received. Washington would be well-advised to avoid the understandable and natural temptation to look beyond the current crisis when making decisions. As unsettling as it may be, the future is largely outside our control; the tangible interests of the present, therefore, must outweigh the intangible interests of the future.

The behavior of the United States is not driven by only tangible, material measures of power; however, perhaps it should be. When the credibility imperative drives policy, due to the inherently uncontrollable nature of this most intangible of assets, states march toward folly. "Many of the tenets underlying American security policy are held with strong but unwarranted conviction," Nancy Kanwisher sagaciously observed as the Cold War drew to a conclusion. "Further, these dubious beliefs often persist even after their flaws have been widely exposed."[85] Few dubious beliefs match the credibility imperative for both the extent of its acceptance and the depth of its flaws.

[85] Nancy Kanwisher, "Cognitive Heuristics and American Security Policy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (December 1989): 652.

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THE MEANING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

Edited by Robert Y. Shapiro

This volume offers appraisals of democracy, institutions, and rights. A section is devoted to analyzing what has transpired from September 11, 2001 through the subsequent war in Iraq. The book also examines 2004 elections, and concludes with a historical and further normative perspective on current politics and challenges to American democracy.

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Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Deception: The Tobacco Industry and Airline Smoking

PEGGY LOPIPERO
DORIE E. APOLLONIO
LISA A. BERO

The provision of specialized information is widely viewed as one of the most important functions of interest groups.[1] Most research on interest group behavior presumes that lobbyists rarely misrepresent evidence, due to the risk of exposure and the need to work repeatedly with policymakers.[2]

[1] John M. Hansen, *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Lester W. Milbrath, *The Washington Lobbyists* (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1963); Kay L. Schlozman and John T. Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986); David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York: Knopf, 1951); Jeffrey M. Berry, *The Interest Group Society* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1989); John R. Wright, *Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence, New topics in Politics Series* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1996); Kevin M. Esterling, *The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

[2] Berry, *Interest Group Society*; Schlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy*; Ronald J. Hrebenar, "Change, Transition and Growth in Southern Interest Group Politics" in Ronald J. Hrebenar and Clive S. Thomas, eds., *Interest Group Politics in the Southern States* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992); Marie Hojnacki and David M. Kimball, "Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress," *American Political Science Review* 92 (December 1998): 775–790; Ken Kollman, *Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest*

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Instead, interest groups are viewed as "information service bureaus" for policymakers, or an extension of research staff.[3] Researchers on lobbying behavior argue that having a reputation for providing accurate information is critical for individual lobbyists,[4] that their career incentives help maintain their honesty, and that policymakers compensate for attempts to deceive them.[5]

The fact that information provided by interest groups can help shape policy, however, raises the possibility that an interest group may be tempted to mislead policymakers when the information it possesses does not support the group's underlying policy preferences.[6] Interest groups have occasionally attempted to sway the balance in their favor by misrepresenting evidence to legislators, particularly regarding constituent preferences, although it is often unclear whether these efforts were intentional or unintentional.[7]

When and to what extent interest groups willfully attempt to mislead legislators remains an open empirical question,[8] in large part because methods of determining their intentions and the extent of the information that they possess at any given time are limited. Moreover, the vast majority of litera-

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Group Strategies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Alan Rosenthal, *The Third House: Lobbyists and Lobbying in the States* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2001); David Whiteman, *Communication in Congress: Members, Staff, and the Search for Information* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995).

[3] Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton, 1963), 353; Hedrick Smith, *The Power Game: How Washington Works* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 234; Whiteman, *Communication in Congress*, 45.

[4] Lewis A. Dexter, *How Organizations Are Represented in Washington* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); Berry, *Interest Group Society*, 119; Jan Potters and Frans Van Winden, "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," *Public Choice* 74 (October 1992): 269–292; Schlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy*, 103.

[5] Carol A. Bodensteiner, "Special Interest Group Coalitions: Ethical Standards for Broad-Based Support Efforts," *Public Relations Review* 23 (Spring 1997): 31–46; Randall L. Calvert, "The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice," *The Journal of Politics* 47 (June 1985): 530–555; Susanne Lohmann, "A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action," *American Political Science Review* 87 (June 1993): 319–333.

[6] Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 98 (August 1983): 371–400; Thomas P. Lyon and John W. Maxwell, "Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy," *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy* 13 (Winter 2004): 561–597; Potters and Van Winden, "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," 270; Samantha Sanchez, "How the West Is Won: Astroturf Lobbying and the 'Wise Use' Movement," *The American Prospect* 25 (March–April 1996): 37–42; Wright, *Interest Groups and Congress*, 106.

[7] Scott Ainsworth, "Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence," *The Journal of Politics* 55 (February 1993): 41–56; E.E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1935), 274; Bodensteiner, "Special Interest Group Coalitions," 32; Lyon and Maxwell, "Astroturf," 563–564; Sanchez, "How the West Is Won," 41; Karl Schriftgiesser, *The Lobbyists: The Art and Business of Influencing Lawmakers* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1951), 71.

[8] Potters and Van Winden, "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," 271; Wright, *Interest Groups and Congress*, 113.

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ture on interest group incentives relies on game theory rather than on empirical observations. In a few instances, however, firms have been required to release internal records in conjunction with legal settlements. Our research uses the most complete and publicly accessible of these records, tobacco industry documents released as part of civil actions on smoking and health, to review the history of airline smoking bans in the United States. The availability of these internal records offers an unprecedented opportunity to closely examine the inner workings of an economically and politically powerful interest group in its efforts to influence policymaking.[9] With these documents, we are better able to understand the role of tobacco industry interest groups in the policy process that led to the first federal restrictions of public smoking, which, we suggest, provides an excellent case study of interest groups as information providers.

This case study challenges key theoretical assumptions about interest group lobbying. We propose that under certain circumstances, interest groups, particularly firms, may present inaccurate information to policymakers about public opinion despite the threat of exposure and the loss of credibility in the long term. The expectation that firms may misrepresent evidence is consistent with the very limited research regarding corporate lobbying, even though most literature claims that it is unlikely that interest groups will attempt to deceive policymakers.[10] Moreover, any loss of credibility, if discovered, may not necessarily compromise future political success. Although the tobacco industry considers itself embattled, it has continued to be effective in preventing the passage of legislation and regulation aimed at restricting the use of its products. Our findings suggest that prevailing assumptions about the validity of information provided by interest groups, especially firms, should be reconsidered and that the current provisions of the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act do not protect against interest group efforts to misrepresent constituent preferences.

Expectations about Interest Group Incentives and Behavior

Early work by E.E. Schattschneider argued that interest groups regularly sought to misrepresent evidence and deceive policymakers about the extent of popular support for their goals.[11] Other research has posited that when the political stakes are high, groups are more likely to attempt such deception.[12] Even research that claims that groups have an incentive to misrepresent

[9] Lisa Bero, "Implications of the Tobacco Industry Documents for Public Health and Policy," *Annual Review of Public Health* 24 (January 2003): 267–288.

[10] Becker, "Theory of Competition," 393–394; Lyon and Maxwell, "Astroturf," 562.

[11] E.E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), 199.

[12] Lohmann, "Signaling Model," 321; Potters and Van Winden, "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," 284; Wright, *Interest Groups and Congress*, 108.

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information, however, does not anticipate that deception is possible under all circumstances.

Charles Lindblom and John Wright suggest that misrepresentation will be ineffective when there are interest groups lobbying on both sides of an issue, because the presentation of inconsistent information would reveal that one group was not being completely forthcoming.[13] To preserve their credibility, rational interest groups should not attempt to deceive policymakers when there are competing groups arguing the same issue.

One of the most critical pieces of information provided by interest groups to legislators is the extent to which citizens in their districts support or oppose policy changes. The extent of grassroots mobilization, because it requires the same type of effort as electoral mobilization, is considered to be a key indicator of constituent preferences.[14] These campaigns, however, are judged by their presumed spontaneity, and support or opposition solicited by organized interest groups is far less meaningful to policymakers.[15]

We propose that interest groups will seek to deceive policymakers, despite the risk of exposure, when the stakes are high[16] and when accurate information does not support their policy goals. Typically, businesses prefer not to become involved in politics,[17] but when regulation becomes threatening to profits, firms will make efforts to influence policy. We propose that the decision to mislead is contextual, and that two conditions have to be met: the issue is critical, and the group fears that it is losing. This theoretical modification provides guidance about when and to what extent organizations may attempt to mislead policymakers.

Data and Methods

Our case study reviews strategies and tactics used by the tobacco industry to influence the adoption of smoking restrictions on aircraft in the United States, beginning with the petition to ban smoking on commercial aircraft submitted to the Federal Aviation Administration by Ralph Nader in 1969, and continuing through the implementation of the smoking ban in 1990. The exact boundaries of the case study were established after preliminary analyses of tobacco industry documents during data collection. As suggested by Harry

[13] Charles E. Lindblom, "The 'Science' of Muddling Through," *Public Administration Review* 19 (Spring 1959): 79–88; Wright, *Interest Groups and Congress*, 175.

[14] Morris P. Fiorina, *Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974); Wright, *Interest Groups and Congress*, 90; Bodensteiner, "Special Interest Group Coalitions," 32; Lohmann, "Signaling Model," 322; Potters and Van Winden, "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," 285.

[15] Wright, *Interest Groups and Congress*, 91.

[16] Ibid., 108; Potters and Van Winden, "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," 284.

[17] Rosenthal, *Third House*.

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Eckstein[18] and John Gerring,[19] we use this single case study to build on existing theory and to suggest parameters that predict when interest groups, particularly firms, may resort to deception.

We conducted a comprehensive search of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) and Tobacco Documents Online (http://tobaccodocuments.org) to identify internal records describing efforts to thwart the restriction of smoking on passenger aircraft. Search terms included broad keywords such as *airlines*, *aircraft*, *airplane*, and *cabin air* as well as the names of organizations, individuals, projects, files, Bates number ranges, and other specific terms identified through snowball searching. (Bates numbers are unique identifying numbers assigned by each producing party to each page of tobacco industry documents when the documents were produced in litigation.) Terms were deliberately wide-ranging and exhaustive to ensure saturation. Searches took place between August 2003 and June 2005. All terms used and their results were documented in an Excel spreadsheet. Searches were repeated periodically through the remainder of 2005 in order to retrieve any newly acquired records as well as to verify the reproducibility of our data collection methods. The industry documents comprised our primary data and included memoranda and correspondence, meeting minutes, proposals, reports, publications, presentations, budgets, newsletters, and press releases. We also included in our analysis documents produced by other organizations, copies of government records, and news clippings and transcripts identified in the tobacco industry's files if they provided evidence of industry strategies and tactics and/or the extent of their implementation.

In order to put the identified documents into their historical context as well as to corroborate the degree to which the tobacco industry actually implemented its plans, we supplemented our dataset with government records from relevant congressional hearings, debates, and publications identified by electronic searches of government websites (www.thomas.gov), LexisNexis, and university law library databases. We also compiled Federal Register notices, public commentary, hearings, and any meeting minutes from germane regulatory proceedings from the National Archives and Records Administration. Other means of triangulating our data collection included searches of the Internet using the search engine Google and social science, science, and news media databases to identify any related research and documentation, especially from flight attendant, aviation, and advocacy groups.

We identified several thousand pages of pertinent tobacco industry documents, public records, and related research and documentation. The majority

[18] Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science" in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975), 94.

[19] John Gerring, "What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?" *American Political Science Review* 98 (May 2004): 341–354.

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of the industry documents came from the files of the Tobacco Institute (the tobacco industry's former lobbying and trade association), Philip Morris (now Altria), and RJ Reynolds. We narrowed our in-depth review and synthesis to approximately 150 documents that most comprehensively described tobacco industry efforts to misrepresent evidence about constituent preferences, excluding redundant materials, all of which are available for public review online through the University of California, San Francisco Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu). Our interpretative data analysis involved iteratively reviewing the documents, categorizing the strategies and tactics, and summarizing results. Findings were organized both categorically and chronologically into four main areas: letter-writing campaigns, petition drives, public opinion surveys, and smokers' rights and other front groups.

Airline Smoking Restrictions Become a Critical Issue for the Tobacco Industry

We posit that one of two conditions that will lead interest groups to attempt to deceive policymakers is the perception that the issue is critical to its survival. The tobacco industry developed its misrepresentation campaign after concluding that maintaining smoking on airlines was key to maintaining the social acceptability of smoking.[20] Reduction in the social acceptability of smoking was viewed by the industry as one of its greatest threats.[21] The adoption of smoking restrictions on passenger aircraft represents the first and remains one of the few interventions by the federal government to protect nonsmokers from the harms of secondhand smoke. Table 1 provides an account of the evolution of the airline smoking policy process from the initial petitions to ban or segregate smokers through the implementation of the smoking ban on most domestic flights in 1990.

By the late 1970s, the tobacco industry felt that the assault on public smoking by anti-smoking forces was a serious problem.[22] The critical importance of airline smoking restrictions was illustrated in a 1980 memo from James Bowling, Phillip Morris senior vice president, to Horace Kornegay, Tobacco Institute president.[23] In this correspondence, which was generated in response

[20] Anonymous. Philip Morris. 1988. *An Action Plan for ETS in Europe and Adjacent Areas, 1989-1992*. 10 Aug. Bates No. 2028364731/2028364743, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hkh56e00, 18 October 2004; James C. Bowling, [Memo to Horace Kornegay: Does this present an opportunity?] 31 Dec. 1980. Bates No. 2023258261, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/pur24e00, 29 December 2004.

[21] Stanton A. Glantz, John Slade, Lisa A. Bero, Peter Hanauer, and Deborah E. Barnes, *The Cigarette Papers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 391; Bero, "Implications of the Tobacco Industry Documents."

[22] William Kloepfer. 1984. *Winter Meeting Presentation TI Board*. Bates No. TI03150024/03150035, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/reu30c00, 20 September 2004.

[23] Bowling.

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TABLE 1

A Chronology of Airlines and Smoking 1969–1990

1969	
December	Ralph Nader petitions the FAA and the CAB to ban smoking on airlines as annoying, unhealthy for nonsmokers, and as a fire danger. John Banzhaf and ASH file a petition with the FAA seeking separate smoking and nonsmoking sections aboard aircraft.
1973	
May	CAB requires domestic airlines to provide designated "no smoking" areas aboard aircraft for reasons of consumer comfort and protection effective 1 July 1973.
1976	
October	Responding to an ASH petition to ban cigar and pipe smoking, CAB initiates a rulemaking proceeding on a wide range of smoking issues.
1979	
January	CAB modifies the 1973 rules, requiring that airlines segregate cigar and pipe smokers; ban smoking when the ventilation system is not fully functioning; ensure that nonsmokers are not unreasonably burdened when a no-smoking section is sandwiched between two smoking sections; accommodate all persons who wish to be seated in nonsmoking areas; and take measures to enforce these rules. Docket 29044 is kept open for further comments.
May	CAB invites comments on several proposals: ban smoking on flights of one hour or less; ban smoking on small aircraft; ban cigar and pipe smoking; provide special seating arrangements for passengers unusually susceptible to tobacco smoke; require partitions or buffer zones between smoking and nonsmoking sections; and permit a waiver procedure for airlines that wish to experiment with ways of segregating smokers and nonsmokers.
1981	
February	In a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking to its 16 May 1979 notice, CAB requests commentary on two more options: a ban on all in-flight smoking or an elimination of the regulation of smoking on passenger aircraft.
September	CAB concludes the rulemaking begun in 1976 by dropping the 1979 modifications to the smoking rule. It revises the rule by requiring airlines to guarantee a seat in the no smoking section to every nonsmoker who meets the airline's designated check-in deadline.
1983	
September	CAB issues supplemental proposals to ban smoking on short flights (one or two hours) and to require additional special protections for those sensitive to smoke.
1984	
June	CAB adopts rules to ban smoking on small aircraft and to ban cigar and pipe smoking on all flights.
1987	
July	House passes (198-193) an amendment to the DOT appropriations bill banning smoking on flights of two hours or less.
October	House Aviation Subcommittee hears testimony on smoking aboard airliners. Senate passes a compromise amendment to the DOT appropriations bill banning smoking on flights of 90 minutes or less for two years.
December	The conference committee agrees to a compromise provision banning smoking on flights of two hours or less for two years and a $2,000 fine for tampering with smoke detectors in airliner lavatories.
1988	
April	Smoking ban on flights of two hours or less goes into effect as per Public Law 100–202.
1989	
June	House Aviation Subcommittee hears testimony on smoking aboard airliners.
July	House Aviation Subcommittee marks up the bill introduced by Chairman Jim Oberstar, modifying it to extend for two years the current two-hour ban. The bill is further amended in full committee to make the ban permanent.
August	House passes an amendment to the transportation appropriations bill that would make the current ban of smoking on commercial flights of two hours or less permanent.

(Continued)

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TABLE 1

Continued

September	Senate adopts by voice vote the Lautenberg amendment to the transportation appropriations bill banning smoking on all domestic flights.
October	House–Senate conferees agree to ban smoking on all passenger flights within the continental United States and all flights to Alaska and Hawaii lasting less than six hours.
1990	
February	Smoking ban (Public Law 101–164) on most scheduled U.S. domestic flights goes into effect.

ASH, Action on Smoking and Health; CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board; DOT, Department of Transportation; FAA, Federal Aviation Administration.

Sources: 38 Fed Reg 12207. "Chapter II. Civil Aeronautics Board. Chapter A. Economic Regulations [Regulation ER-800]. Part 252 Provision of Designated 'No-Smoking' Areas Aboard Aircraft Operated by Certificated Air Carriers." (1973); 41 Fed Reg 44424. "Provision of Designated 'No-Smoking' Areas Aboard Aircraft Operated by Certificated Air Carriers. Proposed Rulemaking." (1976); 44 Fed Reg 5075. Part 252 "Provision of Designated 'No-Smoking' Areas Aboard Aircraft Operated by Certificated Air Carriers. Amendment of Part. Final Rule." (1979); 44 Fed Reg 29486. "Proposed Restrictions on Smoking Aboard Aircraft: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking." (1979); 46 Fed Reg 11827. "Smoking Aboard Aircraft. Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking." (1981); 46 Fed Reg 45934. "Smoking Aboard Aircraft." (1981); 48 Fed Reg 43341. "Smoking Aboard Aircraft. Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking." (1983); 49 Fed Reg 25408. "Smoking Aboard Aircraft." (1984); "Petition for Promulgation of a Rule Requiring Separation of Smoking and Non-smoking Passengers on All Commercial Domestic Air Carriers." (1969); *Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1988*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 133, no. 115 (1987): H 6167; *Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990*, 101st Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 135, no. 108 (1989): H 5005; *Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990* (1990): H 3015; *Department of Transportation Appropriations Act*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 133, no. 171 (1987): S 15423; *Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1988*, Public Law 100–102 (December 22, 1987): H 395; Edmund Preston. *FAA Historical Chronology Civil Aviation and the Federal Government 1926–1996* (Washington DC: Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Public Affairs, 1998); House Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, *To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987; House Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, *To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft*, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989.

to the 1981 Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) request for comment on either a ban of all in-flight smoking or complete elimination of the smoker segregation rule, Bowling stated:

> As you know, I believe that the successful efforts of the anti's in getting the smoking/no-smoking rule established aboard aircraft was the single most effective thing in their effort to create and promote a social stigma to public smoking. If this presents an opportunity to turn that one around—I think we should do everything possible.

The industry was taken by surprise when in 1987, Representative Richard Durbin (D-IL) succeeded in passing a provision to appropriations legislation on the House floor to ban smoking on flights of two hours or less.[24] To

[24] Anonymous. 1988. *Smoking Aboard Airliners: A Strategic Plan*. 22 Apr. Bates No. TI07670374/07670398, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wwy30c00, 17 March 2005; *Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1988*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 133, no. 115 (1987): H 6167.

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stop the legislation, the industry used direct one-on-one lobbying and grassroots mobilization.[25] Efforts to demonstrate public opinion against a ban included the formation by the tobacco industry of the Committee for Airline Passengers' Rights.[26]

Even before the temporary two-year smoking ban on flights of two hours or less went into effect in April 1988, the Tobacco Institute developed a 25-page action plan and an airline smoking program with a budget of over $2.5 million to ensure that the law would expire.[27] The plan had three objectives:

> To ensure that the two-hour ban sunsets as scheduled on April 22, 1990. To persuade congressional and DOT [Department of Transportation] decision makers that the issues to be confronted are cabin air quality and ventilation. To persuade congressional and DOT decision-makers and airlines that smokers expect to be accommodated and that all parties should fight for restoration of a more reasonable system.[28]

By 1989, executives at the Tobacco Institute described airline smoking as the industry's "most persistent and intractable issue"[29] and one of the industry's "most difficult challenges in Congress."[30] Despite the engagement of an army of tobacco industry and third-party lobbyists[31] and the help of influential allies in Congress, the industry was unable to stop the adoption of legislation permanently banning smoking on most domestic flights. Even before final passage of the ban, the Tobacco Institute acknowledged defeat by eliminating the airline smoking program from its 1990 budget proposal, aban-

[25] Anonymous. 1987. *Airline Smoking Presentation at Nordic NMA ETS Working Group Helsinki, December 10, 1987.* 9 Dec. Bates No. 2501330521/2501330536, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cje32e00, 10 March 2005.

[26] Peter G. Sparber. 1987. 15 Oct. Bates No. TI07670456, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/yvy30c00, 10 March 2005.

[27] Peter G. Sparber. 1988. *Enclosed Attached Review Plan for Smoking Restrictions. Smoking Aboard Airlines: A Strategic Plan. Appendix A Thru E.* 25 Feb. Bates No. TI00450004/00450022, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lum30c00, 16 March 2005; Anonymous, *Smoking Aboard Airliners: A Strategic Plan.*

[28] Anonymous, *Smoking Aboard Airliners: A Strategic Plan.*

[29] John Lyons. Tobacco Institute. 1989. 16 Aug. Bates No. TI01140210/01140213, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ybp30c00, 13 April 2005.

[30] Samuel D. Chilcote. Tobacco Institute. 1989. 28 Sep. Bates No. 508088599/508088599, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qls31d00, 15 April 2005.

[31] Ibid., 8 Aug. Bates No. TNWL0034910, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rmk07d00, 13 April 2005; Daniel A. Najjar. 1989. 21 Aug. Bates No. 507641135/507641136, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xbp61d00, 13 April 2005; Daniel C. Nelson. 1989. *Federal Contacts–Airline Smoking Ban.* 29 Aug. Bates No. TI00441729/00441730, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ivm30c00, 13 April 2005; Walter Woodson. 1989. *Airline Contacts During Recess.* 8 Aug. Bates No. TI00442323, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_indexed/TI00442323.html, 13 April 2005; Walter Woodson. 1989. *Airline Smoking Ban Contact Program.* 11 Aug. Bates No. TI00441284/00441288, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_indexed/TI00441284.html, 13 April 2005.

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doning efforts to generate favorable public opinion research, and withdrawing funding for the industry-sponsored group, the Smokers' Rights Alliance.[32]

Misrepresenting Constituent Preferences

Although the tobacco industry used a number of strategies to prevent passage of airline smoking restrictions, we focus on attempts to misrepresent constituent preferences, since this information can be critical in establishing legislative policy positions. The following sections describe the industry's internal discussion about its attempts to mischaracterize public support through letter-writing campaigns, petition drives, public opinion surveys, and smokers' rights and other front groups.

Letter-writing Campaigns

The tobacco industry attempted to hide its involvement in letter-writing campaigns throughout the airline smoking policy process. Letters were generated by the industry's own employees and related individuals and organizations (for example, the Tobacco Institute, tobacco companies and associations, wholesalers, distributors, advertisers, law firms, tobacco farmers and unions, and subsidiaries).[33] Figure 1 shows excerpts of examples of the various covert

[32] Susan Stuntz. 1989. 21 Sep. Bates No. TI17681799/17681804, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI17681799.html, 14 September 2005; Tobacco Institute. 1989. *Public Affairs Management Plan Progress Report October 1989.* Oct. Bates No. TI09911505/09911542, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rga40c00, 15 April 2005.

[33] Coordinating Board of Tobacco. Jack Beaty. 1972. *The Civil Aeronautics Board Has Proposed a Ruling That Would Require All Airlines to Segregate Smokers from Other Passengers.* 4 Dec. Bates No. 518152656/518152657, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zso61d00, 9 November 2004; Jeb Lee. 1972. *Proposed CAB Ruling.* 27 Nov. Bates No. 1003057843/1003057844, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mcw64e00, 9 November 2004; John C.B. Ehringhaus. Tobacco Institute. 1976. *The Civil Aeronautics Board Has Formally Proposed to Outlaw Pipe and Cigar Smoking on Airlines—and Might Even Prohibit All Smoking During Flights.* 19 Oct. Bates No. 500002108, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/viu31d00, 19 November 2004; Rene Rondou. Tobacco Workers International Union. 1976. *Copy of Letter Sent to CAB. Request to All U.S. TWIU Local Union Members to Send a Similar Letter on a Personal Basis.* 28 Oct. Bates No. TI04341735, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bkv30c00, 19 November 2004; Stanley S. Scott. Philip Morris. 1979. 9 Aug. Bates No. 2023022551/2023022552, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/acx36e00, 21 December 2004; Alfred M. Pollard. Tobacco Institute. 1981. *Action Plan on CAB Regulations on Smoking.* 4 Mar. Bates No. TI36310091/36310096, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI36310091.html, 21 December 2004; Paul Serber. Tobacco Institute. 1983. 10 Aug. Bates No. TI12091337/12091346, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI12091337.html, 31 January 2005; Walter Woodson. 1987. *FET Airline Bans, State Efforts During the Recess.* 6 Aug. Bates No. TI09052656/09052665, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI09052656.html, 31 January 2005; David Laufer. Philip Morris. 1987. *Airline Smoking Ban Mobilizations.* 20 July. Bates No. TI09052542/09052547, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI09052542.html, 9 March 2005; Anonymous. 1989. *Airline Smoking Ban Response Cards Received.* Bates No.

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FIGURE 1

Examples of Covert Letter-writing Requests from Tobacco Industry Documents

Lorillard Document, December 1972

> Attached are five drafts of "letters" to the C.A.B. opposing the rule to require airlines to segregate smokers.
>
> Could you get some of the agency people to write these -- by hand -- on non-company letterheads, using home addresses, and ask each one to get one or two more, similar, but not exactly the same.

Brown & Williamson Document, October 1976

> If you decide to write, you should use your own words and you will be writing as a private individual. For that reason, you should not use company stationery nor state that you are connected with B&W.

Philip Morris Document, August 1983

> IN PREPARING YOUR LETTER, PLEASE USE PLAIN PAPER OR PERSONAL LETTERHEAD AND A PLAIN ENVELOPE. DO NOT USE PHILIP MORRIS LETTERHEAD OR ENVELOPES.

Tobacco Action Network, May 1980

> Because you are expressing your own views, your letter should be on your personal stationery or plain paper bearing your home address -- not on business letterhead or with your business address!!

Committee for Airline Passengers Rights (tobacco industry front group), Nov. 1987

> WHAT CAN YOU DO? Join with other concerned New Jersey citizens on the Committee for Airline Passengers' Rights and let Senator Lautenberg know how you feel about the smoking ban. Exercise your rights as a citizen and write to Senator Lautenberg TODAY.
>
> The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg
> United States Senate
> 717 Hart Senate Office Building
> Washington, D.C. 20510
>
> When you write, put one of the Airline Passengers' Rights stickers on the letter and envelope. Senator Lautenberg will know there is a strong group of New Jerseyeans who disagree with his views on tobacco issues.

Sources: James C. Bowling. Philip Morris. 1983. 9 Aug. Bates No. 2500165602/2500165603. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cfi22d00. J. A. Broughton. 1976. 25 Oct. Bates No. 680086604. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rbw04f00. Committee for Airline Passengers Rights. 1987. *No on Airline Smoking Bans Fact Sheet*. 20 Nov. Bates No. TI11153154/11153156. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ulh40c00. Arthur J. Stevens. 1972. 13 Nov. Bates No. 2025015096. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/raa56e00. Tobacco Action Network. Tobacco Institute. 1980. *CAB Action Request*. 22 May. Bates No. TI21441332/21441334. http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI21441332.html.

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letter-writing requests found in the tobacco industry's files, from the first proceeding to establish smoking sections in 1972 through the congressional adoption of a smoking ban in 1987. Requests repeatedly indicated that any association with the tobacco industry be hidden. The industry was also aware that the correspondence needed to be sufficiently varied to "avoid the appearance of a tightly organized campaign."[34]

The industry's efforts to conceal its involvement were not always successful. At least one tobacco company letter drive was uncovered and reported in the major press during the CAB's first rulemaking in 1972.[35] Despite the industry's letter-writing efforts in this case, most of the 4,500 letters received by the agency were in favor of the proposed rule (no further breakdown provided).[36]

The tobacco industry continued to solicit letters in response to each attempt to tighten the smoking rules on aircraft. Important to the industry's future successes at producing favorable comment was the formation of the Tobacco Action Network (TAN) by the Tobacco Institute in 1977. Coordinated through the Tobacco Institute's state activities division and consisting predominantly of tobacco-related individuals,[37] TAN enrollees were first mobilized to write letters in opposition to further regulations proposed by the CAB in 1979.[38] The TAN response to the proceeding was applauded by the industry in one of the organization's monthly newsletters:

> Although letters to the CAB were running as high as 50 to 1 against the smokers at the beginning of the Campaign, the final tally, after the August 20 deadline, showed a ratio of 2 to 1 against further restrictions.[39]

TI00441716/00441725, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mvm30c00, 13 April 2005; Tobacco Institute. 1988. *Public Affairs Management Plan Progress Report.* Aug. Bates No. TIDN0018350/0018388, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fyh91f00, 17 March 2005.

[34] Dennis Durden. 1976. *Here's My Draft of What I'd Suggest Bill Hobbs Send.* 3 Nov. Bates No. 500799117/500799118, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xzf35a00, 19 November 2004.

[35] Jack Anderson. United Feature Syndicate and *The Washington Post.* 1973. *Lorillard Inspires Pro-smoking Mail.* 19 Jan. Bates No. 03742088/03742089, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/chx61e00, 9 November 2004; Jack Anderson. *Miami Herald.* 1973. *Ghosting for Lorrilard. Pro-smoking Letters "Inspired."* 19 Jan. Bates No. 503682687/503682687, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vst31d00, 9 November 2004.

[36] 38 Fed Reg 12207, "Chapter II. Civil Aeronautics Board. Chapter A. Economic Regulations [Regulation ER-800]. Part 252 Provision of Designated "No-Smoking" Areas Aboard Aircraft Operated by Certificated Air Carriers." (1973).

[37] Organization Resources Counselors, Inc. 1981. *The Tobacco Institute. A Study of the Tobacco Action Network.* Mar. Bates No. 03673008/03673077, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oyf71e00, 17 May 2005.

[38] TAN. Tobacco Action Network. 1979. *TAN National UPDATE.* Jun. Bates No. TIFL0063746/0063751, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qsq02f00, 21 December 2004.

[39] TAN. Tobacco Action Network. 1979. *TAN National UPDATE, Volume 1, Number 2 CAB Campaign Called Success.* Nov. Bates No. TI22620786/22620791, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI22620786.html, 21 December 2004.

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Monitoring of letter counts in the CAB docket by the tobacco industry in subsequent proceedings showed that before the initiation of industry-driven letter-writing campaigns, there was overwhelming support of the agency's proposals for further restrictions. One surveillance report from July 1983 stated:

> While at C.A.B., I reviewed some of the 800 pieces received in response to D. 41431. All but one letter was in favor of imposing restrictions on smoking.[40]

Further follow-up of the docket contents demonstrated the industry's overwhelming success in generating comments favorable to its position. Tobacco Institute correspondence from September 1983 indicated that the CAB received a total of 3,700 letters, with 1,700 against further restrictions.[41] By November, the letters ran 64 percent against the proposed regulations.[42] However, the industry sought to make the letter count match the results of its recently released public opinion survey, which claimed that approximately 80 percent of the public supported its position (discussed below).[43] A November 1983 memo from William Kloepfer, Tobacco Institute senior vice president, to its staff declared:

> But this is *not* enough. As we measured public opinion, it's 80-20 against. The docket ratio should be the same and *that* is our goal."[44]

The Institute nearly reached its objective. Of the approximately 20,000 individual letters submitted to CAB, 14,399 (72 percent) opposed any further restrictions on smoking while 5,457 (27 percent) favored further restrictions.[45]

The industry continued its mobilization efforts and boasted of success in generating letters, mailgrams, and phone calls to key legislators, the DOT, and airline executives when the airline smoking issue emerged in Congress.[46] Despite its efforts to conceal its involvement, members of Congress

[40] Adele Abrams. 1983. *C.A.B. Action on Docket #29044 Public Response to D. 41431*. 27 Jul. Bates No. TI12470636/12470638, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dtm40c00, 25 January 2005.

[41] J. Kendrick Wells. 1983. 22 Sep. Bates No. 680011631/680011634, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ayc24f00, 25 January 2005.

[42] William Kloepfer. 1983. *Civil Aeronautics Board: Update*. 4 Nov. Bates No. 690148318/690148331, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/yhq93f00, 1 February 2005.

[43] Tarrance & Associates. 1983. *Airline Smoking Study. A Report Prepared for the Tobacco Institute.* Sep. Bates No. TI10581643/10581654, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mug40c00, 21 April 2005.

[44] Kloepfer. *Civil Aeronautics Board: Update* (emphasis in original).

[45] Gregory R. Scott. Philip Morris. 1984. *February 14-15 CAB Oral Argument Proceedings on Proposed Revisions to Smoking Rules*. 15 Feb. Bates No. 2047363245/2047363251, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/prz62e00, 3 February 2005; 49 Fed Reg 25408, "Smoking Aboard Aircraft" (1984).

[46] Anonymous, *Smoking Aboard Airliners: A Strategic Plan*; Laufer. *Airline Smoking Ban Mobilizations*; Walter V. Robinson. *Boston Globe*. 1987. *Smoky Flight Gave Him a Clear Purpose*. 24 Dec. Bates No. TITX0034759, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ouw32f00, 10 March 2005; Woodson. *FET Airline Bans, State Efforts*; Anonymous. 1988. *Lyons' Report to the Communications Committee on the Status of Airline Smoking Matters*. Bates No. TIMN0014765/0014770, accessed

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were aware that the flood of communications had been generated by the tobacco lobby.[47]

Petition Drives

To offset letters to the CAB supporting smoking restrictions on aircraft, the tobacco industry developed a plan to obtain support from airline travelers.[48] The Tobacco Institute and Philip Morris hired Donnelley Marketing to conduct a nationwide airport petition drive in response to the CAB's first attempt to strengthen its smoking rule in 1976.[49] At a cost of approximately $190,000,[50] about 133,000 signatures were obtained and submitted by the Tobacco Institute, along with its supplemental comments, to the CAB.[51] Despite difficulties in obtaining access to several major airports, the industry claimed its petition drive was a success.[52] At a press conference, president Kornegay stated:

> This dramatic response of airline passengers to the petition drive belies the suggestion ... that a substantial proportion of ordinary airline passengers support further restriction on smoking.[53]

Kornegay did not reveal that the petitions were supplemented with signatures from within the tobacco industry and its subsidiaries.[54] He noted in an

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at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tio03f00, 15 March 2005; Anonymous. *Airline Smoking Ban Response Cards Received*; Tobacco Institute. *Public Affairs Management Plan Progress Report.*

[47] House Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, *To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987. W.V. Robinson. *Boston Globe.* 1989. *Tobacco Lobby Pervades Congress Article # 2.* 24 Sep. Bates No. TI30819602/30819606, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tlp76d00, 4 October 2004.

[48] James S. Dowdell. 1977. *CAB/EAL.* 18 Aug. Bates No. 500002012/500002014, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lij99d00, 21 December 2004.

[49] Edward A. Grefe. Philip Morris. 1976. 14 Dec. Bates No. 2025014956/2025014959, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/joa81f00, 19 November 2004; Edward A. Grefe. Philip Morris. 1976. *Preliminary Test Results of Petition Drive.* 31 Dec. Bates No. 2024989082/2024989084, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zjy46e00, 30 November 2004.

[50] Grefe. *Preliminary Test Results of Petition Drive.*

[51] CAB and Associate General Counsel of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), Memorandum: Summary of comments on EDR-306, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with respect to Part 252, "Provision of Designated 'No-Smoking' Areas Aboard Aircraft Operated by Certificated Air Carriers." Docket 29044. From the National Archives and Records Administration. April 20. See also http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/frg24e00 1977.

[52] Tobacco Institute. 1977. Press release. 21 Jan. Bates No. TIMN0120658/0120659, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fwg92f00, 30 November 2004; Horace R. Kornegay. 1977. *CAB Petition Canvass Results.* 21 Jan. Bates No. 2024989052/2024989056, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/krg24e00, 30 November 2004.

[53] Tobacco Institute. Press release.

[54] Horace R. Kornegay. 1977. 14 Jan. Bates No. 03741908, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jfx61e00, 30 November 2004; William D. Hobbs. 1977. 19 Jan. Bates No. 505197537/505197537, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jvt25d00, 30 November 2004.

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internal memo that it was essential that any petitions circulated amongst employees be delivered to the CAB within a time frame that would "insure [*sic*] that the integrity of the *signatures obtained at the airports* is maintained."[55] Using a short time frame allowed the industry to present its petitions as being signed exclusively by airline passengers. The CAB docket also contained evidence that some signatures may have been falsified.[56]

The Tobacco Institute conducted a second nationwide airport petition drive in 1983 in response to the CAB's proposals to ban smoking on small aircraft and short flights.[57] The Tobacco Institute filed more than 180,000 signatures with the CAB[58] and again did not disclose that the petitions had also been distributed among tobacco industry employees.[59] One industry document revealed that the Philip Morris sales division had collected more than 50,000 of the signatures.[60] Private citizens also filed complaints about petition gatherers who did not always disclose tobacco industry sponsorship or the nature of the petition.[61] We found no evidence of any response to these complaints.

Public Opinion Surveys

The tobacco industry conducted a series of public opinion surveys on airline smoking restrictions and selectively publicized only findings that supported its position. The first opinion poll was conducted in 1983 for the Tobacco Institute by Tarrance and Associates.[62] The telephone survey found that 83 percent of 1,000 U.S. air travelers felt that the arrangement of separate seating for smokers and nonsmokers "works pretty well in making all passengers com-

[55] Kornegay (emphasis in original).

[56] Lawrence Aves, Letter to Iowa Congressman Charles Grassley regarding falsified petition signature. Correspondence file. Docket #29044, National Archives and Records Administration, 28 April 1977.

[57] Anonymous. 1983. *The C.A.B. Proposal: A Program Concept*. 18 Sep. Bates No. 2024078565/2024078570, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/afr14e00, 25 January 2005; William Kloepfer. Tobacco Institute. 1983. *Response to CAB's Smoking Rule Proposals*. 30 Sep. Bates No. 01344941/01344943, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xww81e00, 26 January 2005.

[58] Tobacco Institute and Horace R. Kornegay, Reply Comments of the Tobacco Institute to the Civil Aeronautics Board. Docket No. 41431 EDR-461 and EDR-461B, 27 Dec. 1983.

[59] Stan Boman. Tobacco Institute. 1983. 3 Nov. Bates No. TIOK0029627, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jau91f00, 1 February 2005; Bill Toohey. Tobacco Institute. 1983. *Merryman PUBSAT Interview on CAB Situation*. 11 Nov. Bates No. TI12302213/12302221, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI12302213.html, 1 February 2005; Charles G. Hord. 1983. *Civil Aeronautics Board*. 4 Nov. Bates No. TNWL0029111, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hzn07d00, 1 February 2005.

[60] Anonymous. 1984. *Civil Aeronautics Board*. Nov. Bates No. 2025434656/2025434658, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/swr25e00, 2 February 2005.

[61] Marc Matre. 1983. *CAB-Smoking Rulemaking*. 23 Nov. Bates No. TI00451699/00451703, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_indexed/TI00451699.html, 2 February 2005; B.G. Hall, *CAB-Smoking Rulemaking* (Washington DC: National Archives and Records Administration. Docket No. 41431, 1983).

[62] Tarrance & Associates. *Airline Smoking Study*.

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fortable." The industry did not disclose, however, the results of its pilot study (300 respondents).[63] A September 1983 memorandum from Kloepfer to the Institute's president disclosed these preliminary findings and stated:

> On our pilot survey of airline passengers, we do *not* have reassuring results. While the great majority feel that present arrangements are OK, their number diminishes the moment they are told of possible new regulations. We came out 50% for and 38% against the prohibition of smoking on planes with fewer than 60 seats. We came out 46-47 on the two hours or less prohibition.[64]

Specific questions on proposed regulations or legislation as used in the pilot survey do not appear in the full study or in any subsequent publicly disclosed surveys sponsored by the industry. Furthermore, the 1983 final report falsely stated in its overview that "the Tobacco Institute was unaware of any significant public demand from air travelers to change the present arrangement."[65] When the Tobacco Institute repeated the survey in 1985, it found that 82 percent indicated that they approved the current arrangement of segregating smokers and nonsmokers (1,000 respondents).[66] Data from these polls were used repeatedly in public commentary and hearing testimony to argue that there was no public support for further restricting smoking on aircraft.[67] Philip Morris also studied air travelers' attitudes toward smoking restrictions and found results consistent with the Tobacco Institute's pilot study. The unpublicized survey showed that 55 percent of 101 nonsmokers and 13 percent of 99 smokers strongly approved of a smoking ban on all airplane flights.[68]

In 1987, the Tobacco Institute worked with the airline pilots association to survey passenger attitudes on airline issues including smoking.[69] In this survey, 87 percent indicated that the "practice of separating smoking and nonsmoking passengers is a reasonable policy that respects the rights of each" (1,000 respondents). The Tobacco Institute claimed not to have been involved

[63] William Kloepfer. 1983. 6 Sep. Bates No. TI12302457/12302461, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI12302457.html, 21 April 2005; Richard E. Ryan. Tarrance & Associates. 1983. 29 Aug. Bates No. TI12302453/12302456, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI12302453.html, 21 April 2005; Wells.

[64] Kloepfer (emphasis in original).

[65] Tarrance & Associates. *Airline Smoking Study*.

[66] Tarrance & Associates. 1985. *1985 Airline Smoking Study Prepared for the Tobacco Institute*. Apr. Bates No. 85672258/85672296, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tzl31e00, 21 April 2005.

[67] Tobacco Institute and Horace R. Kornegay, Comments of the Tobacco Institute on Proposed Amendments to Regulations Governing Smoking Aboard Commercial Aircraft. Submitted to the Civil Aeronautics Board. Docket No. 41431 EDR-461 and EDR 461B, 7 Nov 1983; Tobacco Institute and Kornegay, Reply Comments of the Tobacco Institute; *To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft*.

[68] Cheryl L. McKay. Philip Morris. 1985. *Sidestream Smoke Attitude Survey*. 15 May. Bates No. 2021568757/2021568789, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tmb68e00, 21 April 2005.

[69] Anonymous. 1989. *Fact: Airline Passengers Were Satisfied with the System of Providing Separate Sections for Smokers and Nonsmokers*. Bates No. TI04091620, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ttu30c00, 25 April 2005.

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with this research in its testimony to Congress.[70] Internal documents show, however, that the Tobacco Institute paid for the study and developed the questionnaire with the airline pilots association.[71]

Three other public opinion polls conducted in 1987, independent of the tobacco industry, showed broad support for airline smoking bans. At the 1987 House Aviation Subcommittee hearing on airline smoking, a representative of the International Foundation of Airline Passenger Associations presented data from its worldwide survey of passengers' attitudes toward smoking on aircraft.[72] The study found that 60 percent of all U.S. passengers supported a smoking ban on flights up to two hours and that 48 percent favored a ban on all flights (7,200 respondents).[73] Only 17 percent indicated that they preferred dividing the aircraft cabin between smokers and nonsmokers. A survey sponsored by the American Medical Association showed that 67 percent of its 1,500 study participants indicated that smoking should not be allowed on aircraft.[74] The American Association of Respiratory Care (AARC) conducted a study among over 33,000 airline passengers and found that 64 percent favored a smoking ban on all flights.[75]

A second AARC poll conducted in 1989 found that 84 percent approved the ban on flights of two hours or less and 67 percent indicated that the ban should be extended to all flights (27,667 respondents).[76] In a press release, the Tobacco Institute claimed that this study was flawed and stated that the "AARC 'findings' are not consistent with other more reliable measures of public opinion."[77] The AARC responded to the claims by challenging the Institute to work cooperatively to conduct another poll. The offer was declined.[78]

[70] *To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft.*

[71] William Kloepfer. 1987. *Action on Airline Smoking Ban.* 30 Dec. Bates No. TI07670542/07670544, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/svy30c00, 10 March 2005; Susan Stuntz. 1987. *Issues for Discussion with Wendell Ford.* 12 Mar. Bates No. TI07670552/07670553, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mvy30c00, 28 February 2005.

[72] *To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft*; Geoffrey Lipman. International Foundation of Airline Passengers Associations (IFAPA). 1987. *Comments of the International Foundation of Airline Passengers Associations before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, U.S. House of Representatives Legislation to Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft.* 7 Oct. Bates No. TI12030338/12030342, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dzk40c00, 21 April 2005.

[73] *To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft.*

[74] Kane Parsons & Associates, *Health Care Issues* (American Medical Association, 1987).

[75] Sherry Milligan. American Association for Respiratory Care. 1987. *AARC Airline Smoking Survey. Airline Passengers Prefer Smoke Free Environment.* Sep. Bates No. TI07071333/07071342, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI07071333.html, 21 April 2005.

[76] American Association for Respiratory Care. 1989. *Public Attitudes About Smoking on Airlines. A Survey Conducted by the American Association for Respiratory Care.* 20 Jun. Bates No. 87649025/87649056, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rgs21e00, 25 April 2005.

[77] Tobacco Institute. 1989. *Public Opinion Poll About Smoking on Airlines Not Supported by Other Opinion Measures.* 20 Jun. Bates No. 2040852208, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rlm52e00, 25 April 2005.

[78] Tobacco Institute. 1989. *Public Affairs Management Plan Progress Report June 1989.* Jun. Bates No. TIMN0296697/0296730, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fmp62f00, 22 March 2005.

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By 1989, the Tobacco Institute privately conceded that public opinion favored bans on airline smoking.[79] A May 1989 memo from John Lyons, leader of the Smokers' Rights Alliance, states:

> There is $50,000 in the airline budget for a public opinion survey in 1989. I do not anticipate conducting this survey. (Crafting useful questions would be extremely difficult, and other surveys in the last 12 months suggest we would not like the results).[80]

In a July 1989 progress report on the airline smoking strategy, Lyons confirmed that public opinion research among voters in tobacco states would not be undertaken, owing to the apparent acceptance of the two-hour ban. He reported findings from a survey conducted by a Tennessee congressman in which 70 percent of constituents participating in the poll supported a total in-flight smoking ban.[81] Publicly, however, the Tobacco Institute maintained that the general public did not support banning smoking on aircraft. In testimony before Congress in 1989, Tobacco Institute spokesman Charles Whitley repeated the industry's claim that the majority of Americans did not support the prohibition of smoking on aircraft.[82]

Smokers' Rights and Other Front Groups

Committee for Airline Passengers' Rights. In response to Senate passage of an amendment banning smoking on flights of 90 minutes or less in late 1987, the tobacco industry formed the Committee for Airline Passengers' Rights, an organization "made up of smokers and tobacco industry personnel."[83] The group was first developed and deployed in New Jersey with the intention of influencing Senator Frank Lautenberg, a major proponent of the airline smoking ban.[84] David Goldfarb, executive director of the Tobacco Distributors

[79] John Lyons. 1989. *Economics of the Airline Smoking Ban*. 16 May. Bates No. TI17682612/17682613, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI17682612.html, 22 March 2005; John Lyons. 1989. *Airlines*. Jul. Bates No. TI01140253/01140282, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ebp30c00, 23 March 2005.

[80] Lyons. *Economics of the Airline Smoking Ban*.

[81] Lyons. *Airlines*.

[82] *To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft*.

[83] Sparber; Peter G. Sparber. 1987. *Progress on "Airline Passengers Rights" Organizations*. 20 Oct. Bates No. TI07670427, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/nwy30c00, 10 December 2004; Peter G. Sparber. 1987. *Public Affairs Management Plan Progress Report November 1987*. Nov. Bates No. TIFL0536007/0536045, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wpk02f00, 10 March 2005; Anonymous, *Smoking Aboard Airliners: A Strategic Plan*.

[84] Samuel D. Chilcote. Tobacco Institute. 1987. *Importance of Impacting Senator Lautenberg on the Airline Issue*. 1 Dec. Bates No. TI11153152, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wlh40c00, 10 December 2004; Committee for Airline Passengers Rights. 1987. *No on Airline Smoking Bans Fact Sheet*. 20 Nov. Bates No. TI11153154/11153156, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ulh40c00, 10 March 2005.

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Association of New Jersey, was appointed as the Committee's chairman.[85] The front group's main function was to mobilize individuals to write and express their views to Senator Lautenberg so that he would "know there is a strong group of New Jerseyeans who disagree with his views on tobacco issues"[86] (see Figure 1). In this covert campaign, private citizens who received the group's "Fact Sheets" and letter-writing requests were unaware that there was no affiliation with an actual airline passengers' organization.

Smokers' Rights Alliance. The general consensus among the Tobacco Institute's airline working group in early 1988 was that mobilization of smokers was needed to exert pressure on policymakers and airlines to ensure sunset of the smoking ban.[87] A March 1988 memo summarizing the proposed airline strategy from the group's leader, John Lyons, to Tobacco Institute executive Peter Sparber stated:

> Smokers are an unorganized political constituency, but unless there is an outcry among smokers, there will be no reason, no context, to repeal the ban or allow it to sunset.[88]

To achieve this aim, the Tobacco Institute coordinated, publicized, and funded the media events and other public relations activities of Dave Brenton and the Smokers' Rights Alliance.[89] Based in Arizona,[90] with about 700 members,[91] the group claimed to operate on membership dues and private donations, including "some in-kind assistance" from the Tobacco Institute.[92] Brenton was available on a full-time basis for activities pertaining to the airline smoking issue and would receive $5,000/month compensation.[93] In addition, the Tobacco Institute provided informational materials and funded various public

[85] Chilcote. *Importance of Impacting Senator Lautenberg.*

[86] Committee for Airline Passengers Rights. *No on Airline Smoking Bans Fact Sheet.*

[87] John Lyons. 1988. *Views of Prospective Members of the Airline Working Group.* 27 Jan. Bates No. TI01132303/01132310, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_indexed/TI01132303.html, 15 March 2005; John Lyons. 1988. *Summary of the Proposed Airline Strategy.* 10 Mar. Bates No. TI07670369/07670370, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ywy30c00, 16 March 2005.

[88] Lyons. *Summary of the Proposed Airline Strategy.*

[89] Samuel D. Chilcote. 1988. 14 Apr. Bates No. TI11391376/11391379, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tyi40c00, 16 March 2005; Tobacco Institute. *Public Affairs Management Plan Progress Report.*

[90] David W. Brenton. 1988. *Tobacco Observer Volume 13, No. 1.* Mar. Bates No. TI07830356/07830359, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iaz30c00, 26 May 2005.

[91] John Lyons. 1988. *Smokers Rights Alliances Airport Activities.* 23 May. Bates No. TI01571335/01571339, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qpr30c00, 16 March 2005.

[92] Richard Durbin. *Christian Science Monitor.* 1989. *The Tobacco Industry's Smoke Screen.* 16 Aug. Bates No. TI01140241, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lbp30c00, 23 March 2005.

[93] William Kloepfer. Tobacco Institute. 1988. 16 Mar. Bates No. TI44811425/44811426, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI44811425.html, 16 March 2005.

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relations activities budgeted at about $80,000.[94] Included among Smokers' Rights Alliance activities were television and radio appearances, information booths, petition drives, and demonstrations at airports across the country. However, these demonstrations consisted of tobacco industry personnel picketing in the various locales rather than outraged smokers, as advertised.[95]

The relationship between the tobacco industry and the Smokers' Rights Alliance was exposed in the Congressional Record and in the print media in 1989.[96] Funding of the group was suspended when the Tobacco Institute eliminated its airline smoking program in late 1989.[97]

Discussion and Implications

This analysis of internal documents and public records demonstrates the tobacco industry's continued attempts to mislead policymakers regarding public support for airline smoking restrictions, and reviews the circumstances that led the industry to pursue this strategy. As hypothesized, this study shows that there are circumstances under which firms may present inaccurate information about constituent preferences. By implication, it also suggests what might lead organizations in similar situations to engage in comparable behavior. The findings further imply that this misrepresentation does not always lead to a long-term loss of organizational effectiveness.

Although the tobacco industry was ultimately unsuccessful in preventing a smoking ban on passenger aircraft, it managed to delay effective regulation for nearly two decades. Only a few of the industry's strategies to mislead policymakers were exposed, mostly near the end of the 20-year policy process (for example, letter-writing campaigns and the sponsorship of the Smokers' Rights Alliance). More importantly, the extent of industry grassroots mobilization efforts was never revealed. Tobacco industry research on docket contents during several regulatory proceedings demonstrated that in the absence of industry-driven letter-writing campaigns, the public strongly supported banning smoking on aircraft.

The tobacco industry's heavy reliance on its own employees to generate data supporting its position (for example, letter-writing campaigns, petition

[94] Cynthia Piattoni. Nelson, Ralston, and Robb Communications. 1988. *Smoker's Rights Alliance Budget Update*. 22 Jun. Bates No. TI01130417-TI01130425, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI01130417.html, 10 March 2005.

[95] Lyons. *Smokers Rights Alliances Airport Activities*; Piattoni. *Smoker's Rights Alliance Budget Update*; Peter G. Sparber. 1988. 24 May. Bates No. TITX0030529, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/glv32f00, 16 March 2005.

[96] Durbin. *The Tobacco Industry's Smoke Screen*; "The Tobacco Industry's Smoke Screen," *Congressional Record-Extension of Remarks* 135, no. 111 (1989).

[97] John Lyons. Tobacco Institute. 1989. 30 Nov. Bates No. TI01140044/0045, accessed at http://legacy.library.usdf.edu/tid/udq30c00, 26 May 2005; Stuntz; John Lyons. Tobacco Institute. 1989. 13 Dec. Bates No. TI01140014, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fep30c00, 26 May 2005.

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drives, and smokers' rights and other front groups) biases the representativeness of the public record. First, tobacco industry employees may have more-favorable views about tobacco products than does the general population. Second, the tobacco industry's use of its employees is inherently coercive, as the employee's job security depends on the employer. Thus, some employees may have participated in activities that did not accurately reflect their views.

The behavior of the tobacco industry in fighting airline smoking restrictions calls into question prevailing theoretical assumptions about interest group behavior. Interest groups and lobbyists, in the circumstances we describe, may purposefully provide inaccurate information, despite the efforts of competing interest groups to forestall misrepresentation. Existing theories about lobbying behavior propose that an investment in acquiring costly information about constituent preferences and legislative policy outcomes, such as performing public opinion surveys, is a means of increasing organizational credibility. Investments in information gathering are perceived to differentiate groups that possess credible information from those that do not.[98] However, the fact that interest groups possess accurate information does not mean that they will reveal it. For example, the tobacco industry did not make public the results of its surveys that found support for airline smoking bans.

We proposed two conditions under which interest groups would misrepresent or withhold information: when the issue is perceived to be critical, and when accurate information does not support interest group preferences. Our research suggests that commitment to an extensive information-gathering and lobbying campaign should not be viewed as a signal that interest groups are presenting credible information.

Our findings have further implications for judging grassroots lobbying. Although Congress sought to increase disclosure of interest group lobbying through the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, the law does not require groups that engage in activities meant to demonstrate grassroots support for legislation to register or report their funding sources.[99] This exclusion means that many efforts of the type used by the tobacco industry to influence policy, such as letter-writing campaigns and the formation of front groups, are still not reported. Although there is very limited research on these types of activities, other industries have used similar strategies.[100] Our results, which are con-

[98] Wright, *Interest Groups and Congress*, 92; Kollman, *Outside Lobbying*; Esterling, *The Political Economy of Expertise*; Potters and Van Winden, "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," 285.

[99] Jeffrey Tenenbaum, *Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995: A Summary and Overview for Associations* (Washington DC: Center for Association Leadership), accessed at http://www.centeronline.org/knowledge/whitepaper.cfm?ID=1796, 16 March 2005.

[100] Public Citizen, *Why the Lobbying Disclosure Act Needs to be Broadened to Include Grass-Roots Lobbying* (Washington DC: Public Citizen), accessed at http://www.citizen.org/print_article.cfm?ID=7861, 10 March 2005; Public Citizen, *Lobbying Disclosure Act Recommendations. Problems with and Recommended Changes to the Federal Lobbying Disclosure System* (Washington DC: Public Citizen), accessed at http://www.citizen.org/print_article.cfm?ID=6202, 16 March 2005; Arthur Mitchell,

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sistent with game-theoretical literature on the incentives of firms,[101] suggest that the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act should be modified to require that organizations engaging in grassroots lobbying disclose their funding sources and activities. Without such changes, interest groups may continue efforts to mislead legislators about the extent of constituent support.

Our research has certain limitations. Conclusions drawn using internal industry documents can be difficult to generalize, given that it is not always clear whether plans made by industry actors were, in fact, implemented. Also, the records are likely to be incomplete. To the extent possible, we sought to circumvent these problems by relying on multiple outside sources, including contemporaneous public records, press accounts, and other relevant research. Other strengths of our data sources include the stability and unobtrusive nature of the documents and other archival records.[102] Although findings from a single case study can neither confirm nor disconfirm existing theory,[103] our results are consistent with theoretical work attempting to describe corporate lobbying incentives.[104] Given the very limited existing empirical work on lobbying activities,[105] this research enhances the understanding of interest groups as information providers during the legislative process. Whenever a policy proposal threatens a clearly defined interest group, particularly a corporate interest group, lobbying tactics may include the misrepresentation of information to policymakers.*

"Loophole Lets Lobbyists Hide Clients' Identity," *The New York Times*, 5 July 2002; Lyon and Maxwell, "Astroturf," 563.

[101] Lyon and Maxwell, "Astroturf."

[102] Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research. Design and Methods*, 3rd ed., vol. 5, *Applied Social Research Methods Series* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 86; Stacy Carter, "Tobacco Document Research Reporting," *Tobacco Control* 14 (2006): 368–376.

[103] Gerring, "What is a Case Study,"

[104] Lyon and Maxwell, "Astroturf," 594.

[105] Potters and Van Winden, "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," 284.

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Book Reviews

Presidential Secrecy and the Law *by Robert M. Pallitto and William G. Weaver. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. 280 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $25.00.*

This study is a highly compelling exposé of the multiple ways in which the president and the executive branch have accumulated power and successfully skirted accountability over the last three decades. Post–September 11 reforms such as the Patriot Act and the Homeland Security Act are only the most recent examples of a general trend toward the institutionalization of presidential secrecy and impunity. "Notwithstanding the perception by many people that presidents after Nixon have been hemmed in by courts and Congress ... presidents now have more institutionalized powers of secrecy than at any time in history" (p. 9). The authors argue that this institutional transformation violates the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, since it restricts the possibility for oversight between branches of government and limits citizen knowledge.

Congress has been a willing accomplice in this process of executive aggrandizement. Although the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was originally designed by Congress to limit executive discretion, it has actually worked to formalize and strengthen the president's ability to keep surveillance secret. Through FISA, the president has been able to legally violate Fourth Amendment guarantees against "unreasonable searches and seizures" simply by claiming that he is investigating foreign espionage suspects, broadly defined. Since its creation, only 4 out of over 20,000 warrant applications have been denied.

The courts have bent over backwards to defer to the executive on the release of "sensitive" information. They often place blind faith in executive classifications by refusing even to examine documents themselves *in camera*, let alone make them public or an official part of a trial. McCarthy-era decisions such as the 1954 *Reynolds* case continue to hold sway today. *Reynolds* withheld information from family members of civilians who died in a plane crash while testing secret government electronic equipment on the grounds that it contained "state secrets." This decision was inspired by the British precedent of "crown privilege," a concept that ought to be rejected by judges in the contemporary democratic world.

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The authors provide a chilling account of the redefinition of the division of powers in the modern world and the dangers this implies for democracy. The book is written with calm rigor and biting clarity and avoids the traps of alarmist speculation and partisan sparring. Here is an objective account of the facts that will lead even the truest believer in executive privilege and presidential power to hesitate.

There are some weak spots. The authors' provocative dialogue with the relevant literature in chapters 1 and 6 seems to free-float above the empirical chapters, and the overly brief concluding chapter fails to tie together the various theoretical arguments. Chapters 2 and 3 on the history of the construction of secrecy before the era of George W. Bush do not link up as smoothly as they could to the broader discussion in chapters 4 and 5 of civil liberties and the lack of accountability of the present administration. Many political scientists may also regret the absence of formal modeling and systematic comparative methodology. The book is an analytically rich historical study, not a scientific test of formal theory.

Robert M. Pallitto and William G. Weaver have made a major contribution to the study of presidential power and contemporary political development. This book promises to transform research on the separation of powers and should motivate determined action by Congress and the judiciary to limit the long-term institutionalization of executive privilege.

JOHN M. ACKERMAN
National Autonomous University of Mexico

Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower *by Zbigniew Brzezinski. New York, Basic Books, 2007. 240 pp. Paper, $26.95.*

This slim volume aspires to accomplish much. It seeks to assess the performances of the post-Cold War presidents, namely George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, while providing a chronological record of the events that marked their terms. Brzezinski also highlights missed opportunities that have, in his view, grievously damaged America's position in the world. He concludes by offering some general guidance for American foreign policy, a "second chance" (p. 191) for the United States to restore the international goodwill and respect that previous presidents, especially George W. Bush, have squandered. Accomplishing this will require America to "identify itself with the quest for universal human dignity" (p. 202) by working for democracy and human rights. As a former National Security Adviser (to Jimmy Carter) and a respected scholar of international relations, Brzezinski brings impressive credentials to his task. Written in a breezy, conversational style and designed for a general readership, this is not a work of scholarship. It does, however, provide a useful—if not always persuasive—critique of a critical period in American history.

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The first President Bush, in Brzezinski's view, did some things very well. He successfully managed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the threat posed by Saddam Hussein—no mean feats. But if George H.W. Bush excelled as a crisis manager, he failed as a visionary. He left no new set of institutions to guide the new post-Cold War world and did not resolve pressing problems such as the Arab–Israeli conflict and nuclear proliferation, thus bequeathing ticking time bombs to his successors. Unlike Bush, Bill Clinton had "this vision thing," seeing foreign policy as an extension of America's domestic politics, with globalization as its positive core. Clinton had some impressive achievements, notably the expansion of NATO and the elimination of chronic American budget deficits. In Brzezinski's view, however, Clinton handled crises in a piecemeal fashion and left office without having developed a strategy for America's role in the world. Driven by domestic politics and the pressure of lobbies, Clinton pursued policies that left the Arab–Israeli conflict in worse shape than when he assumed office.

While Brzezinski's view of George H.W. Bush and Clinton is mixed (he gives them grades of "B" and "C," respectively), he leaves his ambivalence behind when he assesses the presidency of George W. Bush. Brzezinski pulls no punches in describing Bush's decision to invade Iraq as an unmitigated disaster that has crippled America's credibility, leadership, and moral standing while exacerbating the terrorist threat. In a world where persuasion and consensus are needed, the United States, driven by the machinations of the neoconservatives, is attempting to impose its order on an intractable foe. Moreover, by uncritically supporting Israel and following a hypocritical policy on non-proliferation (opposing Iran while supporting India), America continues to worsen two horrific problems. Not surprisingly, Bush (II) is given a grade of "F" for his disastrous presidency.

It is difficult to argue with Brzezinski's cogent criticisms, especially regarding the Iraq debacle, which, to his credit, he opposed from the start. Nevertheless, not all of his arguments are on such solid ground. Regarding the Middle East, Brzezinski is as one-sided as he claims the Bush (II) administration to be, overwhelmingly blaming Israel (and its American supporters) for the continuing impasse. To be sure, Israeli settlement expansion is an obstacle to peace, but do not the absence of a credible Palestinian negotiating partner and continuing terrorism play roles at least as important in explaining the continuing violence? It is noteworthy than when Clinton convened Camp David and proposed a settlement based on the same principles espoused by Brzezinski (no right of Palestinian return, no significant Israeli expansion, division of Jerusalem), the talks collapsed largely due to Yasser Arafat's refusal to even offer a counterproposal, a point glossed over by Brzezinski. As for the continuing threat of nuclear proliferation, is it really so wrong for the Bush administration to treat India—a vibrant democracy with no expansionist aims—differently from Iran, given that country's ties to terrorist groups and incendiary rhetoric? Finally, Brzezinski's call for the United States to

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develop a shared strategic focus with the Atlantic Community smacks of the imperial tradition he so rightfully disdains. Especially given his view that the ferment in global politics belongs to what used to be called the third world, perhaps it makes more sense for the United States to focus more of its efforts there, rather than on the powers of the past.

In sum, this is a good, quick read that provides a solid assessment of the presidencies of the post-Cold War world. Brzezinski's observations are always worthy of thoughtful consideration, even when their ultimate wisdom is in doubt.

STEVEN R. DAVID
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Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets it Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get it Right *by Richard L. Russell. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 232 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $24.99.*

The CIA has never been more important or less understood. Six years after September 11 and four years after the start of the Iraq war, fake CIA agents are making Hollywood hits and real CIA officials are publishing kiss-and-tell memoirs. Meanwhile, universities are devoting little attention to teaching or publishing serious scholarship about America's premier intelligence agency.

Richard Russell's *Sharpening Strategic Intelligence* fills this void. Professor Russell, a political scientist who spent 17 years as a CIA analyst, offers a critique of the agency's performance from its founding to the present. Drawing on blue-ribbon investigations, press reports, CIA publications, political science scholarship, and personal experiences, Russell provides a sweeping if brief tour of the CIA's Cold War days, performance in the 1990s, and current troubles. The result is both accessible for a general audience and illuminating even for intelligence insiders.

The CIA's mission, he argues, is to provide strategic intelligence to the president about threats and trends that could endanger the nation. The agency has two jobs: collecting human intelligence from foreign spies, and analyzing information gathered by the other 15 intelligence agencies across the U.S. government. Russell gives the CIA low marks at both. The agency never penetrated Moscow's leadership during the Cold War, the upper rungs of regimes in North Korea or China before the Korean War, Havana during the Cuban missile crisis, North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, India or Pakistan before their nuclear tests in 1998, Iraq during the first Gulf War or the run-up to the current war, or al Qaeda before September 11. These human intelligence failures made analysis failures more likely. Russell argues that without access to the intentions and plans of foreign leaders, CIA analysts fell victim to "mirror imaging"—mistakenly assuming that enemies would behave as America would.

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Although evidence about intelligence agencies is hard to come by, Russell misses opportunities to do more with his Cold War data and relies increasingly on anecdotes in the last three chapters. He discusses 18 major Cold War events, concluding that good human intelligence in three of them (the 1980 Polish crisis, the war scare of 1983, and estimates of Soviet missile and bomber forces) led to analysis successes. Far more interesting, however, are the four instances in which the CIA delivered accurate analysis even without good human intelligence—raising questions about when and why analysts can succeed even when spies don't. In addition, Russell argues that the CIA provided "fairly solid warning" of the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, but failed to provide good warning of the Arab–Israeli war six years later (p. 40). These two cases cry out for comparative analysis. Finally, he attributes every Cold War analysis failure to mirror imaging, neglecting to consider whether other explanations—such as relying too much on few or unreliable sources, as the CIA did in the Iraq weapons of mass destruction case—may be more compelling.

Russell's chapters on current problems offer some excellent points about the CIA's bureaucratic sclerosis and ways to overcome it, but at times veer into storytelling and editorializing. For example, he notes that in the CIA's analysis branch, "The vast majority of the ... management team do not have doctorates, and they resent people who do" (p. 125). The evidence? A friend with a PhD was berated by a manager in his "welcome aboard" meeting. "Few of the ... managers have ever written a book or even devote significant attention to reading them," he continues (p. 126). One can hear the axes grinding.

Recent history may be too recent for Professor Russell. Nevertheless, *Sharpening Strategic Intelligence* is a cut above other books by former officials, and offers much-needed insight into the CIA's history and current challenges.

AMY B. ZEGART
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Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11 *by Robert S. Litwak. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. 424 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $25.00.*

This book extends the author's exploration of the rogue state problem from *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000) into the administration of George W. Bush. Robert Litwak offers four broad perspectives. First, September 11 heightened our vulnerability but did not alter the international system structure. Second, as an "imperial republic" (p. 15), the United States faces tensions between system management responsibilities and specific national interests. The Bush administration stressed the latter, being willing to use preemptive/preventive attacks and ignore multilateral institutions or allies when the national interest required. Ultimately, events forced it into more restraint and more recourse to

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containment leavened by negotiation. Third, like its predecessors, the Bush administration had to choose between trying to induce rogue state behavior change and seeking regime change. Its preference for the latter eventually had to give way to more use of the former. And fourth, the main target in anti-terrorism policy should be states that promote terrorism, passively encourage it, or are too weak to control terrorists' use of their territory or theft of dangerous materials. Instead, the United States emphasizes the terrorists. It then stresses acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists, not the more plausible threat of mass murder via conventional means.

Early chapters review modern American national security policy, particularly regarding WMD (mainly nuclear) proliferation, well into the Bush administration, including the inclination to use force, the broader realist-liberal debate, plus core features and limitations of key strategies: rollback or regime change (including decapitation); hard-nosed comprehensive containment; conditional containment (some interaction); conditional engagement (some reciprocity expected); and unconditional engagement.

Litwak says that strategy must be tailored to the opponent's "strategic culture" or "strategic personality" (p. 103), as shaped by its geostrategic situation and history, the regime's character, its declaratory policy and ideology, its capabilities, its foreign policy behavior, the impact of system forces on it, and the effects of its domestic politics.

He then examines Washington's treatment of Iraq, Libya, Iran, North Korea, and non-state terrorism, before and during the Bush administration. He dissects policy dilemmas and debates, plus deficiencies in decision making. While much of this is familiar, he often provides new information and perspectives. His analysis is dispassionate and alert to the difficult choices involved, while assessing rogue state strategic cultures to show how that should be done.

His conclusions:

- Bush's starting assumptions drove Iraq policy. They were never seriously analyzed and debated—a recipe for disaster.
- One assumption was that proliferation threats arise from the *nature of the regime*, making regime change very appealing; actually, regime *intentions* and prospects for changing them are much more important.
- Little attention was therefore given (except with Libya) to reassuring regimes about their survival. This neglected opportunities to induce behavior shifts; when the administration eventually tried negotiation and assurances, it lacked credibility. Even so, progress with Iran is limited because the regime's legitimacy rests partly on rejecting the Western international system and promoting fundamentalist terrorism. And North Korea cannot readily abandon nuclear weapons, national isolation, and totalitarian control, since these are keys to regime survival.
- Recent developments demonstrate the utility and legitimacy of embedding U.S. security management within multilateralism.

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Dense, stimulating, and packed with insights, the book is fine for specialists and can be handled by graduate and upper-division undergraduate students. While the author has more confidence in assessing the "strategic personality" of opponents than is warranted, and sees proliferation and terrorism as urgent problems yet leans toward strategies he admits may work badly or too slowly, these are minor drawbacks in a book that illuminates the heart of contemporary American national security policy.

PATRICK M. MORGAN
University of California, Irvine

Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (and How We the People Can Correct It) *by Sanford Levinson. New York, Oxford University Press, 2006. 181 pp. $28.00.*

Sanford Levinson is shocked to find that the American Constitution is undemocratic. Features like federalism and separation of powers are, upon close inspection, little more than obstructions to effective majority rule. Whatever sense our institutions made in the eighteenth century, they serve no defensible purpose today.

In lively and accessible prose, Levinson offers cogent arguments as to why the key structural features of the Constitution—especially representation on a two-senators-for-every-state basis and the electoral college—cannot be reconciled with democratic principles, given population ratios like those of California, Texas, or New York to those of Wyoming, Vermont, or North Dakota.

Some of the defects catalogued by Levinson could be fixed by amendment. For example, the rules governing the filling of House and Senate vacancies appear to assume that such vacancies will occur only sporadically. In the event of a terrorist attack or other catastrophe that caused wholesale death or incapacitation, there would be no functioning Congress for weeks or even months, during which time the executive would probably assume emergency powers. Levinson accordingly endorses an amendment to empower states to temporarily replace their representatives and senators by means other than election.

Creative solutions can be found to other problems without resort to constitutional amendment. For instance, Levinson touts a movement that would commit states with a majority of electoral votes to assigning their electors to the winner of the national popular vote. If embodied in an enforceable interstate compact approved by Congress, such an agreement would render the electoral college a meaningless formality.

Likewise, Levinson prefers fixed terms for Supreme Court justices to our current system of life tenure. He approvingly cites the analysis of Steven G. Calabresi and James Lindgren ("Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life

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Tenure Reconsidered" in Paul Carrington and Roger C. Cramton, eds., *Reforming the Court: Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices*, Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2006, pp. 15–98), who argue that justices can be made to serve fixed terms without amending the Constitution; after their terms are finished, justices would become lower federal court judges if they chose not to retire.

Yet there is no sub-constitutional fix for Levinson's core problem, the enormous over-representation of the residents of small states in the national government. Worse, constitutional amendment is impossible as a practical matter because, by the terms of Article V, any amendment requires the concurrence of three-fourths of the states, and one that tinkers with the Senate, requires unanimity.

Levinson strives to avoid offering a counsel of despair, and thus in his concluding chapter, he approves Akhil Reed Amar's suggestion that the Constitution permits a national referendum to ratify amendments proposed by a constitutional convention, even though Article V describes no such procedure. Amar's idea cannot be taken literally. There would be little point in specifying supermajority or unanimity requirements for amendments if those requirements could be circumvented by an unnamed majoritarian procedure. At most, Amar shows that the people retain the moral right, not the legal right, to bypass Article V.

Levinson's main target throughout the book is unthinking worship of the Constitution we have, and he consistently hits that target. Yet, he also discounts what he deems elitist fears that the old Constitution could be replaced by something far worse.

Moreover, Levinson may unwittingly exacerbate what he regards as one of the Constitution's most dangerous features. The president, he says, "is too unconstrained and can all too easily engage in dramatic exertions of power, especially in the realm of foreign policy" (p. 108). As Levinson continually notes, however, constraint comes not only from text, but also from popular understanding. By urging the circumvention of so fundamental a provision as Article V, Levinson gives comfort to those who would free the president of whatever bounds can plausibly be found in the old Constitution.

MICHAEL C. DORF
Columbia University

Strategic Selection: Presidential Nomination of Supreme Court Justices from Herbert Hoover Through George W. Bush *by Christine L. Nemacheck. Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 2007. 187 pp. $35.00.*

By the time Potter Stewart announced his retirement from the U.S. Supreme Court in June of 1981, the administration of Ronald Reagan had compiled

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a list of about 20 possible replacements. On the list were prominent legal academics, lawyers, politicians, and sitting judges, and it included several women—notably, North Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Susie Marshall Sharp, the California state court judge Joan Dempsey Klein, and, of course, Sandra Day O'Connor (p. 152).

With such (female) luminaries from which to choose, why did O'Connor get the nod? O'Connor credited her selection to chance. "Stated simply," she once claimed, "you must be lucky. That certainly is how I view my nomination" (p. 107).

Many leading accounts of judicial selection, as Christine Nemacheck points out, would not take much issue with O'Connor's explanation. They contend that the selection process is largely idiosyncratic, varying with the particular style and priorities of the appointing president.

Not so, says Nemacheck. If we assume that presidents desire to appoint ideological soul mates to the Court and we know whether they are constrained (that is, the opposing party controls the Senate), then their choices are quite explicable. Unconstrained presidents, in Nemacheck's accessible yet elegant account, will pursue a "pure informational strategy" (p. 111). That is, they will select the candidate they believe most likely to act as they would were they on the Court. Constrained presidents, too, would pursue this strategy, but they are—well—constrained. Consequently, they follow a more politically minded path, placing greater emphasis on nominees recommended by senators or those lacking (tell-tale) political experience.

Matching the innovation of Nemacheck's account are the methods she uses to assess it. Rather than relying exclusively on anecdotal evidence—rampant in this line of inquiry—she turns to the appointing president's papers. From the presidential libraries of Herbert Hoover through George H.W. Bush, she was able to piece together each administration's short list of nominees. It is these lists (thoughtfully housed in an appendix) and other information mined from the papers that form the centerpiece of Nemacheck's empirical analyses.

This is a great book. It is accessible, though sophisticated. Hard-nosed in its empirics, yet full of interesting stories. Nuanced in its conclusions but clear in its takeaway: Never again can commentators dismiss the nomination process as "idiosyncratic"; it is not. Nor, for that matter, should Sandra Day O'Connor—or any other modern-day nominee—attribute her selection to dumb "luck"; it was anything but.

Almost needless to write, *Strategic Selection* has my strongest recommendation. Anyone with an interest in American politics will find something to like about it. And those who think they have little more to learn about the selection process will find themselves disproved (this reviewer included).

LEE EPSTEIN
Northwestern University School of Law

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Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy *by Karl P. Mueller, Jasen J. Castillo, Forrest E. Morgan, Negeen Pegahi, and Brian Rosen. Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2007. 319 pp. $30.00.*

Preventive attacks on the sweeping scale and with the oversized ambitions of the Iraq war will not soon be undertaken again, at least not by the United States. But preventive and preemptive military action, or what the authors of this useful book term "anticipatory attack," remain important policy instruments (pp. 99–105). When should states consider using military force preventively? What demands does anticipatory attack make on militaries and intelligence agencies? These questions remain pressing, even as the Iraq war festers.

The book is divided into analytical and empirical halves. The analytical framework emphasizes the degree of certainty that the adversary will strike and the net benefits of striking first, and it is spare and useful. The authors review the traditional distinction between preemption and prevention, but then also rightly point out that the arguments of the George W. Bush administration, in its much-debated 2002 *National Security Strategy* (Washington DC: The White House) have some merit. The old standard for preemption—the imminence of attack, captured in the image of enemy armies massed at the border—makes little sense, given the capacity of states to project armed force over great distances with little warning, and given an international terrorist threat that operates surreptitiously with substantial destructive potential. The authors also rightly criticize the recasting of prevention as preemption. Philosophical and legal space must instead be created for legitimate prevention, and lawyers and ethicists have been engaged in precisely that project. The authors review some suggested new standards (pp. 59–66), and others are continually proposed. No consensus has emerged on when anticipatory attack is justified, but a consensus is taking shape that although it pains most observers (including this reviewer!) to admit it, the administration may have had a point: preventive attack, long seen as unethical and illegal, may at times be necessary. Whether it need be promulgated as formal doctrine, however, is another matter.

The authors see the obstacles to prevention as imposing: many threats cannot be addressed by striking first, the intelligence demands are high, and the domestic and international political costs may be overwhelming (pp. 94–96). While the authors are right to note the short-run operational success of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is hard to imagine that this war will inspire future preventive military action, as the authors anticipate (pp. 96–98). Their recommendations for the U.S. defense posture are sensible, and they wisely warn that anticipatory attack can be only an occasional policy tool, not a cornerstone of grand strategy.

For all its virtues, however, this book leaves questions unanswered, particularly those of a more explanatory or theoretical nature—hardly surprising for

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a work of its kind. Who tend to be the advocates of preventive attack: military officers or civilians? When do advocates get their way, and when do they fail? If prevention is so dangerous, why does it continue to attract admirers? Are democracies more or less likely to engage in preventive action? More broadly, when does domestic politics drive and when does it impede prevention? Some of these questions are alluded to, but they are not adequately explored. Structurally, the book is unsatisfying. The historical studies of anticipatory attack, which constitute over half of the published text, are not well integrated into the analytical argument. The reasons for examining these particular cases are not presented, and thus their analytical value remains unclear. That said, the case studies are well done, and they are interesting in their own right.

U.S. forces will eventually withdraw from Iraq, but the United States will undoubtedly employ military force preventively in the future. For concerned citizens who want to know more about the logic and challenges of preventive attack, this book is a good place to start.

RONALD R. KREBS
University of Minnesota

Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World *by Nicola Christine Pratt. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $22.00.*

Nicola Pratt provides a thorough analysis of a very complex subject. The book is without doubt required reading for policy and opinion makers who seek an objective and enlightened outcome and broader perspectives on their contributions. Pratt's wealth of informed analysis and her commitment to precision are strong incentives for scholars to further expand their research on the subject.

But while reading this book, a nagging feeling persisted that the circumstantial and historical underpinnings of emergent Arab nationalism might not have been sufficiently and adequately addressed here, given the determinant role they played in the current predicaments that confront Arabs. Perhaps this lacuna explains a slight discrepancy in an integrated approach that would seek to explain the many dilemmas that Arab civil societies confront and, as the author rightly asserts, the problematique of democracy and authoritarianism. For example, the preponderance of Western sources used by Pratt—notwithstanding that many are credible and sympathetic—did not equally acknowledge the wealth of United Nations Development Program Arab Human Development Reports and publications of the Arab Unity Center and the Institute of Palestine Studies, among others.

Suffice to say that nationalism to the Arabs was primarily a function of liberation and not an ideology in itself. Arab nationalism that followed the breakup of the Ottoman Empire confronted multiple colonial powers and disparate levels of foreign control. This led Arab nationalists during the twentieth

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century to accept the reality of what ultimately became the Arab League "state system" but not to submit to its inevitable permanence. Perhaps this was one of the causes for the fragmentation of Arab civil societies; but also for the persistent networking among Arab nationalists reflected by the ongoing urge for some form of Arab unity.

With the liberal values of the mainstream nationalist movements, there was also a prevailing conviction that unity takes precedence over individual liberties. While prioritizing national liberation and postponing democratic freedoms, commitment to the realization of such freedoms actually persisted. This negates the assertions frequently referred to in the book by authors such as Daniel Pipes, Samuel Huntington, Elie Keddourie, and particularly Bernard Lewis, whose writings deliberately sought to assert that Arab culture is alien to democracy and liberalism.

The exceptional experience that Arab nationalist movements faced was the all-encompassing confrontation with the Zionist project and consequently with Israel. The jolting experience of the successful creation of Israel brought a sense of collective humiliation and a belief that the West was expiating its guilt in the aftermath of the Holocaust at the expense of Palestinian rights. The reward of independence was mitigated in part by the failure of the Arab states to play an effective role in the 1948 war.

It is because of this sense of national malaise in the Arab world that a degree of permissiveness toward military coups evolved and was tolerated by large sectors of Arab civil societies. Shortcuts to progress claimed by coup leaders frustrated and successfully marginalized democratic and liberal values and traditions. Only the coup in Egypt, dubbed the "July 23 Revolution," endured, not only in terms of governance, but also in assuming the leadership of a revived Arab nationalist commitment after the Suez Crisis.

The policy that Nasser articulated demonstrated that independence was far more than the outer attributes of sovereignty; it was an assertion of independent judgments, especially in the bipolar global system that existed. Nasser's leadership in the non-aligned movement made "hegemonic" tendencies spontaneous, and thus authoritarian powers were willingly delegated to Nasser's regime.

Charismatic leadership is no substitute for democratic institutions. While it can mobilize, the outcome usually culminates in an exercise of absolute power. It is worth noting that most Arab regimes experience serious challenges from the newly emboldened civil society activists—though their influence remains in a state of flux, as elaborated by the author. In the aftermath of the UN-sponsored international conferences in the nineties that culminated in the Millennium Declaration in May of 2000, Arab civil societies started to exert growing influence, although still with no prospect of an early exercise of serious democratic power.

I offer these observations to complement the content of this impressive book and to compliment the author's diligent research, which renders her book

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a significant addition to our knowledge and a contribution to understanding Arab human evolution at a moment when the Arab region is in the throes of managing complexity in order to avoid chaos.

CLOVIS MAKSOUD
American University

The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda *by Scott Straus. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2006. 273 pp. $27.95.*

In general, and for an audience not acquainted with tedious theory or methodology, this book is readable and informative. For genocide scholars, it is on one hand a significant contribution, but on another, it is sometimes aggravating in its claims of new insights or new scholarship (see, for example, p. 65). On the positive side, this is the latest study on Rwanda, one that leaves no stone unturned in its search for an explanation of the processes of genocide at the local level. For an empiricist, the major contribution is Scott Straus's use of sub-national analysis of prefectures, communes, and individuals. His efforts in conducting interviews, translating original documents, and in other information-gathering techniques are laudable, and his statistical methods are sound. In addition, he debunks some previous assumptions about the antecedents and processes of genocide.

His literature review is somewhat problematic. The review includes scholars who have written on generic and ethnic conflict, showing that genocide studies build on general theories of conflict phenomena. True, but genocide is a distinct phenomenon in need of separate explanation. The author laments on the one hand that the literature on genocide is already too vast, yet does not explore in detail the much more limited empirical literature in genocide studies—a handful of scholars and published studies. Especially missing is a discussion of early warning efforts that include dynamic modeling that delineates the processes that lead to genocide. In the more general literature, remarkably absent are sociologists like Charles Tilly, who have written on mobilization, a concept that the author uses.

Empiricist that I am, I am astonished at the author's lack of careful reading and use of prior analysis. For example, my often-quoted empirical article ("No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955," *American Political Science Review* 97 [February 2003]: 57–73), which tests many theories and assumptions, is cited by Strauss for its findings in regard to only one or two variables, and the other thirty or so tested are ignored. On conflict and genocidal processes, the author would have benefited from a careful reading of *Journeys Through Conflict* (Hayward Alker, Ted Robert Gurr, and Kumar Rupesinghe, eds., *Journeys Through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). He would have found himself on familiar ground. Another

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lack is a definitional discussion about genocide and political mass murder (politicide). This would have been useful, insofar as the author categorizes previous outbreaks of violence in Rwanda as "massacres" rather than genocide, as others do.

On the positive side, he finds that party membership and support are mobilizing agents for participation in genocide—an important finding. His analysis of deaths, particularly separating women and children from men, is a sound and innovative way of determining genocidal intent: identifying noncombatant victims helps differentiate civil war from genocide. He makes the argument as well that at the onset of violence, there was an initial gap in social authority, a gap that opened what he refers to as a "space of opportunity" for a pro–National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development rural elite and their nucleus of killers (p. 71). These and other ideas are well established in the genocide literature and have been tested to some degree at a more aggregate level; this study supports them with empirical analysis on the local and regional level. One essential argument from the literature is that ideology, however defined, contributes to the evolution of genocide. Among elites, ideology is the motivating factor, and hate propaganda derived from ideology becomes the mobilizing factor at the local level. This is generally consistent with the author's findings at the local level, where he emphasizes a combination of vague references to the Tutsi as the enemy and arguments that it was "the law" that Tutsis be killed because of their past and future threats to Hutu survival. He also finds that high state capacity, understood as long-standing authority patterns combined with state penetration to the local level, is significant in determining the intensity of killings. This is contrary to the arguments of others about the inherent weakness of post-colonial regimes, and is thus an important finding.

The key question posed by the author is, "What were the dynamics that drove the genocide on the local level?" (p. 64). This question has been carefully answered, and in this lies the essential and original contribution of the study.

BARBARA HARFF
U.S. Naval Academy and Clark University

Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Polities *by Vivien A. Schmidt. New York, Oxford University Press, 2006. 328 pp. Cloth, $90.00; paper $27.95.*

Vivien A. Schmidt has written an important book for academics and students of the European Union (EU). The book, which is a multi-level discussion of problems of democracy in Europe, moves briskly from an introduction, which locates the key problem of democracy at the national level, to a chapter on the EU as a regional state, to the importance of the argument for national political

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institutions, national policymaking, and national politics. The penultimate chapter, "Theorizing Democracy in Europe," nicely brings together the generalizations and case material and draws out the implications for democracy. The focus on four countries—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy—helps to concretize the abstract arguments.

The key question asked is how supranational institutions and policies have affected domestic institutions with regard to democratic practices (p. 219). The problem faced by member states is not that democracy has changed in the transposition of decision making to Brussels but that "national ideas and discourse about democracy have not [changed]" to keep pace (p. ix). The message of this book is twofold: first, discourse is important for democracy; second, the structure of state authority and societal interests are important for understanding the impact of the EU on national states.

Democracy in Europe is at its best developing the complex relations among the different levels of governance. Schmidt shows how national discourses vary across her four countries. She argues that the member states have "politics without policy" and the EU "policy without politics." This seems too formulaic at first, but there is substantial truth in it. What Schmidt means is that those activities that might create input legitimacy are located at the national level (pressure groups, lobbying, parliamentary elections), while policymaking takes place at the supranational level. This gap between the input and output sides of democracy creates confusion about whom to hold responsible and makes legitimacy and accountability problematic. Prior to the question of "Who guards the guardians?" is the question of who the guardians are and what they are guarding on behalf of whom.

While this book focuses heavily on discourse, most of the theoretical lifting is done by societal and institutional variables, particularly the centralization of state authority and fragmentation–centralization of societal interests, in combination with traditional workhorse variables such as electoral rules, executive autonomy, and federal–unitary organization. I found the three core substantive chapters (2–4) very illuminating in pointing out the similarities and differences in the way integration works in the four cases. By contrast, the importance of discourse to the democratic deficit (as opposed to the descriptive differences in national discourses) is not demonstrated. Is there a language (discursive) failure here or does the extant situation reflect an unacknowledged equilibrium? Perhaps the real reason for the discursive deficit, as Schmidt hints but does not pursue, is that creation of such a dialogue would undermine national elites. France's declining influence in the EU would be exposed; Italy's outsourcing of authority to EU institutions would be more clearly seen, though not necessarily resented; and Germany's role as a good European might be exposed as having a tinge of "will to power." Only the UK might come through relatively unscathed, since they are already the most Euro-skeptical. As a result, I am not ready to admit "discourse failure" into the lexicon along with market failure, resource failure, and institutional failure. Nevertheless, *Democracy in*

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Europe is a valuable book. It effectively makes the case for "discourse as prism" if not "discourse as causal variable" explaining the democratic deficit.

JAMES A. CAPORASO
University of Washington

Poor America: A Comparative-Historical Study of Poverty in the U.S. and Western Europe *by Samuel J. Eldersveld. Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 2007. 178 pp. $60.00.*

In time-honored fashion, Samuel J. Eldersveld revisits the question of the exceptionalism of America's welfare state vis à vis a sample of more-generous Western European nations. Eldersveld's central question is why the United States spends so little of its gross domestic product to ameliorate poverty, compared with the efforts of other industrialized nations. While this point of departure is certainly not new to those familiar with the comparative welfare state literature, Eldersveld has, in a potentially useful way, organized his narrative around five factors, each of which may offer a partial explanation for America's welfare laggard status. These factors include historical experiences, public opinion and broadly held values, political institutional design, predispositions among political elites, and the political orientations of business leaders. In the first half of the book, a chapter is dedicated to each of these dimensions in a way that will probably interest and inform general readers.

In the second half of the book, Eldersveld offers a series of historical summaries of early national experiences with poverty in six European nations—the Netherlands, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and West Germany—plus the American case. One of the more interesting lessons he draws from the synoptic narratives of these early experiences is that several of the European examples involved no clear institutional or ideological predispositions that obviously would have anticipated the creation of comprehensive welfare states during the first half of the twentieth century. Despite this early absence of welfare-friendly infrastructure—ideational or institutional—European nations came, particularly between 1920 and 1950, to provide much more clearly defined safety nets than did the United States. In the end, Eldersveld concludes that aside from deficits in the political representation of the poor in the United States, the United States has no good excuse not to use its wealth to create a comprehensive social welfare state. He concludes with a call for a sustained discourse of "moral outrage" (p. 145) in the face of growing economic inequality in the United States and its tattered safety net.

Tattered as it may be, with gaping holes in health care, child care assistance, employment and training programs, and time-limited cash assistance, isolated victories for the working poor, such as the dramatic expansion of the earned income tax credit during the 1990s, receive short shrift in this book. Focusing instead on the gaps, Eldersveld's final chapter serves up a passionate

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and cogent indictment of the American patchwork of public assistance programs and calls for renewed thinking about how such a wealthy nation can choose to neglect its poor. A certain amount of hand-wringing tends to go with this sort of account of the American welfare state's deficiencies, but pleading for change from a position of moral outrage in this case would seem to do little to advance the author's stated analytical agenda.

The ambition of this slim book is admirable, though its organization limits its gravity. Eldersveld's decision to examine the European cases with such brevity (at the extreme, the discussion of Germany fills only two pages) means that an important part of his central question—why European nations tended to develop comprehensive welfare states—goes substantially under-treated. Further, in narrating the American case, much of the discussion focuses on pre–New Deal years, effectively neglecting the later period when the potential was arguably greatest for a mature American welfare state to have blossomed. The lesson that the very early roots of the poverty experience in the United States are not so different from those in Europe emerges, but this book does little to answer its more penetrating question of why public assistance in the United States has lagged.

GREG M. SHAW
Illinois Wesleyan University

Misfortunes of War: Press and Public Reactions to Civilian Deaths in Wartime *by Eric V. Larson and Bogdan Savych. Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2007. 298 pp. $30.00.*

Just as I began reading this volume, the news media reported from Iraq that the U.S. military had killed 17 men in the village of al-Khalis after mistakenly identifying them as al Qaeda fighters. A few days earlier, seven children had been killed during an air strike by the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan on what was believed to be a religious compound and hideout of al Qaeda. Although the authors examine news reporting and public opinion about civilian deaths during military deployments in the past, this book is nevertheless very timely. Accidental killings of civilians and "collateral damage" during military deployment cause unspeakable suffering and sorrow, but this is not a text about human tragedies. In this volume, commissioned by the U.S. Air Force as part of a larger RAND study titled "Controlling Collateral Damage in Air Operations," researchers analyze media content and public opinion data in order to come up with recommendations specifically for public affairs personnel in the Air Force on how to address civilian casualties during combat operations before and after they actually occur. The authors' recommendations are based on poll data showing that Americans do not weaken in their support for military deployments because they learn of civilian deaths as long as they believe that the U.S. military tries hard to prevent such casualties. Hence,

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public affairs officers and others who deal with the press are advised to help explain civilian casualties in ways that address and mitigate the concerns of the public.

The recommendations are spelled out in a summary up front and a conclusion that frame an introductory chapter and four case studies of military deployments and high-profile incidents of civilian deaths: the first Gulf War and the February 1991 bombing of the Al Firdus bunker in Baghdad; NATO's intervention in the Kosovo war and the April and May 1999 attacks on convoys in Kosovo and the Chinese embassy in Belgrade; the war in Afghanistan and the July 2002 attack on an Afghan wedding party; and the Iraq war and the March 2003 explosion at a crowded Baghdad market. Contrary to what is stated in the introduction, the authors focus not on the specific incidents but rather on the overall context of each of the wars in which they occurred. The length of the four deployment periods may be the reason that the content analysis of the news about civilian casualties and anti-war demonstrations in leading domestic and foreign media is rather limited. The presented frequency of relevant terms in the news (that is, *civilian deaths*, *collateral damage*, and *civilian casualties*) would have been more meaningful alongside a qualitative analysis that could have established whether and how the coverage was different with respect to reporting of civilian casualties in the four cases. Such an interpretive approach might have explained why public concerns about civilian deaths were higher after the Chinese embassy incident, lower following the collateral damage cases during the first Gulf war and the war in Afghanistan, and at a medium level after heavy civilian casualties in Baghdad during the military phase of the Iraq war. Self-evident conclusions, such as "collateral damage incidents led to increased reporting" (p. 119), "war generates media reporting on both civilian casualties and antiwar protest activity" (p. 208), or "civilian casualties have increasingly been a topic of official Washington, especially during wartime" (p. 205) do not enhance our understanding of the news about collateral damage and public reactions to such incidents.

In sum, then, this volume should be useful and interesting to those who commissioned it but less so to experts in media, communication, human rights, and other fields, or general readers.

BRIGITTE L. NACOS
Columbia University

Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States *by Hiroshi Motomura. New York, Oxford University Press, 2006. 272 pp. $29.95.*

Citizenship is a hot topic today, particularly in the wake of September 11, when the rights of non-citizens accused of terrorism are bitterly contested. Political scientists and law professors treat citizenship as a placeholder for many

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of their normative ideals: fairness, inclusiveness, participation, social justice, equality. Hiroshi Motomura's important, provocative, and highly readable book is among the best examples of this tradition.

Motomura, a leading immigration scholar, distinguishes three different views of legal permanent resident (LPR) status. The first, "immigration as contract," emphasizes the traditional sovereignty-based plenary power doctrine; it limits LPRs' rights to those Congress has chosen to confer. But the courts' recognition of certain basic rights attaching to all residents ("territorial personhood," p. 10), including procedures to protect certain substantive interests ("phantom norms," p. 108), has led to a second, more-inclusive conception, "immigration as affiliation." Here, LPRs' rights expand over time as their ties to American society grow, partly in recognition of the interests of citizens in nourishing and cementing those ties.

With great skill and even-handedness, Motomura shows how the contract and affiliation models have evolved in federal law and Supreme Court decisions, as well as their distinctive strengths and weaknesses. His most imaginative, intriguing argument, however, relates to his third model, "immigration as transition," to which he devotes the last half of the book. The subtitle's "lost story ... is that for much of its history, America treated lawful immigrants as future citizens, and immigration as a transition to citizenship" (p. 8). From 1795 to 1952 (when it became optional), federal law required would-be citizens to file a declaration of intent to naturalize several years in advance. This gave these declarants a preferred status, one that many states recognized by giving them the right, among other things, to vote. Claiming that this signaled America's warmer, more-inclusive embrace of new immigrants, Motomura wants to revive this presumptive citizen status and universalize it; no declaration would be necessary. He proposes that immediately upon entry, all LPRs should acquire all the rights that citizens enjoy—for example, priority status for family members who wish to immigrate to the United States, safety net benefits, the right to seek public employment (including at a policy level), and the right to vote. The immunity of citizens from deportation would also extend to LPRs, except for the most serious criminals. (These rights, however, would expire at the point at which immigrants could naturalize but do not, although many other rights would remain.) The proposal "treats new lawful immigrants and citizens equally not just to send a clear message of welcome but also to make the most of the prenaturalization years as an integration period," a reciprocal process, "in which immigrants change America as much as America changes them" (pp. 163–164).

Motomura's position is exceedingly well argued, yet it is not altogether convincing. Here are just a few concerns, very briefly stated. He assumes, contrary to probability: that the 40 percent of LPRs who decline to naturalize do so because our welcome is not ardent enough; that depriving them of their rights once they fail to naturalize is workable; that immediate access to welfare would not encourage LPR dependency and send a misleading message about

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social expectations; that voting by those who come with little or no knowledge of our politics and society would have only benign effects; that full family sponsorship and public employment rights is not a zero-sum game that would reduce the same opportunities for citizens; that immunity from deportation even for most criminal behavior would be politically acceptable; and that these concerns about equally entitling LPRs once inside would not backfire and cause Congress to close the door to more of them in the first place.

PETER H. SCHUCK
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Black Feminist Voices in Politics *by Evelyn M. Simien. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2006. 196 pp. $23.95.*

The challenge of extending the guarantee of equal rights for all citizens in the pursuit of happiness in the American political system has always been a prominent concern of African American women. While W.E.B. Du Bois famously pointed to the world problem of the color line as it relates to American blacks in his 1903 *The Souls of Black Folk* (New York: Bantam Books, 1989), Evelyn M. Simien writes that black feminist Anna Julia Cooper, in *A Voice from the South, by a Black Woman of the South* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969) argued in 1892 that black women were "confronted by a woman question and a race problem" (quoted in Simien, p. 2) in advance of Du Bois.

Black Feminist Voices in Politics represents a unique combination—a theoretical quest to position black feminism in the center of African American studies and an empirical and epistemological critique of the existing literature on black feminism. Simien organized the book to serve as a teaching device in undergraduate and graduate classes, explaining to readers the politics of early black feminists as she establishes her core thesis concerning the separate feminist consciousness of blacks, both male and female. On the basis of Michael Dawson, Ronald Brown, and James S. Jackson's National Black Political Study (NBPS), as well her own 2004–05 survey of blacks replicating the 1993–94 NBPS, Simien argues that the best conceptualization of black feminism is to ask blacks if they identify with black women. While the empirical work in *Black Feminist Voices in Politics* does not extend beyond existing research in black political behavior, the book lays the groundwork for the intellectual advancement of political science through the examination of black women's studies as separate research and teaching fields.

Each chapter begins with a discussion of a leading black American feminist, such as Mary Church Terrell, a founding president of the National Association of Colored Women. Chapters then explore the social and political determinants of black feminist consciousness as well as its impact on black political behavior. Black feminist consciousness is measured by six items,

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specifically: whether racism, poverty, and sexism are linked; whether black women should be equal partners in black leadership; whether black churches need more female clergy; whether black feminists help the black community; whether black women suffered from both sexism in the black movement and racism in the women's movement; and finally, whether respondents identified with the fate of black women in this country. Michael Dawson, in his award-winning *Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001), used four of the items that Simien used to measure black feminist consciousness. Based on these surveys, the important determinants of black feminist consciousness are race consciousness and income. The absence of a large array of determinants indicates the long historical roots of a philosophy regarding race/gender oppression that is commonly shared by both black males and black females. She notes, "Individual (or ascriptive) characteristics are less important than those factors rooted in lived experience that make one ever so aware of the persistence of structural inequality" (p. 89).

The 1993–94 data set reveals that black feminist consciousness is less important in predicting black political behavior than is race consciousness or linked fate. This finding comes less as a surprise, Simien points out, as "feminist consciousness and race consciousness go hand in hand," and "race loyalty" for both black women and black men can trump black feminism in African American politics (p. 117). Simien examines the impact of black feminist consciousness alone (without the simultaneous influence of race consciousness) utilizing her 2004–05 data set. She finds that black feminism strongly influenced certain forms of the electoral and political behavior of both black women and black men in 2004–05. Thus, her scholarship historically and empirically establishes the centrality of black feminism in the realm of black politics and society. Without recognizing the works of Sojourner Truth, Maria W. Stewart, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, and other black women like them, political science will fail in its methodology and intellectual endeavor to determine the true ideological and political character of African Americans and their contribution to collective forces working against group oppression and exploitation.

KATHERINE TATE
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Changing White Attitudes toward Black Political Leadership *by Zoltan L. Hajnal. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 230 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $22.99.*

For decades, scholars have debated the extent to which black elected officials have made a difference in improving overall conditions in their black communities. One set of scholars has argued that black representation has brought

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about important changes, even though the changes are either small or limited, in comparison to the seemingly intractable problems of racial and economic inequality. On the other side of the debate, however, are other scholars, who continue to argue that black elected officials are largely irrelevant, due to a host of explanatory factors that range from ineptitude to white resistance as well as structural barriers.

Zoltan Hajnal, as the author of *Changing White Attitudes toward Black Political Leadership*, argues that scholars have focused myopically on the effects of black representation on the black community as an entity. He argues that an important aspect of assessing the efficacy of black representation is to examine the effects of black elected officials on white voters. In this context, he undertakes an ambitious and important multi-city study that seeks to discern how white Americans react to having blacks serve as their elected representatives.

Hajnal's seven chapters demonstrate his competence with a vast array of scholarship on this important topic. He utilizes an arsenal of data to cast a wide net that allows him to examine voting behavior, racial attitudes, differences in political identification, and variations across city contexts. The author's overall analysis is undergirded by an information model that he sets forth to explain the circumstances under which white Americans who initially opposed black leadership might support black candidates in subsequent elections and, in the end, also have a more tolerant view of the black community.

The author subsequently argues that whites learn that to a large extent, black leadership, per se, poses very little threat to what is seen as white well-being. In other words, Hajnal's argument is that exposure of whites to black leadership allows them to unlearn feelings of racial threat as well as prejudice, and that such unlearning varies across municipal settings and partisan attachments, and also with the status of the black elected official. According to the author, his information model is more appropriate for explaining white voting behavior in biracial elections than are explanations based purely on prejudice or white backlash against perceived racial threat.

Invariably, readers will find the assembled data both impressive and extensive; they facilitate a more thorough study of white voting behavior than has previously been addressed. Yet, there is a limitation in the data, especially when the author attempts to provide specific or certain proof of influences across time as well as direct evidence that the influences on whites resulted, necessarily, from learning as opposed to other factors. This is especially true because Hajnal's explanations focus very little attention on the issue of mechanisms through which the information about black elected officials is gathered and evaluated. Nevertheless, Hajnal is to be applauded for creativity and resourcefulness in piecing together previously disparate sources of data to address his provocative research question.

Apart from the obvious creativity of Hajnal's work, he also offers the following unsettling premise that is repeated throughout his well-argued text:

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"Once black officeholders have the opportunity to prove that black leadership generally does not harm white interests, uncertainty should fade, whites' views of blacks and black leadership should improve, and more whites should be willing to consider voting for black candidates" (p. 15). The problem with this premise is that black leaders are elected by their black communities to make changes in the structural fabric of society, indeed with the understanding that some of those changes will be adverse to the interests of white voters who have benefited from de jure and de facto racial inequality. If, however, black leaders can only gain the confidence of whites by maintaining the status quo, one must be tempted to wonder whether blacks are elected to make white Americans comfortable or to ease the racial discrimination and economic inequality that have plagued the black community, from the years of slavery as well as Jim Crow, to the present. To a large extent, Hajnal addresses this issue by arguing, inter alia: "If black representation continues to expand and white Americans continue to grow more sympathetic to the plight of the black community as a result, it may be possible in the future to enact large-scale reforms that reduce basic racial inequalities. Contrary to what many have argued, then, black representation does matter" (p. 160).

However, the haunting query that remains unanswered by Hajnal's important work is whether black elected officials' ability to make white voters comfortable matters enough to set aside and/or postpone the unfinished and long-overdue agenda of racial justice and economic equality for black Americans. While change in the behavior of white voters is important, the fact that black socioeconomic conditions have changed very little over the last three decades poses the substantive query of whether society has won a small battle but lost the larger and more important war.

YVETTE M. ALEX-ASSENSOH
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Republicans and the Black Vote *by Michael K. Fauntroy. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006. 181 pp. $49.95.*

Some years ago, the esteemed political scientist E.E. Schattschneider remarked that "what happens in politics depends on the way people are divided" (*The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960, p. 62). And in the historical context of the once-venerable relationship between the Republican Party and African American voters, nothing could be more accurate. "For a party that once had deep roots and great popularity in the African American community" (p. 1), consider these data: George W. Bush received a mere 9 percent of the African American vote in the hotly contested 2000 presidential election. He garnered just two percentage points more in his reelection effort four years later. Fewer than 50 of the more than 9,000 African American elected officials throughout

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the country are Republican. And despite more than a decade of GOP dominance on Capitol Hill, there are no African American Republicans presently serving in either the U.S. House of Representatives or the Senate. Hence, Michael Fauntroy's central analytical issue: why is today's GOP in such trouble with black voters?

In attempting to understand the party's fall from grace among the African American electorate, Fauntroy settles on an interesting hypothesis: the volatile interplay among ideology, race, policy platforms, and party politics. That is, "African Americans, like everyone else, define their interests in five categories: income, housing, education, health care, and justice" (p. 167). And to put the matter forthrightly: "The message from the GOP to African Americans has often been that the party embodies a racial conservatism and behavioral norms that oppose black progress and equality" (p. 128).

To appreciate the importance of Fauntroy's argument, he duly reminds us: "The origins of the Republican Party were very much in line with black aspirations. Its most important initial policy position was the call restricting the expansion of slavery in the wake of the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act" (p. 15). Indeed, it was during the Reconstruction era that the GOP forged a pragmatic alliance with the African American electorate and therefore had an "early lock" on black votes (pp. 13–37). No doubt these historical origins are manifestly lost on many of today's pundits.

Unfortunately, in a number of places, Fauntroy undercuts his own points. He states, by way of example, "Republicans contend that they have poured considerable resources over the years into being a more appealing party to African American voters. Their lack of success in this regard, however, stems from the fact that *they have been uncomfortable talking about racial issues*, leaving many to conclude that they simply 'don't get it' on race" (p. 1) (emphasis added). On the contrary, the GOP has been very comfortable talking about racial issues. Fauntroy himself acknowledges—later in the text—Republicans' shrewd use of politically charged symbolism in presidential elections (for example, "states' rights"; "the Southern Strategy" of Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon; Ronald Reagan's "welfare queen"; George H.W. Bush's injection of "Willie Horton" into the 1988 presidential campaign; and George W. Bush's speech at Bob Jones University).

A more significant weakness, however, is his lack of serious consideration of Republicans' use of institutions (that is, the courts and the bureaucracy), as well as the George W. Bush administration's failed response to Hurricane Katrina and the impact of these on African American political behavior. A fuller engagement of these issues is certainly warranted.

Despite these minor flaws, I nonetheless appreciate Fauntroy's efforts here—especially his fusing of historical analysis with interviews of political elites. To be sure, the text provides an illuminating analysis of how the Republican Party has strayed from African American voters and how much ground there is to make up. And the author rightly concludes that today's

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GOP is a "far cry" from the political party of its Reconstruction origins (p. ix). And on that point, Schattschneider would most certainly agree.

KEITH REEVES
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Democratic Laboratories: Policy Diffusion among the American States
by Andrew Karch. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2007. 288 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $24.95.

To outside observers, the line of scholarship examining state policy diffusion might seem to have peaked with no new innovations taking place. Andrew Karch's new book should help convince any doubters that there is still much to be explored and understood in the field. Karch has crafted an excellent study of the dynamics of innovative policy diffusion in five areas of welfare and health policy (senior prescription drugs, medical savings accounts, individual development accounts, welfare time limits, and family caps) over the past 15 years. He not only expands our understanding of these policy areas, but charts a course for future research on policy diffusion generally.

Under the metaphor of "laboratories of democracy," Karch investigates how policy ideas spread throughout the states, the central role of information, and how states take policy ideas and modify them to meet local conditions. This is the essence of policy diffusion studies generally, but Karch explores deeply the role of information and unpacks the dynamic causal process through which diffusion works. Most diffusion studies fail to provide anything resembling Karch's rich and nuanced account. Indeed, part of what sets this book apart from so many other diffusion studies is the excellent mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches used to uncover causal mechanisms in the policy process.

Karch's central thesis can be summarized with the notion that legislators are constrained by time and electoral considerations, and the relative influence of causal forces on policy diffusion are different depending on the portion of the political process one is examining. For example, Karch demonstrates that electoral considerations matter more at later stages in the policy process, policy drafting and enactment, but less at early stages in the process.

The introduction to the book offers a brief overview of diffusion literature, broadly couched in the diffusion of ideas, as well as Karch's thesis. Chapter 2 begins with a quick and dirty quantitative examination of state adoption of innovative changes to health and welfare policy, but quickly finds that most of the usual suspects used to predict the likelihood of policy adoption simply do not perform well in predicting the diffusion of these policies. Karch then moves on to analyzing the role that the electoral considerations of key actors, such as legislative leaders, play in the policy adoption process. Chapter 3 examines the roles of issue salience, national government actions, and political debate in the agenda-setting process, focusing on initial legislative consideration

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of policy innovations. One innovative aspect of this analysis is that Karch explores both top-down and bottom-up agenda-setting phenomena.

The role of information in the policy process is the central focus of chapter 4, making this chapter perhaps the most innovative in the book. On the basis of survey data, Karch provides a detailed analysis of how decision makers obtain information, how their information searches are constrained, the content of information sources, and how information shapes the policy consideration process. Highlighted is the central role played by national professional associations and think tanks. Finally, chapter 5 focuses on what Karch refers to as the customization of policy innovations. Here, Karch explores the role of organized interests in the drafting of policy proposals and the modification of policies considered by other states. Karch concludes that electoral considerations and interest group efforts help to explain why the specific content of innovative programs varies from state to state.

In summary, Karch offers an accessible but excellent read for public policy and state politics scholars at all levels. The book is an easy fit for most upper-division and graduate-level public policy courses.

DONALD P. HAIDER-MARKEL
University of Kansas

Dewey's Dream: Universities and Democracies in an Age of Education Reform *by John L. Puckett, Ira Harkavy, and Lee Benson. Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 2007. 160 pp. Cloth, $59.50; paper, $18.95.*

For reasons of crass self-interest and high idealism, urban research universities engage in diverse projects to strengthen the local communities surrounding them. Frequently, such projects aim to improve the community schools, basing an array of human services in them. The better projects have real worth for all involved, partnering to improve public health, environmental quality, economic development, and cultural expression within the locality while allowing university students in diverse fields to learn better by doing good and researchers to ground inquiry in settings in which needs are imperative and complex. Can such a coincidence of need, interest, and capacity serve as the basis for providing democratic aspirations with deep civic roots in localities around the world? The authors of *Dewey's Dream* try to answer this question with a rousing affirmative.

Lee Benson, Ira Harkavy, and John L. Puckett, all associated with the University of Pennsylvania, offer their book as "a democratic manifesto" to help initiate a movement that will eventually realize "John Dewey's inspiring utopian vision of a worldwide, organic 'Great Community' composed of truly participatory, democratic, collaborative, and interdependent societies" (p. ix). In a brief introduction, they state "the Dewey problem": he understood that participatory democracy provided the best social means for permitting human potentialities to flourish, but he never charted a potential course of practical

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measures that might lead to the realization of participatory democracy in American life. The authors hold that "university-assisted community schools ... constitute the best practical means to help realize Dewey's general theory of participatory democracy" (p. xiii). The two parts of their book include the Dewey problem and their call for its resolution.

Through the four chapters of part 1, the authors quote Dewey and secondary sources at length to explain Dewey's ideas about participatory democracy and the unfulfilled role of democratic schooling in its realization. Their aim, undercut by wooden prose, is hortatory, not scholarly. They show how Dewey first originated his ideas about democracy and schooling and then developed them between 1894 and 1904, highly productive years at the University of Chicago. But instead of participating democratically in local life, even here, Dewey favored the controlled environment of the "Laboratory School" (pp. 24–33). And from 1904, on moving to Columbia University, he largely stopped theorizing about participatory democracy, with the exception of *The Public and Its Problems* in 1927 (in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953*, vol 2, Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1981, pp. 235–372). Instead, during the Depression, Elsie Clapp acted on Dewey's dream by starting rural community schools in Kentucky and West Virginia and showing their potential as democratic centers of participation. The authors hope that these beginnings will transmute into a movement for university-assisted community schools.

Part 2 opens with two chapters detailing how "since 1985, the University of Pennsylvania has increasingly engaged itself with its local public schools in a comprehensive school-community-university partnership" (p. 81). With a whiff of administrative self-congratulation, Benson, Harkavy, and Puckett assert that such partnerships will provide the practical means for actualizing participatory democracy in contemporary societies. Two final chapters briefly survey a broader, nascent movement, most concrete in the Coalition for Community Schools (the staff of which numbers three, according to its web site) and in a congressional effort, recurrently failing, to authorize expenditures through a Full Service Community Schools Act. The manifesto ends, "*Academics of the world unite! Help solve the Dewey Problem!*" (p. 126). It is not a specter that is likely to haunt the powers of global capitalism.

ROBERT MCCLINTOCK
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Diverse Communities: The Problem With Social Capital *by Barbara Arneil. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 280 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $29.99.*

Criticism of Robert Putnam's theory of social capital has become something of a cottage industry in political science. Barbara Arneil's *Diverse Communities*

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joins the fray by asking how the "collapse of American community" in Putnam's *Bowling Alone* (*Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000, p. 25) would sound if it were retold from the perspective of women and cultural minorities. What sets Arneil's book apart from other multicultural and feminist critiques of *Bowling Alone* is the way in which she uses her re-interpreted history of American civil society to point toward alternative regulatory principles of civic engagement for an increasingly multicultural America.

Putnam saw social capital—social networks and their related norms of trust and reciprocity—as unraveling since the last high point of civic engagement in the 1950s and 1960s. Arneil argues that the 1950s were not so idyllic from the perspective of women and minorities. Although Putnam acknowledged the exclusionary potential of "bonding" social capital (*Bowling Alone*, p. 22), Arneil is pointing to a more fundamental problem in Putnam's story. The "counter-narratives" of racial minorities and women saw social networks—even Putnam's benign "bridging" social capital (*Bowling Alone*, p. 22)—as the way in which dominant groups protect their interests, enforce cultural boundaries, and practice coercive assimilation (p. 39).

The power and appeal of *Diverse Communities* is its central insight that no science of social capital can be completely divorced from cultural assumptions and normative commitments. Arneil shows how national organizations for women and minorities emerged in the early twentieth century as a response to exclusionary social networks, and how since the 1960s, they were rightly interested in dismantling old social networks and creating new ones. Most of the traditional women's organizations tracked by Putnam were losing members by the 1960s and 1970s. But Arneil notes that organizations like the Girl Scouts and new "child-centered activities" groups grew in membership because they emphasized multiculturalism and female empowerment. (pp. 85–87).

Putnam's theory of social capital argues that if communities find ways to be more civically engaged, it necessarily leads to a "revival" of trust and reciprocity. But for Arneil, the decline in trust is not wholly explained by decreased participation. She focuses on the widening gaps in levels of trust between whites and racial minorities, suggesting an entrenched sense of collective betrayal felt by marginalized cultural groups (p. 217). If these realities of a multicultural future are taken into account, social capitalists would be advised to work on building minimal norms of reciprocal cooperation between cultural groups, rather than pleading for more participation.

Putnam's prescription of restoring social unity and trust through greater volunteerism efforts and picnics with people who are different from us seems increasingly unrealistic and anachronistic in this era of increasing cynicism, inequality, culture wars, and distrust of government. Arneil's alternative emerges in a more realistic yet hopeful theory for using social capital to build a liberal multicultural society. Principles grounded on gender equality, inclusion, intercultural respect, and justice should regulate the effort to increase civic and

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political engagement. It would be good to hear even more details from Arneil about how to construct inclusive forms of social capital, and how her principles are related to the work of contemporary normative political theorists writing on democracy. But to her credit, Arneil admits that constructing a just and diverse community is elusive and will involve open-ended processes of tension and negotiation between cultural entities. Arneil has provided an important contribution toward conceiving a form of communal belonging that will also respond to people's desires for cultural distinctness, mutual respect, and meaningful membership.

SCOTT MCLEAN
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Democratic Accountability: Why Choice in Politics Is Both Possible and Necessary *by Leif Lewin. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2007. 264 pp. $45.00.*

In this stimulating analysis, Leif Lewin wrestles with one of the most frustrating problems of contemporary democracy, the difficulty of holding elected leaders responsible for policies. The difficulty is based on the objective complexity and interdependence of policymaking in the modern state and on the tendency of politicians to use that context deliberately to avoid responsibility when policies go bad. The temptation, of course, is understandable, although not, as Lewin reminds us, ethically excusable.

Lewin offers the interesting suggestion that "arguments formulated by political theorists" to explain policymakers' lack of control over events provide a ready refuge for politicians attempting to avoid responsibility (p. 1). Insofar as each of these arguments has some truth in it, politicians can use them to avoid an admission, or even a sense, of responsibility unless they apply tactical and strategic skill with a strong sense of ethical responsibility. Citizens face an even sterner test of their insight and determination if they are to make democratic choices and hold policymakers responsible.

Leif Lewin deals with seven general arguments that "politicians have no control" (pp. 1–2): history predetermines policy outcomes; war and violence are inevitable; globalization has overwhelmed national policies; policymaking involves cooperation with others; bureaucracies determine what policies will be implemented; unforeseeable consequences emerge from intended policies; and even unchecked leaders are merely instruments of fate.

A chapter is devoted to each of these blame-avoiding arguments, offering both a conceptual analysis and a critical, qualitative case study to refute generalization of the argument. For example, after a discussion of Frances Fukuyama's formulation that we have reached the "end of history" (*The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, 1992), Lewin asserts the power of choices made by political leaders against seemingly inevitable historical forces.

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His critical case is the decisive role of the Marshall Plan in averting the apparently inevitable conquest of communism over the shattered European democracies after World War II. Similarly, he offers the emergence of European integration to counter the inevitability of violence, international environmental cooperation to demonstrate choice against the overwhelming force of globalized markets, Swedish unionized unemployment insurance to show that sometimes long-range strategic policies may achieve their objective, and Margaret Thatcher's attack on the British welfare state to argue the responsibility of politicians for the size of that state.

The power of critical case studies to reveal the character and strategies to confound the "inevitable" depends greatly on the choice of cases. Lewin argues that he chooses cases most likely to support the generalization (for example, power-sharing excludes accountability) so that the specific refutation weakens it severely. Not all of these seem equally persuasive. Does a sketch of the deeply troubled Italian system and the multiple, interacting causes of the Italian "Clean Hands" revolution clarify how citizens can make power-sharing government accountable? Is it really "another story" whether Italy's changes were "enough to restore a healthy polity" (p. 110)? Moreover, any single method has its weaknesses. Lewin, in my view, too easily dismisses (p. 114) a complementary role for multivariate analysis to pinpoint multiple causal factors.

Despite these limitations, I learned much from this book, as any reader would, about democratic accountability, its interplay with the "politics of blame avoidance" (p. 1), and its empirical and normative dimensions for politicians and citizens alike.

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University of Rochester

The End of Government As We Know It: Making Public Policy Work *by Elaine Ciulla Kamarck. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007. 157 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $19.95.*

Elaine Kamarck has written a brief and excellent summary of the transformation of public management over the past 50 years. She begins by noting that while government and the private sector performed in much the same manner in the mid-twentieth century, today the private sector has been dramatically transformed while government has stagnated.

She discusses the growing demand over the past quarter century for government to do more with less. People want lower taxes and better services. These increased demands have coincided with growing distrust of government. This has pushed government to change its mode of management. According to Kamarck, three new modes of implementing policy have been developed in the past several decades: reinvented public sector organizations, government by network, and government by market.

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- *Reinvented government* uses performance measures to help government operate with higher efficiency and better customer service and without the "trappings of traditional bureaucracy." Reinvented government is government run as much as possible like a private-sector business.
- *Government by network* is the use of government funds to have the market produce services that otherwise might be produced by government. Work is paid for by government, but performed elsewhere.
- *Government by market* is where government uses regulation to create a market that otherwise would not exist to fix a problem.

Kamarck explores and analyzes government management through the lens of this categorization scheme. She also focuses on the issue of democratic accountability. One of the reasons that traditional government bureaucracies are so rule-laden is to ensure transparency and accountability. She is correctly concerned that the price of greater government efficiency and effectiveness may be reduced accountability to the institutions of representative democracy.

Kamarck states that "the underlying assumption behind reinvented government ... is that with respect to management, there are few significant differences between the public and private sectors. A second but equally important assumption behind these entrepreneurial governments is that the goals of public-sector organizations can be clearly articulated and measured" (p. 28). She argues that reinvented government can be accountable because it is still directly controlled by government's rules. Networks, on the other hand, are inherently harder to manage, because they are separate from government, less accountable, and less transparent. In this continuum of accountability, while government by market is an efficient way to create policy outcomes, it is not accountable to public control. Government can create the market, but to realize its benefits, must walk away from governing that market.

Kamarck's analysis of government management is well written, interesting, and quite insightful. However, at times she finds herself a little trapped by the limits of the book's framework. Traditional bureaucracy, reinvented agencies, networks of organizations, and government by market are usefully separated for purposes of analysis and communication, but in fact exist side by side, and function interactively in most government agencies and programs. Government may create a market, but may also set up a traditional command-and-control regulatory framework to govern it. Government may utilize contractors to implement parts of a program, but retain the in-house capacity to do the work if the contractor fails to perform. Managing a network requires subtle skills in informal communication and the use of performance information in real time, but fortunately, technology is providing us with low-cost communication and even lower-cost information.

Kamarck seems too willing to accept the verdict that government is badly managed and the private sector is well managed. Both sectors provide ample evidence of competence and incompetence. However, while the private sector

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has the relatively simple job of making a beer "that tastes great and is less filling," government gets the job of making sure that our less-fortunate children receive meals and have a place to sleep. Maybe it is easier to look competent if the job is easier.

STEVEN COHEN
Columbia University

The Rehnquist Court: Understanding Its Impact and Legacy *by David L. Hudson, Jr. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2006. 208 pp. $49.95.*

In 1986, President Ronald Reagan elevated William Rehnquist, then an associate justice of the Supreme Court, to chief justice. Rehnquist had for years been the court's most conservative member, and Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, who joined the court thereafter, were also conservatives. Legal observers, therefore, expected the Rehnquist court to take the law on a sharp turn to the right.

What actually happened? In his book, David Hudson systematically examines Rehnquist's 19-year tenure as chief justice and adds up the final score on the Rehnquist court. Hudson chronicles the areas in which the Rehnquist court indeed had a substantial, conservative impact on the law and the areas in which the result was more balanced or nuanced. Throughout, Hudson attempts to trace the influence that Rehnquist had on the court as its chief justice. In many areas, Hudson shows, the story of the Rehnquist court was that of the gradual transformation of Rehnquist's lonely, conservative dissents (from his days as an associate justice) into majority opinions, but in others, Rehnquist never managed to bring the full court around to his conservative views. In still other areas, Rehnquist himself took a surprisingly moderate position.

Thus, for example, Hudson confirms the conventional wisdom that the Rehnquist court had perhaps its most substantial, conservative impact in the area of federalism—the relationship between the federal government and the states. The court embraced Rehnquist's vision of states' rights and expanded state autonomy at the expense of federal power (pp. 55–67). By contrast, Hudson shows, Rehnquist was less successful in persuading the full court to join him on social issues. Over dissents by Rehnquist himself, the Rehnquist court limited, but never eliminated, the right of abortion, and it held that states may not criminalize homosexual sex. It also moved only partway toward Rehnquist's views on affirmative action—it held that courts must strictly scrutinize all racial classifications, but it permitted some preferences for members of minority groups in the name of promoting diversity (pp. 125–140). Occasionally, Hudson notes, Rehnquist surprised observers by taking a moderate position and refusing to overrule older, liberal precedents, such as when he personally wrote the opinion reaffirming the requirement that police give *Miranda* warnings to arrested suspects (pp. 111–114).

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Hudson similarly assesses the work of the Rehnquist court in other areas, including freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and criminal law. The strength of the book lies in its simple, clear recitations of the results on numerous legal topics. The reader comes away with a thorough, balanced picture of the work of the Rehnquist court.

On the negative side, the book suffers from its mildness and lack of ambition. The bulk of the book consists of bland accounts of case after case after case—a recitation of facts, a summing up of the court's opinion, a sentence or two from the dissent, perhaps a brief comment from an academic or practicing attorney, then on to the next case. The book does not offer behind-the-scenes accounts of how the court reached its rulings; nor does it provide a great deal of analysis that would deepen one's insight into the cases discussed. It is rather like reliving a baseball season by rereading a year's worth of box scores—accurate but very dry.

For this reason, *The Rehnquist Court* has little to offer the academic reader or the lawyer already familiar with the cases discussed. General readers will find the book a useful, topically arranged catalog of nearly 20 years of Supreme Court decisions. But even they will read the book more with a sense of diligence than enthusiasm.

JONATHAN R. SIEGEL
George Washington University Law School

Boris Yeltsin and Russia's Democratic Transformation *by Herbert J. Ellison. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2006. 313 pp. $30.00.*

A reminder of the profound transformation in Russian politics under the leadership of Boris N. Yeltsin is especially welcome when so much commentary either denies that Russia ever democratized, or purports that democracy has failed. Herbert J. Ellison concentrates on the variable that should occupy the very center of any analysis of any democracy: election returns! He wastes no space discussing such a fashionable but undefinable variable as civil society, nor any on public opinion as measured by ambivalent responses to ambiguous questions posed in surveys. Instead, to explain why the displacement of Soviet dictatorship by Russian democracy has remained incomplete, Ellison repeatedly reverts to Communist electoral strength. By prevailing in every Duma election during Yeltsin's presidency except the first, when the Communists finished second to a hardly less authoritarian party led by Vladimir Zhirinovskii, the Communists continued to assail Russian democrats with the same organizational weapon that complicated Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts at a transition and that had subjected Russia to seven decades of dictatorship.

Perhaps the best passages of Ellison's powerful brief for Yeltsin's achievements against unrelenting opposition concern the Russian President's persistently misunderstood subordination of the new Duma to a variety of presidential

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controls. Until 1993, controlled by a majority coalition of Communists and anti-democratic "patriots" forcing the hand of Yeltsin's erstwhile ally, Ruslan Khasbulatov, the previous legislative branch had obstructed efforts to democratize at every turn. Acting through the legislature's right to appoint the head of the central bank, the Communists deliberately spurred inflation in a successful attempt to hamstring the economic privatization that would otherwise have freed workers' votes from the influence of state appointees in the workplace. They blocked even until the end of Yeltsin's presidency the land reform that would have undone the Communist appointees' control of rural votes through the collective and state farms. Rather than a mistake that doomed Russia to democratic failure, Yeltsin's subjugation of the Duma was the only means of preserving democracy in the face of the Communists' continuing stranglehold on many Russian voters. Of course, the strongest evidence that Russia remains democratic must be the Communists' conversion to working so hard to win elections. Under the Soviet dictatorship, they could take voter support for granted.

Ellison deserves special praise for choosing to restrict himself solely to public evidence. He regales the reader with no tales of doubtful bribes supposedly paid in secret to Duma deputies, or stories of private meetings during which Yeltsin played spoons on the heads of post-Soviet presidents. The "Family" that supposedly ran Russia in Yeltsin's failing years makes no appearance, and even ostensible members are mentioned but once. Even passages from the Russian press are quoted not as hearsay to prove the truth of the matter asserted but instead reliably, as evidence of the viewpoint presented by the journalist quoted. Of course, this absolutely commendable restriction to public evidence comes with the cost that events deliberately concealed, such as the seemingly widespread payment of bribes, the activities of criminal gangs, and the practice of political assassination, cannot figure in the analysis. It is a surprising shortcoming, given Ellison's consistent concern for reliability, that he uses Yeltsin's ghostwritten memoirs, rather unnecessarily, as evidence of the Russian President's own thinking at the time of any given episode. Another deficiency is Ellison's concentration on maneuvers by Russian politicians rather than on the voter behavior to which he so ably shows they were responding. These flaws are minor in a book that richly deserves to be read and taught.

RICHARD D. ANDERSON, JR.
University of California, Los Angeles

Divide and Pacify: Strategic Social Policies and Political Protests in Post-Communist Democracies *by Pieter Vanhuysse. Budapest, CEU Press, 2006. 200 pp. $41.95.*

So many perils were forewarned about Eastern Europe's journey from communism that ultimately never came to be. Among the gloomy predictions was

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an upsurge in social unrest, caused by the inevitable lowering of living standards that accompanies radical economic reform. In fact, the transition from command socialism to mixed markets was remarkable for its lack of sustained social conflict and destabilizing protest politics. This "unexpected quiescence" (p. 22) is the empirical puzzle that Pieter Vanhuysse attempts to sort out in this trim monograph. His research findings suggest that the outcome is best explained by the state's "strategic social policies" designed to "divide and pacify" society.

Vanhuysse first sets up the project by taking issue with previous scholarship, which focused attention on a post-communist revival of protest politics, particularly in Poland. By contrast, he contends that "post-communist transitions, it turns out, have been surprisingly quiescent" (p. 9). To demonstrate, he provides a comparison of strike activity across countries, including six cases from Eastern Europe, six cases from the advanced industrial West, and four from Latin America. The findings show that "post-communist strike cases were muted rather than massive—even in Poland" (p. 21). While Vanhuysse capably makes a good point here, it should also be noted that his basis for comparison makes the Eastern European cases appear a bit more exceptional than perhaps they are. His comparison covers the years 1990–1995 without making sufficient distinctions between when transition policy reforms are enacted and when their effects are felt, which is problematic, to say the least. For example, Poland took the plunge with radical economic reform in 1990, but the harsh social impact did not hit until the next year, 1991, and more so the following year, 1992, which actually coincides with the spike in Polish strike activity. And it seems strange that Belarus made it onto the list, since in 1990 and 1991, it was still part of the command economy of the USSR. Strike activity in Belarus in 1991 was caused by a surge in nationalist sentiment, not a reaction to economic transition.

Next, Vanhuysse argues that existing explanations of political quiescence in the face of socioeconomic adversity are not sufficient. His critique includes three alternative explanations: the economic rationale of strikers, the neocorporatist structure of political institutions, and the "exit" option into the informal economy. Again, this chapter makes some reasonable criticisms generally in pointing out shortcomings in the existing literature, but its attempt to put the kibosh on particular authors tends to go too far. For example, to dispel the argument that tri-partite wage bargaining contributed to labor peace, Vanhuysse draws attention to a 1995 episode in Hungary, in which bargaining broke down and the government imposed harsh reforms, but mass protests did not occur (p. 40). This anecdote aptly demonstrates the need for more nuance with a political institutional argument, but it hardly undermines the position that Eastern Europe's more-inclusive political institutional arrangements help to explain why there has not been more protest politics. Certainly the alternative explanations that Vanhuysse would like to discredit seem more to complement than to contradict his main argument.

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And Vanhuysse is clearly on to something with his main argument—that "strategic social policies" explain the relative weakness of protest politics in Eastern Europe. More specifically, he identifies a governing strategy of "divide and pacify," by which the workers who were most likely to unite in protest were instead turned against one another in a contest for limited economic resources. He shows how policies promoting early retirement (p. 67) enabled post-communist governments to remove older workers with more protest experience and more social ties from the traditional arenas of state–labor contestation. The departure of these particular workers from the labor force weakened the capacity for collective action. In a case study of government manipulation of pension policy, Vanhuysse does a good job of showing how aggrieved social actors in particular economic sectors or regions were politically isolated and/or defused. Moreover, with limited funding available in the state budget, workers and welfare recipients found themselves in competition with each other. Finally, the book makes an important connection between the strategic allocation of welfare benefits and political consolidation of liberal market democracy—something you do not hear much about from the neo-liberals, who like to take credit for east-central Europe's historic transformation.

The book makes a valuable contribution to the political economy of the post-communist transitions. The findings will be of interest to specialists in East European politics as well as generalists in labor and protest politics. It also should be required reading for policy technocrats, who, when it came to Eastern Europe's post-communist transition, were so forthcoming with economic advice and so reticent about political consequences.

GERALD M. EASTER
Boston College

Russia and Postmodern Deterrence: Military Power and Its Challenges for Security *by Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter Jacob Rainow. Dulles, VA, Potomac Books, 2007. 192 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $24.00.*

In their book, Stephen Cimbala and Peter Rainow consider the transformation of the Russian military from the "late modern" Cold War period to its current "postmodern" state (p. 138), using this process to discuss a broad range of issues—from the revolution in military affairs to missile defenses.

The book begins with an analysis of the Soviet military doctrine, which emphasizes the effect that the strategic surprise of 1941 had on Soviet military thinking. The authors then project this "fear of surprise attack" through the Soviet years and all the way to the current era, arguing that this is one of the factors that determine Russia's military policy today, in particular its attitude toward NATO expansion (p. 18). This seems to be a stretch. Even though the Soviet military was certainly influenced by the trauma of 1941, there is little

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evidence that this event had any effect on actual military policy. In fact, the authors themselves observe later in the book that, for example, a surprise nuclear attack "was *not* judged to be the most likely" war scenario by Soviet military thinkers (p. 28, emphasis in the original). Besides, it is unclear to what extent the Soviet military writings of the 1960s and 1970s, on which the conclusions of these chapters are based, are relevant to the analysis of current Russian military policy.

The discussion of nuclear command and control in the next chapter underscores the uncertainties and dangers associated with the launch-on-warning posture of nuclear forces and makes a case for improvements in Russia's command-and-control and early-warning systems that would help it maintain this posture in a safe manner. At the same time, the analyses of nuclear exchange scenarios presented in the chapter do not seem to make a compelling case for launch on warning—the difference between launch-on-warning and ride-out options is relatively small in all of them (pp. 59–60). The model itself and the assumptions that were made also raise some questions. SS-18 missiles, for example, are not mentioned at all, while a silo-based version of the SS-25, which does not exist, is added to the force. But the details of the model are not described, so it is hard to say whether this affected its conclusions.

The chapter devoted to the role of missile defense in U.S.–Russian relations deals mainly with U.S. policy choices, although it does attempt to consider the effect that a missile defense system could have on Russia's deterrence. The model used by the authors suggests that defense might have some effect, which leads them to conclude that at some point, a "very effective defense" can provide a capability to initiate a "first strike followed by acceptable, as opposed to unacceptable, retaliation" (p. 86). Unfortunately, the question of what might constitute "acceptable retaliation," critical for any analysis of missile defense, is left unexplored.

If other chapters deal primarily (although not exclusively) with strategic weapons, the final chapter describes the performance of the Russia Army during the first Chechen war of 1994–1996. This analysis generally supports one of the main conclusions of the book, that is, if Russia wants to remain a major military power, it needs to "engage in a higher level of RMA [revolution in military affairs]" (p. 136). As the authors explain throughout the book, this means building a modern military equipped with a range of conventional-strike weapons systems and creating a cadre of military professionals capable of handling them. This may well be the case, but it may not be enough; as the authors themselves point out, security challenges are evolving, increasingly shifting emphasis to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

PAVEL PODVIG
Stanford University

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Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation *by Madawi al-Rasheed. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 332 pp. $30.00.*

Despite the interest directed at Saudi Arabia in recent years, internal politics there remain shrouded in mystery. Not only do conventional treatments of Saudi Arabia fail to capture its political complexity, they also fail to unravel the political ferment that currently grips the country and pressures the state. Madawi al-Rasheed's superb new study demystifies the major political forces at play there. Hers is a sharp exploration of the political landscape and serves as a major contribution to those interested in religio-political thought in Saudi Arabia today.

It will come as little surprise that religion and politics are deeply interconnected in Saudi Arabia. What is less well understood is the dynamism of Islamist thought, as well as the various ways that Islamists use religion as a medium for both supporting and challenging the authority of the house of Saud. *Contesting the Saudi State* maps out and historicizes the terrain upon which this support and opposition are played out.

Since the eighteenth century, the political authority of successive Saudi states has been premised on a fundamental division of power. In exchange for control of religious and cultural of affairs, religious scholars who follow in the tradition of Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab and who remain closely allied to the al-Saud have lent Saudi rule religious legitimacy. Al-Rasheed argues sharply that it is the political support of these "consenting subjects," those who ascribe to and use their influence to justify the authority of the al-Saud, rather than their doctrinal beliefs, that defines them as *Wahhabi*. Although this compact has been tested over time, it remains a fundamental feature of the contemporary Saudi state.

While Saudi authorities and their religious supporters project themselves as omnipresent and uncontested, religio-political opposition is a key part of political life in the kingdom. Since the early 1970s, several generations of Islamist activists have challenged the Wahhabi–Saudi alliance. The most popular has been the *al-sahwa al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic Awakening), a movement that gained global attention in the early 1990s for criticizing the presence of American troops in the Arabian Peninsula. Several leading members spent time in jail for their activism. While Sahwi clerics were once the leading edge of opposition politics in Saudi Arabia, al-Rasheed expertly demonstrates how today they have recently been almost totally co-opted by the state.

In spite of the retreat of the main Sahwi religious figures, there are several political trends that continue to contest Saudi authority. Perhaps the most visible are Saudi *jihadis*. Many Saudi jihadis received military training and ideological indoctrination on the front lines in Afghanistan. Al-Rasheed carefully points out that this should not distract from the fact that support for

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violent jihad was not imported to Saudi Arabia. Some scholars suggest that this support stemmed from the radicalizing influence of Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brothers on Saudi Islamist thinking, but she argues that domestic religious and political trends inside the kingdom were no less important in birthing violent militancy and influencing it abroad. Al-Rasheed's treatment of Saudi jihadi politics is expertly done and includes a fascinating examination of the performative aspects of jihad, including a close reading of the ways in which Saudi jihadis appeal for public support, in addition to a rich consideration of an important supporter of jihad that maintains a prominent presence on the Internet.

While jihad may be the most visible opposition force operating in Saudi Arabia today, there are others that are more hopeful and constructive, including Islamic activists that since 2003, have been calling publicly for political reform rooted in religious thought. Al-Rasheed sees these, alongside several influential opposition figures in exile, as the forces that may eventually lead to the dismantling of authoritarian rule in Saudi Arabia.

TOBY JONES
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The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor *by William Langewiesche. New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2007. 192 pp. $22.00.*

In December of 1975, nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter and his colleagues at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency published a report, "Moving Toward Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd," which assessed the connections between atomic weapons and civilian nuclear energy. (An abridged version later appeared in *Minerva* XV [Autumn–Winter 1977]: 387–538.) The report warned that "by 1985, according to their plans in 1975, nearly 40 countries [would] have enough chemically separable plutonium for a few bombs." They were not the first to worry about the spread of nuclear weapons; already, in 1963, then-Defense Secretary Robert McNamara had compiled a list of 19 potential proliferators—including China, Israel, and India, as well as East Germany and Czechoslovakia. In the event, the much-feared explosion of nuclear weapons states never happened; we are now in 2007, and the number of nuclear weapons states is still less than 10.

Once again, however, there is widespread concern that nuclear weapons will become the "poor man's bomb"—a role once occupied by chemical weapons—and even fall into the hands of terrorists, since any country with money and intent can acquire the necessary materials and build atomic devices virtually guaranteed to work. This, at least, is the assertion made by William Langewiesche, who describes the bomb dropped on Hiroshima as a "device of the sort that any number of people could build in a garage" (p. 3). Yet, Langewiesche also suggests that few people could, or would, attempt such a

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project in their garage. The widely held contention that atomic bombs are well within the grasp of international terrorists is, he suggests, mostly wrong on the details. Acquiring the necessary nuclear materials to build either a gun-type uranium bomb or an implosion-type plutonium bomb would be difficult, unless the materials were bought or stolen from places such as Russia, where massive stores of both are sometimes poorly secured and accounted for. And assembling atomic devices is not a risk-free proposition: radiation, engineering, or premature "fizzles" could all cause a project to fail. Nor is there any glory or martyrdom in dying in a garage rather than at Ground Zero. Still, notwithstanding reports of black markets in nuclear materials in Eastern Europe, no "stateless nukes" have ever turned up anywhere in the world.

How, then, did countries such as Pakistan and North Korea acquire their bombs?

Here is where Langewiesche demonstrates his journalistic bona fides, providing a detailed and compelling account of the adventures of A.Q. Khan. Khan is the Pakistani engineer who operated, in almost full view of the nuclear weapons states and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and with the blessing of the government of Pakistan, an illicit international network in the trade of nuclear blueprints, technologies, and skills. For a number of years, Khan had worked for European companies specializing in devices such as uranium centrifuges and was able, with very little trouble, to walk away from them with detailed plans and critical equipment. After returning to Pakistan, he oversaw the building of a uranium bomb, managing to acquire almost all of the necessary raw materials and equipment either by subterfuge or on the black market.

Inasmuch as the legal market in nuclear technologies is under the close control of various national and international authorities who are loathe to facilitate proliferation (although not necessarily the spread of nuclear reactors), Khan found a significant demand for his skills, knowledge, and equipment among nuclear "have-nots" such as North Korea, Iran, Libya, and others. Until Pakistan finally put a stop to his activities, under intense pressure from the United States, as a result of the global war on terror, Khan's network seemed destined to create the much-feared "nuclear-armed crowd" on its own.

Langewiesche is not one of those observers who believe that only the original five—Russia, China, France, the UK, and the United States—are responsible nuclear-armed states; indeed, he severely condemns their failure to fulfill those provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that require the Five to engage in a serious and concerted program of nuclear disarmament. Rather, Langewiesche is somewhat fatalistic. He believes that the diplomacy of nuclear nonproliferation must continue even as we will have to find "the courage ... to accept the equalities of a maturing world in which many countries have acquired atomic bombs, and some may use them" (p. 178).

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Such acceptance and maturity might even motivate a real international attempt to do away with nuclear weapons and nuclear desire.

RONNIE D. LIPSCHUTZ
University of California, Santa Cruz

Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village *by Daniel H. Deudney. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2006. 384 pp. $35.00.*

In an original and theoretically rich enterprise to integrate forgotten strands of political theory, Daniel Deudney shows that all international relations theories are the offspring of a single ancient concept of republicanism. In a challenging text that draws attention to numerous Renaissance and Enlightenment sources, as well as neglected twentieth-century works, from Charles de Montesquieu, James Madison, John Dewey, H.G.Wells, and others, Deudney presents a unified theory of international relations that he calls *republican security theory.* Security restraint republicanism is composed of two problematiques—anarchy interdependence (divided into first, second, and third order) and hierarchy restraint. "In simple terms, a 'republic' is a plural political order marked by political freedom, popular sovereignty, and limited government" (p. 13). Within this framework, states are conceived of as equal members of a global republic that is the world state system. Within this global republic, as within each individual republic, members seek to protect themselves from violence and to prevent any one party from holding extreme power. "It is thus the core claim of republican security theory that situations of anarchy combined with intense violence interdependence are fundamentally perilous for security, and that in this situation government, some authoritatively binding agreement of restraint, is necessary for security" (p. 35).

Ultimately, republicanism is a mix of an understanding of anarchy and threat (neorealism), a desire for equality among states (neoliberal institutions), and a convergence of ideas (constructivism), showing that far from being polar opposites, all three strands of international relations theory are intimately related. Realism and liberalism are effectively two sides of the republican coin, with liberalism devoted to the protection of freedom and realism to the protection of physical security (survival). Republicanism is devoted to avoiding violence, unrestrained anarchy, and hierarchy—liberals do this with checks and balances through institutions and also through ideas, realists do this with a balance of power and relative capabilities. Moreover, "the three core polar Liberal ideas of democratic peace, commercial peace, and international unions are straightforwardly from republican security theory" (p. 87).

The discussion of the "Natural Republic of Europe" in chapter 5 shows the process of twentieth-century European integration in a new light, with a

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broader historical basis than is commonly presented, and will be of great value to European scholars as well as integration scholars. The discussion of the "Philadelphian System" in chapter 6 is perhaps the only relating of a distinctly American political theory to modern international relations. Drawn largely from the *Federalist Papers* of Madison (as Publius), the Philadelphian federal system of checks and balances to control the central government and factions has until now not been considered for its international applications, but for Deudney it is of critical influence. Deudney claims that "federal union is much more important than democratic peace in the actual historical development of republican polities over the last two centuries" and thus argues that Publius (Madison), and not Immanual Kant, "is the crowning achievement of Enlightenment republicanism" (p. 181). On closer examination, this idea translates into a twentieth-century global system of institutions championed by the United States under its own hegemony, giving rise to neoliberal institutionalism. He is probably right that American ideas of federalism are most influential, but unless we can disaggregate the impact of American political theory from American power, we can only conclude that ideology converges around capability. Even the democratic peace idea did not catch on until a unipolar United States adopted it as a pillar of its foreign policy. Nevertheless, the argument that eighteenth-century American political thought can translate well into modern international relations is fascinating.

Where the book is weak is in its criticisms of neorealism. It was often difficult to distinguish many of Deudney's new concepts from Kenneth Waltz's structural theory. For example, despite the author's extensive argument, it is unclear how structural-materialist or material contextual restraint or global-industrial material context is substantially different from relative capabilities, just how physiopolitics is distinct from geopolitics, why geography is not part of relative capabilities, or why hierarchy restraint is anything but a balance of power. Deudney's material-contextual restraints impede hierarchy, just as Waltz's relative capabilities-balancing impedes hegemony. It is also unclear why degrees of anarchy giving rise to degrees of threat (or Deudney's *violence interdependence*) need to be given a new name in Deudney's first anarchy, second anarchy, and third anarchy. Or why global republican government is not a form of self-help alliance with specific (institutional) attributes. Waltz does not ignore violence, as Deudney claims; he emphasizes threat (or violence and war). Anarchy is constant; it is the intensity of threat that changes. Often it appears to this reviewer that the idea of republican security theory is one and the same with neorealism, only with different terminology.

There is, however, one specific point that indeed is under-utilized by contemporary scholars, and that is that *violence interdependence* means that we, too, can be as much of a threat to others as they are to us, and thus we need *mutual restraint*. "Thus while neorealists tend to ignore or discount the role of interdependence in their continuing analysis of violence, neoliberal theorists tend to drop violence in their analysis of interdependence. Thus emerges the

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situation in which one school of international theory focuses on violence, the other on interdependence, and neither on violence interdependence" (p. 83). Instead, republican security theory centers on mutual restraint—something evident even in Thucydides. One thing we all need to think hard about is that we too, and not just they, are possible aggressors or potentially violent; thus we, too, would/should want to be restrained. The concept of *negarchy* as an alternative to either anarchy or hierarchy in a republican security structure also deserves more consideration, particularly within the European Union. "Actors in hierarchies are in ordinate and subordinate relation; actors in anarchies are not authoritatively ordered; and actors in negarchies are authoritatively ordered by relations of mutual restraint" (p. 48).

Finally, the idea of a global republic may sound appealing on a number of levels. One implication, however, is that republicanism in domestic politics is not a democracy—that is, not everyone gets a voice in decision making. Does republicanism in international politics, then, also mean that not all states will have a say in global governance? If so, might this not smack of a new kind of imperialism? These questions are unanswered. Deudney concludes on a positive note on the prospects of a global republic. Considering his discussion of violence interdependence, I would be more skeptical. If, as he argues, government is unnecessary for security when violence interdependence is either weak or strong (and only necessary when it is intense), where actors can harm but not destroy one another (that is, where survival is not in question), then we might not need global government, so long as only a few states (perhaps still only two) are fully capable of destroying each other in the nuclear era.

Readers will find much to argue about here, but that is one of the hallmarks of a good book. Deudney reminds us that there is much more to international relations theory than is normally thought. *Bounding Power* could easily have drawn out even more, and anyone who reads it will surely anticipate future works by the author on this topic.

ANASTASIA XENIAS
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UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality *by Andrzej Sitkowski. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2007. 208 pp. $49.95.*

Council Unbound: The Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Cold War *by Michael J. Matheson. Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006. 422 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $19.95.*

Following its political gridlock during the Cold War, ensured by the dueling vetoes of the superpowers, the United Nations (UN) Security Council has

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been freed to serve a far more active and expansive role in international security affairs. As the Council has been unleashed, so has a literature on the political and legal evolution of this important institution.

In *UN Peacekeeping*, Andrzej Sitkowski reveals the emotion—and, at times, the cynicism—of someone with firsthand experience working with the UN in conflict situations. He offers a devastating and comprehensive critique of UN peacekeeping; virtually no government, international agency, or individual is spared. The book starts from a compelling premise: that those in and around the UN have clung to the paradigm of traditional peacekeeping—based on impartiality, consent of the parties, and reluctance to use force—with unwarranted vigor and often with tragic results.

Through case studies of UN missions in the Middle East (involving Israel and its neighbors), the Congo, Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, Sitkowski argues that more-effective coercive options were repeatedly eschewed out of allegiance to the old paradigm. He offers detailed histories of these episodes and powerful anecdotes of UN dysfunction. Sitkowski is stingy with his praise, saving it for a few diplomats and military commanders who showed assertiveness in interpreting mandates from New York, and for Kofi Annan, whom he credits as the first Secretary-General to engage in real self-criticism of the UN's peacekeeping role.

A virtue of the book is that it reaches back in time to unite the traditional peacekeeping missions of the Cold War with the "peacebuilding" and "peace enforcement" interventions of the last two decades, demonstrating significant continuity in the philosophy of peacekeeping at the UN and a chronic failure to apply lessons from the past. The book's weakness is that it lacks balance at times. Sitkowski understates the degree to which UN staff and troop-contributing countries are constrained by the Security Council and broader geo-political forces. Moreover, some of the most damning critiques of individuals and organizations are not backed up by evidence, leaving the reader to rely on the author's impressions and assertions. Finally, more recognition of the UN's successes and more effort to explain the conditions under which success can arise out of a flawed peacekeeping system would give the book more theoretical impact.

Nevertheless, Sitkowski makes a clear and compelling argument: the UN and its most powerful members should either intervene thoroughly, providing troops with the resources and flexibility to defend themselves and their mandate, or not at all. He recommends a division of labor for future operations. In situations that are likely to require the use of force, the UN should abandon the "false promise of peacekeeping" (p. 152) and instead focus on its strengths: mediation, conflict prevention, and humanitarian relief. When the deployment of military forces is required, the Security Council should defer to ad hoc coalitions—led by powerful states or regional alliances, such as NATO—with the ability (and willingness) to use "all necessary means."

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In *Council Unbound*, Michael J. Matheson outlines the evolving legal authority of the Security Council and provides a nice overview of its conflict-related activities since the Cold War. He shows that the end of the Cold War did more than simply unleash the Council's authority as provided in the Charter, it produced "an interpretation and application of that authority more expansive than what the Charter's founders might have contemplated" (p. 41). This trend is demonstrated with chapters on sanctions, peacekeeping, the use of force, technical commissions, and criminal tribunals.

Matheson finds the Council's extensive use of its power to authorize force to be the most important recent development. In particular, the basis for action under Chapter VII has widened to include internal conflicts and even domestic situations with the mere potential to produce conflict, such as humanitarian crises, repression, and threats to democracy. Another shift includes the invocation of Chapter VII to deal with what Matheson calls "generic" threats to peace not tied to any particular conflict, such as terrorism and proliferation. He sees few legal constraints on this expanding power.

When it comes to peacekeeping and the use of force, Matheson echoes Sitkowski in many ways, noting that contemporary peacekeeping is more complex and coercive and therefore requires larger forces, robust resources and rules of engagement, and the political fortitude to persevere in the face of resistance. He also favors clear mandates that are not hamstrung by the impartiality principle when a realistic assessment of the situation calls for choosing sides. For major combat operations, Matheson advocates that the Security Council delegate to great powers and regional organizations with sufficient capabilities. In such cases, he argues for maximum flexibility: the UN should coordinate activities and receive reports from non-UN military forces but should not interfere in military operations.

Overall, while clearly cognizant of the system's flaws, Matheson provides a far more positive assessment of Council activities and is more sanguine about the future than Sitkowski. In his view, the expansion of the Council's legal authority is a salutary development that allows the international community to act against collective threats. Nevertheless, Matheson rightly notes that the Council's effectiveness depends on political consensus and will, "which in turn requires both leadership and compromise by the United States and other major players" (p. 39). This theme of political will is repeated throughout the volume. Unfortunately, however, political issues, within UN bureaucracies and among member states, are largely set aside in the book, so we do not get a sense of when the requisite political will is likely to be present and what political forces are the greatest threats to effectiveness.

Both books merit a close read. The Sitkowski book is most recommended for UN mavens familiar with peacekeeping history and debates and able to put his provocative arguments in perspective. The Matheson book, with its broad coverage of contemporary Security Council activities, should be useful for a

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wide audience and would be appropriate for advanced courses on international law, international organization, and the UN.

ALEXANDER THOMPSON
Ohio State University

Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia *by S. Paul Kapur. Palo Alto, CA, Stanford University Press, 2007. 280 pp. $24.95.*

Scholars often assume that after decades of intense study during the Cold War, the political effects of nuclear weapons are well understood. The innovative arguments in S. Paul Kapur's *Dangerous Deterrent*, which explores the consequences of India's and Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict between them, suggest that much room remains for insightful scholarship.

Kapur begins by using statistical analysis to establish a strong correlation between nuclear weapons proliferation and conventional conflict between the two sides, a welcome methodological addition to a literature that tends to cherry-pick cases. The book subsequently explores causal relationships through a series of thorough case studies; impressively, these draw on interviews the author secured with both the current Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, and his predecessor, Benazir Bhutto.

Kapur observes that Pakistan initiated most of the nuclear-era disputes. He argues that Islamabad has been emboldened to pursue revisionist aims in Kashmir because fear of escalation to the nuclear level inhibits Indian conventional escalation. Further, nuclear danger draws international mediation perceived to strengthen Pakistan's negotiating hand.

Kapur contrasts these dynamics with the much-cited nuclear–conventional "stability–instability paradox," arguing that in South Asia, nuclear or strategic *in*stability, and not stability, drives conventional instability. By suggesting that nuclear danger sometimes foments sub-nuclear conflict, Kapur contrasts his findings with those of proliferation optimists and deterrence theorists, who hold that nuclear danger deters conflict. Although Kapur agrees with the conclusions of proliferation pessimists, he sees the political, technical, and organizational pathologies they emphasize as merely reinforcing underlying behavioral incentives.

For all its strengths, the book has some shortcomings. Perhaps choosing to emphasize theoretical parsimony, Kapur essentially treats the degree of strategic stability as an externally imposed condition, rather than a product of the actions and perceptions of the two sides, and therefore as malleable in intended and unintended ways. This is particularly significant because the book's arguments suggest that strategic stability benefits India more than it does Pakistan. This could help explain Pakistani behavior that perplexes some

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Indian and international observers, such as the destabilizing, first-strike-bolstering nuclear-capable cruise missile that Islamabad is currently developing.

While Kapur considers variation in conventional arsenals and distinguishes between opaque and overt nuclear postures, he makes no further quantitative or qualitative distinctions with regard to either nuclear arsenals or the conventional capabilities that could defeat them. This is marginally tenable in the Indo-Pakistani case, where the two sides deploy roughly equal forces and where, at present, neither possesses either a plausible conventional or nuclear first-strike capability against the other side's nuclear forces. It is less tenable when Kapur suggests that if North Korea has revisionist preferences, we should expect its few and primitive nuclear weapons to embolden it to pursue territorial aggrandizement through conventional force against the U.S.–South Korean alliance.

Kapur argues that nuclear weapons only embolden conventionally weaker states such as Pakistan, because stronger states such as India are free to undertake revisionist actions even without nuclear weapons. This poses the question of how great asymmetries need to be and whether nuclear weapons have any effects on states whose antagonists have roughly equal conventional capabilities. Kapur's arguments about the behavior of weaker states like Pakistan are consistent with those of Robert Jervis and others who have observed that the potential for escalation risk manipulation entails effects for nuclear weapons beyond merely deterrence in kind. But the extant literature suggests that these dynamics are likely to apply broadly, including potentially to equally capable and more capable states.

Finally, Kapur does not address whether the dynamics he describes are transient or enduring, and if the former, how long they are likely to last. His description of Pakistani military adventurism triggering unexpectedly robust Indian responses suggests that through trial and error, the two sides may be moving toward a more stable nuclear relationship. To those skeptical of the broader effects of nuclear weapons, this is likely to raise the question of whether India and Pakistan are learning—the hard way, and with some risk of nuclear catastrophe along the way—that while nuclear weapons are useful for deterring nuclear and non-nuclear threats to national survival, they are not useful for much else.

PHILIPP C. BLEEK
Georgetown University and Center for Strategic and International Studies

Ethnicity and Electoral Politics *by Jóhanna Kristín Birnir. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 280 pp. $85.00.*

Few assumptions are as entrenched in the public and scholarly mind as the belief that ethnicity and politics are a combustible combination. Witness Slobodan

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Milosevic's tearing asunder the former Yugoslavia under the flag of Serbian nationalism, Basque bombs that have lit up Spain for decades, or the genocidal turn of the Rwandan Hutus in 1994 that resulted in as many as one million murders. Prominent scholars have labored for decades to propose institutional solutions to ethnically divided societies in order to promote, if not harmony, at least political stability. Ethnic politics is cast as a seductive temptation that risks cracking societies into intransigent, entrenched camps.

Jóhanna Birnir's fundamental insight is to note that in spite of these memorable tragedies, ethnic politics exists in many places without devolving into violence. On the basis of this observation, she develops the argument that ethnic politics can actually produce political stability in emerging and maturing democracies. This is so, according to her Ethnic Attractors model, because she assumes that voters in new democracies lack established political party affiliations and use ethnicity as an informational shortcut to organize around one of their most enduring identities. Ethnic political parties—or parties that incorporate appeals to ethnic groups and interests—can therefore help a new democracy crystallize around viable parties that in turn contribute to the stability of the new system.

But clearly there are circumstances under which ethnic parties lead to fundamental challenges to the state or that result in political violence. The important issue, then, is to identify the conditions under which ethnic parties produce stability versus instability. By assuming that ethnic voters are not intransigent, passionate primordialists, Birnir aligns herself with the constructivist or instrumentalist strand of theorizing about ethnicity. In keeping with this school of thought, Birnir asserts that voters will use ethnicity as a tool for mobilizing and for acquiring political information, but that the ultimate goal is to share in political power. For Birnir, therefore, it is those ethnic parties that are systematically excluded from power—by virtue of never participating in government, or of holding too few seats in Parliament to sway political outcomes—that become disaffected and veer toward violence.

This is an intuitively appealing corrective to much of the overly nervous tone that pervades discussions about ethnic politics, and it is one that Birnir supports with a welter of research. She follows what David Laitin has called a tripartite methodological strategy that includes a formal model, statistical analysis, and deep and detailed case studies. There is, in short, something for every taste, and enough of each to satisfy almost everyone's appetite. Her Ethnic Attractors model is formalized in an appendix, but its logic is laid out in plain English in a chapter that is easy to follow for the non-mathematically minded. Two of the book's chapters undertake detailed statistical analysis of questions relevant to her study, namely, an examination of the ethnic stability hypothesis in 60 new democratic party systems from five continents since 1945, and a study of the long-term effects of ethnic voting and of ethnic exclusion from government on regime stability in almost 40 countries. She supplements these with two chapters containing rich analytic narratives of ethnic politics in

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Romania, Bulgaria, and Spain that are informed by her time spent in each of these countries.

This is an excellent book. Although it will appeal mostly to scholars and to graduate students, and although some of the ideas it contains are not quite as new or as divergent as the author sometimes implies, the heart of the argument is one that should be carefully considered by policymakers and undergraduates as well: namely, that ethnic political mobilization and ethnic parties can help produce democratic stability, and that systematic ethnic exclusion from political power is the greatest danger of all.

ERIK BLEICH
Middlebury College

Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency *by Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 300 pp. $28.00.*

State, federal, and transnational policies now frequently contain information disclosure as an essential part of their regulatory strategy. Examples include pollution inventories, sex offender registries, and school performance disclosure. Since the costs of information dissemination are expected to decrease with improvements in communications technology, such transparency policies are also likely to become increasingly prominent in the future. Revenue accounting systems to counter national corruption, nutrition disclosure for restaurant food, and carbon labels estimating product-specific greenhouse gases are but a few proposals for new information policies.

Full Disclosure examines the emergence and effectiveness of transparency programs. It defines transparency, reviews the policy context, establishes a conceptual framework, dissects successful and unsuccessful policies, and considers the future of mandatory information disclosure. Key questions include: What factors contributed to the rapid emergence of transparency policies? Do transparency policies work? And, if so, how? Eighteen major case studies, a convincing qualitative model, and a superb synthesis of a rich and growing multidisciplinary literature provide answers.

People seem to have strongly held beliefs about transparency, suspecting that information policies are either a panacea or a substandard political compromise. This book's fundamental insight is that neither belief is correct. Transparency policies can achieve an issuing agency's goals, but effective disclosure requires the appropriate context, careful ex-ante design, and persistent ex-post revisions. Evidence from successful programs, like corporate financial disclosure and restaurant hygiene grade-cards, and unsuccessful policies, like mass layoff disclosure and national threat advisories, reveals that disseminated information must be simple, understandable, and standardized. Further, the disclosed information must be actionable. For example, while it is clear how

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sanitation grades might affect restaurant patrons' choices, it is less clear how national threat levels changing from yellow to orange might affect the average citizen's behavior. Evidence also suggests that transparency policies must be enforceable, enforced in practice, designed to benefit at least some of the disclosers themselves, and flexible, to remain accurate and dependable over time.

Despite the book's comprehensive and insightful analysis of the history and efficacy of transparency policies, important questions remain unanswered. Most notably, it is not clear when, if ever, targeted transparency is the optimal response to a given risk, market failure, or public service limitation. In other words, while the book reveals how and when disclosure policies work, it does not generally reveal how and when these policies are preferred to other regulatory options. Criteria might include goal attainment, cost effectiveness, or distributional consequences. This limitation, however, is acknowledged by the authors and represents a weakness of the state of knowledge rather than of the book itself.

In sum, should you read *Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency*? Yes. It is fantastically researched and excellently written. While it does not answer every important question about transparency, it adeptly answers many critical ones. I suspect it is destined to become the definitive book in the area, and I recommend it to academics commencing or conducting disclosure research, policymakers considering or refining information programs, and decision makers concerned about the impact of transparency on the organizational bottom line. Further, since the book is an accessible and relatively entertaining case study of politics, policy, and governance, it should appeal to the general reader interested in democracy in action.

JAY P. SHIMSHACK
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Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security *by Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon. New York, Basic Books, 2006. 224 pp. $26.00.*

Repeatedly in American history, during the Civil War, after Vietnam, and especially in the wake of September 11, the Republican Party has gained political "ownership" of national security issues, skillfully identifying Republicans in the public mind as strong and patriotic and Democrats as weak and disloyal. Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon, two smart and experienced Washington analysts, aim to break this electoral advantage. They encourage Democrats to rediscover the moxie that their predecessors Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy displayed during the Cold War and "come to admit, comfortably and unambiguously, that military strength constitutes a critical element in maintaining peace" (p. 43).

Hard Power sets itself a difficult task: blending serious nonpartisan policy analysis with political advice on framing national security issues for post–

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Vietnam-era Democrats known for their stereotypical aversion to the military and the use of force. The authors recognize the benefits of multilateralism, diplomacy, American culture, democratic values, and other elements of what Joseph Nye aptly calls "soft power" (Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2004). Like Nye, Campbell and O'Hanlon stress the complementary need for "hard power," particularly the use of military means to achieve national goals. The comparative advantage Democrats and moderates possess in promoting "soft power" will amount to little "unless they can master the first-order matters of traditional national security—that is, how and when to put force on targets" (p. 9).

In what will be unwelcome advice in some Democratic circles, the authors also recommend that "hard power Democrats, independents, and moderate Republicans" not run "against the Bush legacy on matters of ideas so much as of seriousness, competence, and execution" (p. 77). Campbell and O'Hanlon do not favor a radical new vision for America's role in the world. They are internationalists, ready to confront threats to the United States and to selectively undertake humanitarian interventions. *Hard Power* highlights the complexity of combating *jihadist* violence and the concomitant need for political, economic, and educational reforms in many Islamic states. But it skirts larger strategic debates, such as whether global counter-terrorist operations reinforce the resentments that gave rise to al Qaeda or whether Washington has been seduced by primacy into self-defeating over-estimations of what its considerable military power can accomplish at an acceptable cost.

On Iraq, the authors accept that there was a case for ousting Saddam Hussein and warn that a precipitous U.S. military withdrawal might worsen the situation. Thus, although Republican bungling of the war substantially dispels the myth of their superiority in matters of hard power, Campbell and O'Hanlon warn that Democrats still need to be serious, informed, and credible on national security.

Other chapters range widely and thoughtfully, from homeland security, defense procurement, and terrorist financing to nuclear nonproliferation, energy security, and the rise of China. The authors want to increase the size of the active-duty army by 50,000, scale back missile defense, and cut in half the F/A 22 program, but not substantially change the size of the defense budget. They also favor creating a State Department response force (with thousands of civilian reservists) to manage post-conflict situations, and regional National Guard planning centers to improve the response to national emergencies.

The authors pass up the chance to warn political leaders about the tendency to repeat avoidable errors—such as resorting to military half-measures instead of defining less-ambitious goals when stakes are low or maintaining a pretense of impartiality by modest interventionary forces in armed conflicts, which may prolong the killing (as the noted political scientist Richard Betts argues), instead of first deciding who the United States wants to win before committing U.S. forces. Similarly, the book's thoughtful discussion of civil–military relations should go further to show how constructive push-back by

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both political and military leaders helps avert misadventures and costly miscalculations about the conduct and consequences of war.

CYNTHIA ROBERTS
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Local Democracy Under Siege: Activism, Public Interests, and Private Politics *by Dorothy Holland, Donald M. Nonini, Catherine Lutz, Lesley Bartlett, Marla Frederick-McGlathery, Thaddeus C. Gulbrandsen, and Enrique G. Murillo, Jr. New York, NYU Press, 2007. 368 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $22.00.*

These case studies of local democracy suggest that market-driven local governance delivers less than ideal outcomes for many citizens, and they point to the difficulty of using community-based organizations as a solution to inequalities in local governance. The analysis is organized around case studies of five geographic areas in North Carolina (two issues per case). They illustrate a cycle of economic change that affects government and citizens: productive industries decline, jobs are lost, local economies worsen, and large-scale economic changes occur. Citizens who are least able to express political voice are hurt most by economic shifts. This inexpressiveness leads to further concentration of political power and influence in the hands of a few people, particularly people with interests in real estate, finance, development, and affiliated industries.

For example, Durham's redevelopment resulted in a boom for some and a bust for most minorities and the poor. Poor blacks and poor whites are badly represented, but the authors argue that race allows observers to discount the problems of poor whites by blaming problems on race, leading them to attribute inequalities to race and not to their structural causes. Presumably, the demise of racial categories would result in a rise of class consciousness that could produce more political engagement.

The authors discuss the devolution of financing and authority from the national government to local governments, claiming that it has centralized power in the national government. Shutting off the downward flow of money increased local responsibility for policymaking while decreasing local capacity and funding ability, reserving those powers for the national government. Bond rating systems are viewed as the "new fiscal overlords of local governments" (p. 113). Bond ratings are crucial to local governments, and governments sometimes fail to act, out of fear that their actions could result in downgraded bonds. This leads to cautious decision making, which reinforces existing political circumstances.

A case study of the battle over the establishment of an asphalt plant in a rural county in the Blue Ridge Mountains illustrates the changing politics of rural North Carolina. The development scheme resulted in a coalition of pro-development elective officials, businesses that would benefit from the roads the asphalt would cover, and long-time citizens, many of whom were put off

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by the confrontational political styles of newcomers who opposed the plant's construction on aesthetic and environmental grounds, leading to a win by forces of development and tradition. The authors recognize that despite short-term triumphs, the traditional political style will cease to be relevant as power accrues to the transplants and outsiders, who may view the old style of politics with nostalgia. When that happens, another, possibly even less-inclusive system will exist.

The authors recommend "empowered participatory governance" structures to enhance local democracy. This system requires that the central government allow local governments to make decisions and that it help coordinate actions among levels of government. It also assumes that problem solving will be state centered rather than private or voluntary. Thus, the system requires that two major features of contemporary American governance be reversed, so the prognosis for success is cautious. This is the problem with most changes: they butt against sometimes intransigent political, institutional, and behavioral features of local areas and, as result, may succeed only in very rare cases. Organizations rarely succeed in their initial attempt to affect policies, and the most successful organizations are those that are able to develop standing in the community's political affairs. This is difficult, given the importance of economic development in everything local governments do; organizations that affect economic development in some way (or that are geared toward profit making) are more likely to succeed than those with social, religious, or other focuses. Activist groups are self-selecting and, as a result, introduce the same problems of representation that otherwise exist. In the end, these cases nicely illustrate the problems that plague local democracy, but they offer no firm solutions.

CHARLES BARRILLEAUX
Florida State University

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

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





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

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

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

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

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

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

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



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

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

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

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

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

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

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





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

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